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ABSTRACT
In this thesis the problem of planning under uncertainty is examined. A classification 
of uncertainty is given with the purpose of identifying those areas where traditional 
methods for planning under uncertainty fail to prescribe suitable courses of action. 
Traditional planning methods have increasingly proved inadequate in their handling of 
the uncertainty inherent in complex and turbulent environments. Methodologies 
suitable to planning under uncertainty should attempt to preserve future flexibility, by 
keeping options open for later resolution.
This thesis describes the development of Scenario-Robustness Methodology (SRM), 
a flexible methodology for planning under uncertainty. SRM uses scenario analysis 
to develop alternative futures, and robustness analysis to determine the most flexible 
options under those futures, for both the short and long term. A new criterion is 
proposed for evaluating the consequences of initial decisions in terms both of the 
positive options which are maintained and of the undesirable options still left open. 
This criterion is a composite measure which enables decision-makers to give relative 
weights to positive outcomes (robustness) or negative outcomes (debility), by varying 
a key parameter.
A number of alternative measures of uncertainty which may be employed in a 
planning situation characterized by a set of initial decisions and a set of alternative 
future scenarios, are also examined. The coefficient of concordance W is found to be 
the most useful of such measures.
An example is given of the application of SRM to an HIV/AIDS-related resource 
allocation problem. Planning for HIV/AIDS is selected as a suitable area of 
application because of the uncertainties surrounding the nature of the disease, the 
availability of treatments and their timing, and the size of the planned for population. 
SRM is used to assist in structuring the problem and to identify those initial 
commitments which are preferable in terms of flexibility. The problem structuring 
capability of SRM is of particular value since it initiates a process of reflection and 
negotiation which helps to incorporate in the analysis, in addition to flexibility, other 
relevant factors which will shape the final selection of an appropriate course of action.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND THESIS OUTLINE
The current stage and form of social organization generates problems which make 
planning essential in the environment of institutional decision-making. Uncertainty, 
complexity, and conflict are inherent in planning problems and past experiences show 
that there is a strong need for flexible decision-making.
Businesses and public agencies operate in an increasingly turbulent environment, in 
which future trajectories of events cannot be predicted with certainty. Striking 
examples of this volatility include the oil crises of the 1970’s, the transformation of the 
political map of Eastern Europe, successive revolutions in computer technology, the 
recent NHS reforms, and the emergence of AIDS, to name but a few. Such conditions 
of uncertainty cannot be accommodated by traditional planning methodologies which 
were largely developed for the conditions of the 1960's, a period of relatively steady 
economic expansion. In today's turbulent environment, new methodologies designed 
to recognize the presence of uncertainty and the possibility of rapid and radical changes 
need to be developed, so as to enable appropriate and effective responses to be made to 
the changing circumstances.
The current work presents a new methodology for planning under complexity and 
uncertainty, and applies it to the problem of planning the provision of health services to 
persons infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and to those who 
have developed the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). To this end, a 
microcomputer based model, AIDSPLAN, has been developed as a tool to assist the 
decision-making process in conjunction with the new planning methodology.
11
C hapter I: Introduction an d  T hesis O utline
The following chapter deals with uncertainty as a factor which renders traditional 
methodologies inappropriate for present-day organizational planning, and also with the 
inflexibility which arises as a result of the implementation of such methodologies, 
rather than as a result of the structural organization of the activities which give rise to 
the need for planning. A review and critique of existing traditional planning 
methodologies is followed by a discussion of the required properties of methodologies 
for planning under conditions of uncertainty. A review of alternative methodologies 
which recognize the presence of uncertainty is given with special emphasis on 
metagame theory and robustness analysis. Finally a set of criteria to evaluate and 
interpret the results of robustness analysis is proposed.
The need for flexibility when planning under uncertainty is discussed in Chapter 3. 
Alternative definitions of flexibility are given together with a discussion of flexibility 
and other properties related to i t
Chapter 4 presents the foundations of a new framework for planning under conditions 
of uncertainty. This methodology is called Scenario-Robustness Methodology (SRM) 
and is based on robustness analysis with elements of scenario analysis. Scenario 
analysis itself is described first, followed by the new methodology.
Chapter 5 proposes a set of measures of uncertainty when a number of initial decisions 
are considered and where a number of alternative scenarios about the future have been 
constructed. The most promising of these measures is the coefficient of concordance 
between system performance under the various scenarios.
The ideas presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are applied in Chapter 7 to an example of 
HIV/AIDS planning situation, using AIDSPLAN, a decision support system, as an 
option-scanning tool. Chapter 6 provides the necessary background on HIV/AIDS- 
related planning, and is divided into four sections: The first of these describes the 
disease itself, the second discusses available treatments, and the third identifies the
12
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uncertainties associated with planning for AIDS. The fourth section discusses 
HIV/AIDS-related modelling and explains the purposes for which the HIV/AIDS 
planning model, AIDSPLAN, was developed. This model is described more fully in 
Appendix I.
Finally, Chapter 8 gives a summary of the thesis and the conclusions reached and 
identifies areas where further research might be indicated.
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CHAPTER 2 
PLANNING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
2.1 Introduction
Definitions of planning commonly refer to it as a process activated by the need to 
achieve some objective in a formulated or organised method. Both the form and 
content of planning have been the subject of extensive study over the last thirty years. 
The form of planning has been examined by planning theory, whereas theory in 
planning deals with its content Within planning theory three main positions have been 
articulated: rational comprehensive planning, disjointed incrementalism, and mixed 
scanning which, as its name suggests, takes features of both the other two positions.
An examination of the three approaches will point out the weaknesses of both rational 
comprehensive planning and disjointed incrementalism in handling uncertainty, and will 
argue that mixed scanning is the most promising alternative. Indeed, this thesis will 
propose a method for planning under uncertainty which can best be seen as an example 
of the mixed scanning approach.
We cannot, however, proceed with the development of a method for planning under 
uncertainty, without making some preliminary remarks about the nature of this 
uncertainty, and how it influences different planning approaches and methodologies. 
The first part of this chapter, therefore, will concentrate on uncertainty, examining 
alternative definitions and classifications. The second section will present and criticize 
the principal planning theories with respect to their handling of uncertainty, and 
pinpoint the required elements of a methodology appropriate for planning under 
uncertainty. Finally, the third part of this chapter will present and discuss two of the 
less traditional planning methods that have been proposed as appropriate to uncertainty 
situations, with particular emphasis on robustness analysis, which forms the basis of
15
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the methodology which will be proposed in this thesis. Also, in the third part, some 
possible measures of decision flexibility will be introduced.
2.2 Uncertainty: Definition and Classification
Real-world problem situations are suffused with uncertainty. Authors in a variety of 
disciplines such as operational research, systems analysis, social policy, social 
psychology, decision analysis and politics have recognized that uncertainty is the main 
factor restricting choice. According to Ackoff [1962] a state of doubt in the decision 
maker as to choice is a necessary condition for a problem to exist. By this definition, 
some degree of uncertainty is therefore inherent in any problem.
Uncertainty is the situation of not certainly knowing. It is the absence of perfect 
information about something. However, the degree, kind, and object of uncertainty 
encountered in problem situations may vary widely. Luce and Raiffa [1957] partition 
the decision field into conditions of:
(a) Certainty, where each action is known to lead invariably to a specific outcome
(b) Risk, where each action leads to one of a set of possible outcomes with known 
probabilities, and
(c) Uncertainty, where the probabilities of occurrence of each outcome are unknown or 
not even meaningful.
In the following section, we present an overview of the dominant paradigm in decision 
making, and argue that it is inadequate as a normative theory of decision making under 
conditions of uncertainty.
16
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22,1 The traditional model o f decision making
The traditional Justificationist (or Bayesian) model of decision making is the dominant 
paradigm in decision making theoiy. It is called Justificationist because it attempts to 
show how at least some choices may be justified. At the centre of this model is the 
claim that a decision is rational to the extent that it can be justified by the person who 
makes i t  Decisions that cannot be justified may sometimes have to be taken, but the 
rational person will make decisions s/he can justify wherever s/he can. A decision is 
justified by being shown to be the best of all options available to the decision maker. 
It should be noted, however, that an option has no intrinsic value except that which 
accrues from its consequences.
Three axioms form the basis of the model:
(i) for every set of options A, B, either A is preferred to B, or B to A, or the decision 
maker is indifferent between the two options.
(ii) only one of these three cases is true for any pair of options.
(iii) if option A is preferred to option B, and option B is preferred to option C, then 
option A is preferred to option C (Transitivity).
When there is a single decision maker who knows all options open to her/him and who 
knows all the consequences which each option would have if chosen, then decisions 
fall within the certainty classification. The decision maker should:
(i) list all the consequences of each of the options which are available
(ii) place the consequences in order of preference
(iii) choose the option with the most preferred consequence.
Decisions under risk are the ones where the consequences of at least one of the options 
are not known with certainty, but a list of possible consequences may be drawn up and 
assigned a probability distribution. Then the decision maker chooses the decision 
which maximizes her/his expected utility.
17
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To assign a probability distribution, certain statistical information has to be available. 
In some cases, information of this sort may not exist, or worse, may not even be 
possible. Such cases may be the introduction of new technology, launching of a novel 
product, developing cures for new diseases etc. A decision of this sort is said to be 
under uncertainty. Bayesian decision theory suggests the use of subjective probabilities 
to replace the missing information. Then the decision maker can choose as if s/he were 
deciding under risk conditions.
In the case of a single decision maker with multiple conflicting objectives, the 
traditional paradigm offers the application of multi-attribute utility theories (MAUT). 
Almost any important decision engages multiple values. Sometimes these may go 
together, but the tough problems arise when, within the set of options available, doing 
well on one value requires doing poorly on another. Rarely does luck offer an option 
that is simultaneously best on them all; trade-offs must be made. Trade-offs are 
judgements which depend on the decision maker's assessment of the relative 
desirability of the available options on each dimension and on his/her feelings about the 
relative importance of these dimensions. Trade-offs are subjective; there can be no 
objective or universal mles for making them.
All MAUT procedures include the following 5 steps:
1. Define options and value-relevant attributes
2. Evaluate each option separately on each attribute
3. Assign relative weights to the attributes
4. Aggregate the weights of attributes and the single-attribute evaluations of options by 
means of a formal model (either additive or multiplicative) to obtain an overall 
evaluation of options
5. Perform sensitivity analyses and make recommendations.
All approaches are essentially identical in steps 1 and 5. They differ in the procedures 
for single attribute evaluations (step 2), in the techniques for weighting (step 3) and in
18
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models for aggregation (step 4). Von Winderfeldt and Edwards [1986] give a 
comprehensive discussion of the available alternatives in each step.
Collingridge [1982] argues that the Justificationist model, even when it is expanded to 
accommodate cases of conflicting objectives and multiple decision makers, is still 
operational only under very restricted conditions. The reasons he puts forward are the 
following:
1) All states of the world must be identified. They must be mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. In real world decisions the problem is not how to ascribe probabilities to 
the states of the world, but rather to identify what states of the world are relevant to the 
decision.
2) All options must be identified. A decision maker who has not considered all the 
options open to her/him should place a premium on options that are easily revised so 
that s/he may improve her/his decision if a superior option is discovered in time. This 
is an additional factor to the conventional one of expected utility and some trading 
between ease of revision and expected utility may be required. It is very difficult to see 
how this could be accommodated within Bayesian methodology.
3) All pav-offs must be known. But pay-offs (consequences of decisions) can be 
known only if a set of options that is known to be complete is considered. Not only 
must the set of options be complete, and all states of the world identified, but a utility 
must be assigned to every option/state of the world pair, except where sensitivity 
testing can marginally reduce the severity of this condition.
4) All relevant information must be collected. Since information has a decreasing 
marginal expected value under risk, there comes a point where the decision maker stops 
collecting information and chooses on the basis of the information already collected. 
Under uncertainty, however, qualitative information may be needed, and it may prove 
impossible to make sure that all information that is relevant has been collected. 
Bayesian methods are nevertheless often applied to such decisions, using what relevant
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information has been identified. This is inappropriate. A decision maker who cannot 
be sure that all significant information has been gathered should rather favour options 
that are easily revised, so that s/he may improve her/his decision if more information is 
discovered between her/him taking it and its full implementation.
5) All interpretations of data must be examined. Data are the raw unanalyzed 
observations, which become information when analyzed and interpreted. For any set 
of data there are always many, mutually incompatible interpretations. For decisions 
under uncertainty, rival interpretations of data may not just be theoretically possible but 
may be a central feature of the decision problem. Even if there is a rule to select the 
best interpretation available, there is no way to ensure that this is the best of all 
interpretations. As before, ease of revision becomes a factor in the decision together 
with maximization of utility or expected utility.
Collingridge therefore makes a proposal to change the spectrum of certainty/risk 
/uncertainty to certainty/risk/restricted \mcznamty/ignorance. Ignorance covers all 
decisions where Bayesian techniques cannot be applied because the above conditions 
do not hold. Restricted uncertainty covers decisions where subjective probabilities may 
be employed and where all the conditions are met, so that Bayesian methods can be 
used.
2.2.2 Sources o f uncertainty
In this section three factors contributing towards the uncertainty which surrounds a 
planning situation will be discussed. The first is the availability of information, the 
second is time, and the third is the presence of conflict
When dealing with uncertainty, a distinction should be made between things we cannot 
know and things we could know or learn more about if a reasonable effort was made, 
both now and in the future. For example, the size of the AIDS epidemic is uncertain 
because, among other things, we cannot know what is or will be the future behaviour
20
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of people belonging to high risk groups. We cannot know if or when our competitors 
are going to launch a new product Of course, there are different reasons why 
knowledge about something cannot be obtained. There could be observational 
problems by nature, or even conflict of interests: in the case of competitive companies, 
secrecy about future plans is often essential. It could be argued that the collection of 
information could help to reduce uncertainty. However, whenever a decision whether 
to collect information or not arises, there are numerous factors that have to be 
considered, such as the size, cost and complexity of such an exercise, the 
organization’s priorities, the necessary selection of the separate data items, etc. When 
all these factors have been considered, the effort might seem unreasonable.
Time is also a differentiating factor. Already existing situations can be shrouded in 
uncertainty since it can be very difficult or expensive to get more information about a 
question, or the available tools and methods may be inadequate, or the resources may 
be scarce. As mentioned before, this type of uncertainty can be partly resolved by 
assigning more resources or developing new tools. Uncertainty about the future is 
more difficult to tackle since the events we try to predict have not yet taken place. 
Again, the development of new tools may partly abolish some of the uncertainties. 
However, the more important "hard" uncertainties and surprises will still remain.
To illustrate this, we may use the example of AIDS. There are various estimates of the 
number of people who are currently infected with HIV, but there is uncertainty 
concerning the actual number. Sophisticated projection methods can eliminate part of 
the uncertainty, that is they can put upper and lower bounds to this number with 
varying degrees of confidence. Future numbers depend not only on current numbers 
but on unknown factors such as behavioural trends. Behavioural studies combined 
with current estimates can produce ranges of future forecasts. However, fifteen years 
ago, the emergence of the disease itself was not anticipated and there was no way one 
could have predicted it, although there is proof today that some earlier deaths from 
unknown causes were due to AIDS. Shackle’s principle of expected surprise applies in
21
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this example. If the doctors who tried to find the cause of death of a patient from AIDS 
before the disease was discovered, had added to their list of alternatives a “residual 
cause” they would not be surprised to find later that the actual cause of death was an 
unknown syndrome. They would be however very surprised to learn the nature of 
AIDS itself.
In some situations the prevailing uncertainty is due to conflict between interested 
parties.-The resulting uncertainty can have two facets. It can either be uncertainty 
about whose views will prevail or uncertainty which is internal to one or more players; 
even in the case of one decision maker conflict can exist This happens when goals are 
not simultaneously achievable. To correctly identify the source of the uncertainty in a 
conflict situation and devise appropriate remedies we should distinguish between three 
types of conflict:
1) Internal conflict Internal conflict applies to the case of a single decision maker, 
either a group or a person. In the event of a group, it is assumed that the persons that 
comprise it have common interests, agree on their objectives unanimously, and take up 
concerted action. In such situations conflict is confined to mutual incompatibility of the 
objectives. Even in this almost ideal situation, where the members of the group agree 
on a set of objectives, it does not follow that these can be achieved simultaneously. 
Decision analysts have used extensively methods known as multiattribute utility 
techniques or theory (MAUT), which have already been described in section 2.2.1, to 
deal with this kind of conflict. These techniques, however, are appropriate for 
resolving the simplest form of internal conflict, which can hardly constitute a problem 
once priorities are set and agreed upon.
A more complicated foim of internal conflict is moral conflict, or conflict of values. 
Dewey and Tufts [1932] distinguish between two kinds of moral struggle: one is when 
the individual is tempted to do something which s/he is convinced is wrong. The other 
is when there is a struggle between values each of which is an undoubted good in its 
place but which may get in each other’s way. The moral struggle in the first case, is a
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struggle against temptation. There is no doubt as to what should be done. In the 
second case, the agent is undecided as to what s/he ought to do. Levi [1986] claims 
that in this case inquiry, and not therapy is required to address the issue at hand.
Davidson’s discussion of weakness of will [1980] states that all occasions where 
strength of will is demanded arise when there is moral conflict in a “minimal sense”, 
which exists “whenever the agent is aware of considerations that, taken alone, would 
lead to mutually incompatible actions”. Davidson’s cites as illustrations of-moral 
conflict in this sense situations that coincide with Dewey and Tufts' moral struggle of 
the second kind. The most common example of this situation is the case of the pacifist 
who is called to join the army and eventually fight in a war. In this case, pacifism and 
patriotism, the two principles that the agent endorses, recommend incompatible actions.
Davidson asserts that very little attention has been paid to this problem and two 
unsatisfactory solutions have been presented: the first insists that there is only one 
ultimate principle, and the second denies that the allegedly conflicting principles 
prescribe actions which are not jointly feasible. Davidson thinks that the agent should 
determine which option is prima facie best, relative to all the known relevant factors.
The difference between the views of Dewey and Davidson concerns the analysis of 
conflict. Dewey and Tufts maintain that the agent, instead of choosing the best prima 
facie option, should recognise that he does not know what should be done and 
acknowledge that this predicament is an appropriate occasion for moral reflection and 
inquiry. Although Davidson’s account of weakness of will is consistent with 
recognising the possibility that when all the relevant considerations are taken into 
account there is no uniquely permissible value ranking of the feasible options, he 
nowhere acknowledges this possibility. To the contrary, he seems to think that 
contexts of moral dilemma are precisely the occasion where challenges to willpower 
arise. This is considered by Levi as false. When moral conflicts arise, because the 
relevant moral considerations yield conflicting prima facie recommendations, it will
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usually be the case that there is no clear prima facie recommendation if these moral 
considerations are taken together. Further inquiry will be needed.
2) Conflict between multiple decision makers. Let us now consider the more 
organizationally relevant example of a situation with multiple decision makers. 
Obviously, conflict of interests can arise between departments and individuals in the 
organisation. As Rosenhead [1989a] put it: M An organisation is not an individual ... 
Decisions and actions emerge out of interactions between a variety of actors internal to 
the organisation. Each may, indeed will, have an individual perspective or world-view 
(Weltanschauung) through which the actions and statements of others are interpreted.” 
Each actor may define the problem, the objectives and the required actions quite 
differently. In this case, the application of techniques which facilitate communication is 
relevant. Cognitive mapping, a technique incorporated in the Strategic Options 
Development Analysis (SODA) method [Eden 1989], described briefly at a later section 
of this chapter, is such a technique.
3) Conflict in a multi-organisational context. This type of conflict arises when there is 
direct conflict of interest between organisations, such as occurs between companies 
producing competing products. It can arise, even if the objectives of both organisations 
or collective bodies are common. Take the example of political parties: at least one of 
their objectives is common. It is, or should be, the welfare of the country. Yet, they 
have completely opposing views on how this is to be achieved and by whom.
This last type of conflict includes the previous two since the participants are 
organisations which are aggregates of individuals. The boundaries between conflicts 
of types 2 and 3 are somewhat blurred. Indeed, if the groups of individuals or the 
departments within the organisation are to be viewed as micro-organisations, the two 
types of conflict reduce to one. There is, however, a difference: although nobody 
expects the departments of the organisation or the individuals to have exactly the same 
views, it does not automatically follow that these views will be directly conflicting as in 
type 3.
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Although conflict of the first type has been discussed extensively , it is a subject that 
falls in the territory of philosophers and psychologists. The present analysis will 
concentrate on the other two types of conflict and discuss methods that have been 
proposed to deal with such situations while avoiding to use conventional tools and 
techniques, whose inappropriateness will be discussed elsewhere in this chapter.
2J2.3 Classification o f  uncertainty
There are a number of alternative bases for classifying uncertainty. In this section we 
will present those attempts at such classification which could be relevant in structuring a 
planning problem.
Dror [1988] makes a distinction within uncertainty, differentiating between quantitative 
uncertainty, that is when the outcomes are known but their probability distribution is 
unknown, and qualitative uncertainty where the outcomes themselves are not known. 
Dror says that qualitative uncertainty characterises what he calls explosive situations. 
He also makes a distinction between “hard” and “soft” uncertainties based on the 
criterion of predictability. It should be noted though, that the criterion is used in terms 
of its presence or absence rather than in terms of its measure. “Hard” uncertainties are 
inbuilt in the dynamics of the phenomena which behave in an indeterminate random 
mode, and where prediction methods are not applicable. On the other hand, “soft” 
uncertainty characterises phenomena the dynamics of which follow some orderly 
pattern, but there is incomplete knowledge about this pattern. “Soft” uncertainty can be 
compared with quantitative uncertainty, whereas “hard”-uncertainty is of the qualitative 
form. Soft uncertainties may also be called unreduced uncertainties in contrast to hard 
uncertainties which may be called irreducible uncertainties. Dror also uses the concept 
of ignorance based again on the criterion of predictability, but in this case the presence 
or absence of predictability itself is unknown.
Ravetz and Funtowicz [1990] argue that to approach the problems of uncertainty, a 
distinction should be made between the sources and the types of uncertainty.
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Classification by sources is normally done by experts in a field when they try to 
comprehend the uncertainties within their particular practice. But for a general 
understanding, we have to distinguish among the technical, methodological and 
epistemological levels of uncertainty; these correspond to inexactness, unreliability and 
the “border with ignorance”. Ignorance can be compared with the mathematical 
infinite. In such a context we can speak of “usable ignorance”, that is when we are 
aware of the extent of ignorance, and recognize its dynamic interaction with 
knowledge.
Friend and Jessop [1969] have identified three types of uncertainty which can beset 
long-term planning: uncertainty as to the Environment (UE), uncertainty as to values 
(UV) and uncertainty as to the actions of decision makers in related fields of choice 
(UR). This classification in Ravetz’s terms could be seen as a differentiation according 
to the sources of uncertainty and not according to its type. This fact though, does not 
reduce the practical effectiveness of this classification.
Pye [1978] matches these three types of uncertainty to an extension of the fundamental 
model which Ackoff [1962] proposed as underlying all models for problem solving. 
This formulation is
v  = f  (x,r,e)
where v  is the measure of the value of the decision made, x is the vector of variables 
subject to control in the decision considered, r  is the vector of variables subject to 
control by the decision maker but not in the decision considered, and e is the vector of 
variables not subject to the decision maker's control. UE, UV, and UR concern 
uncertainty about e ,/, and r, respectively. We could argue here that UR does not 
exactly correspond to uncertainty about the r  variables, since UR refers to actions of 
decision makers in related decision fields which could be outside the decision maker's 
control in all cases. A relevant example could be the introduction of government 
legislation. In this case UR could refer to variables in e rather than r.
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Another classification of uncertainty similar to Friend and Jessop's has been proposed 
by Hopwood [1980], who claims that uncertainty may be of two types: uncertainty as 
to objectives, and uncertainty about the consequences of actions resulting from 
decisions. Figure 2.1 shows what form of decision processes are relevant according to 
the level and type of uncertainty. When both types of uncertainty are low, 
computational methods can be used. When only uncertainty about consequences is 
high, an approach which involves judgment is necessary. Conversely, when only 
uncertainty over objectives is high, negotiations are needed to produce consensus; this 
is a case for bargaining. However, in problems where both types of uncertainty are 
high, decisions are taken on an inspirational basis; this is an area for entrepreneurial 
thinking.
UNCERTAINTY OVER OBJECTIVES 
Low High
Low
UNCERTAINTY 
OVER 
CONSEQUENCES 
OF ACTIONS
High
Figure 2.1: Uncertainty and decision making processes according to Hopwood
Hopwood's uncertainty over objectives can be compared with Friend and Jessop's 
uncertainty as to values. They both include the element of the present and the future: 
our objectives reflect the future we desire, but this is often determined by our current 
perception of the world. Consider the example of a district hospital which treats 
patients with AIDS; an objective might be to discourage non-residents from requesting 
treatment, so that the workload does not increase to an uncontrollable level. The 
relative weight of this objective over another depends on subjective judgment about the 
severity of the problem now, and on the estimate of the current and future in-flows of
COMPUTATION BARGAINING
JUDGEMENT INSPIRATION
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patients. But then, according to Friend and Jessop, the correct figure for the current in­
flows can be considered as an uncertainty about the environment We can therefore 
see that uncertainties can fall into more than one of the Friend and Jessop 
classifications. In this aspect Hopwood's categorization seems to have an advantage, 
as it distinguishes clearly between uncertainties over what we want and uncertainties 
over how to achieve it, i.e. the subjective and the objective. The methodology 
proposed in this thesis will concentrate mostly on uncertainty over consequences of 
actions, or according to Friend and Jessop’s classification, uncertainties pertaining to 
the environment and to actions of related decision makers, without completely ignoring 
uncertainty over objectives or values.
Figure 2.2 displays the relationships between Friend and Jessop’s and Hopwood’s 
classifications according to the source of uncertainty.
Hopwood
Uncertainty over Uncertainty
consequences of over
ACTIONS VALUES
_^____ __ _______ _^_______________
Friend & Jessop
UV
Figure 2.2: Relationships of uncertainties according to their source
The spectrum of uncertainty proposed by Collingridge consisting of certainty /  risk /  
restricted uncertainty /  ignorance can be further modified by considering surprises. 
Dror [1988] defines surprise events as events with a very low chance of occurring. It 
can be argued that since surprise presumes the element of the unexpected, a very low 
probability event cannot produce surprise, because the outcome was originally 
considered as possible, and a probability, however low had been assigned to it. 
Shackle [1953] explains the paradox of expecting a future surprise although surprise is 
what one feels when the unexpected has occurred. He supposes that an individual can
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only be surprised by an unexpected event, that is one that was never formulated in the 
individual’s imagination, and not by a counter-expected event which is an outcome that 
has been considered at some point and then rejected. When considering a set of rival 
hypotheses, an individual will have to include a residual hypothesis to make it 
exhaustive. This residual hypothesis will be a recognition of the non-exhaustiveness of 
the list of the precisely stated hypotheses. If the residual hypothesis has been assigned 
zero potential surprise, the individual can both expect the outcome to fall under the 
residual heading and the outcome’s character in detail to surprise him. The recognition 
therefore of imperfect knowledge can lead individuals to expect surprises in the sense 
that the nature of the outcome was never conceived. In those terms surprises are of the 
same nature as “hard” uncertainties.
The various degrees of uncertainty are mapped in Figure 2.3 using predictability as a 
criterion:
UNCERTAINTY
CERTAINTY RISK RESTRICTED,
"SOFT"
UNCERTAINTY,
KNOWN
OUTCOMES
"HARD"
UNCERTAINTY,
UNKNOWN
OUTCOMES,
SURPRISES
IGNORANCE
PREDICTABILITY
Figure 2.3: Degrees of Uncertainty
In the case of “hard” uncertainty and ignorance the arrow of predictability is dashed, 
which denotes that in these cases predictability is either absent (“hard”) or there is no 
knowledge about its presence or absence (ignorance). Restricted uncertainty as termed 
by Collingridge falls into the “soft” uncertainty category. It is with the latter two 
elements on the uncertainty spectrum, "hard" uncertainty and ignorance, that the 
methodology to be developed in this thesis is concerned.
29
JChapter 2: Planning tinder uncertainty
2.3 Review of planning theories
Before discussing any planning theory, we must clarify the concept of planning itself. 
At this point, therefore, we will examine different definitions of planning and attempt to 
give a definition.
Hall [1974] writes that “Planning is concerned with deliberately achieving some 
objective, and it proceeds by assembling actions into some orderly sequence”. Other 
definitions refer to planning as: “the laying out of a course of action that we can follow 
and that will take us to our desired goals” [Churchman 1968]; “a process of strategic 
choice, requiring a capacity to anticipate the future and yet also to adapt to the 
unforeseen” [Friend and Jessop 1969]; “a process of human forethought and action 
based upon that thought” [Chadwick 1971]; “the process of preparing a set of 
decisions for action in the future, directed at achieving goals by preferable means” 
[Dror 1973]. Planning, therefore, must be seen as a process activated by the need to 
achieve some objective. The outcome of this process is the plan which is a description 
of a formulated or organised method by which the objective is to be achieved.
All definitions given above use the words "objectives”, "goals", "thought" and so on 
without referring to any particular "objective", "goal", etc. At the same time, these 
words acquire a substance of their own , and in this way they become objects about 
which theories can be built. They become therefore the objects of planning theory.
Theory of planning or planning theory is concerned with theories of the planning 
process, that is procedural theories. The distinction between theory of planning and 
theory in planning must be borne in mind when examining these theories; the first 
deals with questions concerning the form of the planning process, whereas the other 
examines the content of planning policies.
There are two major positions in planning theory, rational comprehensive planning, and 
disjointed incrementalism. The incrementalist approach, in contrast with rational 
comprehensive planning, views planning as a dynamic process where decisions have to
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be taken sequentially. Both approaches however, have been extensively criticised, and 
alternative planning concepts and methodologies have been proposed. The most well 
known alternative approach is mixed scanning. The three approaches will be discussed 
next.
2.3.1 Rational comprehensive planning
Under rational comprehensive planning, a set of values or objectives is identified and 
agreed upon. Then, the opportunities of action are listed, the consequences of each 
course of action are identified, and the "best” course of action is selected on the basis 
of maximising the objectives. The term rational owes its presence to the fact, or better 
to the assumption, that decision-makers make rational choices, whereas the concept of 
comprehensiveness implies complete evaluation of all the available alternatives. 
However, this is not the only implication: the requirement of comprehensiveness may 
also refer to the attempt to satisfy all goals of the various interest groups, or to the idea 
that equal importance must be given to all elements of the area of concern, and the 
examination of these elements in the same degree of detail. Since rational 
comprehensive planning implies a highly structured and formalised planning process 
and stresses the issue of professionalism which distinguishes planners from routine 
administrators, it was widely adopted and for an extensive period held the dominant 
position in planning theory.
The major criticisms of rational comprehensive planning question the feasibility of 
achieving both rationality and comprehensiveness, and doubt the claims made for its 
scientific status. For the successful application of the method, consensus on the set of 
values to be maximised is a prerequisite. However, planners’ perceptions of the 
relative merits of each objective are very likely to differ. These disagreements can 
range from different opinions on the rankings of the objectives up to inclusion or 
exclusion from the set Moreover, the "professionalism" and the resulting "objectivity" 
which is supposed to characterise the resulting plans are heavily questioned. Planners,
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even if they are hired professionals and not members of the organization's manpower, 
are seldom detached from the political activity of policy-making. Personal views and 
pressure from sponsors, trigger processes of bargaining and compromise to reach 
agreements on key issues.
Comprehensiveness implies that the planners have complete knowledge of their field, 
but the identification of the consequences of each action requires the acknowledgement 
of the presence of uncertainty about key factors. However, under rational 
comprehensive planning there is no such provision. The collection of large amounts of 
data can only deal with some types of uncertainty, and such an investment could be 
either very cumbersome or even infeasible. Moreover, the assumption that the 
decision-makers have full control of the factors affecting their decisions and the power 
to implement them is often quite wrongly made. Most of the time there is no guarantee 
that once a decision has been made it will be implemented as well. Again, uncertainty 
about external influences is not to be ignored. The concept of risk may be included in 
the method, but then again, the problem of uncertainty is by-passed by attaching 
subjective probabilities to the possible outcomes. As will be discussed in a later 
section, attempts to abolish uncertainty by applying probabilities may have disastrous 
consequences since the idea of a total surprise is being ignored. Methods such as 
scenario or robustness analysis have been considered as more appropriate in high 
uncertainty situations.
Comprehensiveness also refers to the effort to maximise the selected objectives. 
Unfortunately, sets of objectives which are simultaneously maximised are seldom 
found. The more common case is that of conflicting objectives. As will be seen later, 
various strategies have been proposed as appropriate to this situation.
Those in favour of rational comprehensive planning argue that its technique-orientation 
produces "scientific" and hence "objective" results and recommendations. A counter­
argument, however, is that techniques are simple tools that can be open to manipulation 
and can be used in a variety of ways to produce contradictory results. It should also be
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added that since each planning case is unique in the circumstances that define it, it is 
impossible to test and evaluate the plans using objective measures as can be done when 
scientific methods are applied to other types of problems.
It has been argued [Camhis 1979] that rational comprehensive planning is closely 
related to verificationism- a philosophical position that stresses induction. In both 
systems (philosophy of science and theory of planning) the evaluation principle is the 
same, namely the amount of agreement, either with accepted facts (philosophy of 
science) or with accepted values that acquire the status of facts (planning). In 
philosophy of science, verificationism has been attacked and successfully overthrown 
by Popper’s falsificationism. In a parallel way, rational comprehensive planning has 
been attacked by incrementalism which draws upon falsificationism.
2.3.2 Disjointed incrementalist planning
Disjointed incrementalist planning has emerged as a major critique of rational 
comprehensive planning [Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963; lindblom 1965]. The main 
areas of criticism are the unattainability of rationality, goal directed action and 
comprehensiveness in the planners' knowledge and efforts. Indeed, as already 
discussed above, the assumptions of non-conflicting objectives, consensus of opinion, 
full understanding and control of the planning field, are extremely weak in complex 
situations.
Incrementalists attach more importance to the planning process itself, which they see as 
a political activity which develops through a gradual process, where advocates of 
particular views compete with others to have their ideas adopted. They recognise the 
pluralism of various interest groups and the influence they exert to determine outcomes.
- The approach does not attempt to pre-take all decisions necessary to achieve the 
required end result, but instead subjects them to continuous adjustment. The test of 
a“good” policy is agreement on that policy itself, which is claimed [Lindblom 1959] to 
be possible even when agreement on values is not. Incrementalism favours remedial
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policies, and choice between alternatives is made in marginal analysis terms. Hence, 
this approach considers only policies similar to the currently adopted one and attempts 
gradual change to achieve better results in terms of limited objectives.
Although incrementalism is more practical and acknowledges human limitations, the 
role of politics and the need for flexibility, it still has considerable weaknesses [Etzioni 
1967; Dror 1968; Faludi 1973]. By considering policies close to the current one, it 
excludes the possibility of radical change which could be advisable in turbulent 
environments. For the same reason, it has been criticised as favouring the status quo 
and those who have power. Therefore, although it is more flexible compared to 
rational comprehensive planning, it still remains a "conservative" approach, 
inappropriate in many planning situations where the results of existing policies are not 
satisfactory.
lindblom has also been criticised for replacing validity as a criterion for decisions with 
agreement [Faludi 1973]. The incrementalist approach draws from Popper’s 
falsificationist scientific method, in that a theory is never verified; after being tested 
against the facts, with aim of refuting it, it can become at most well corroborated. In 
the same way, Lindblom is extremely sceptical about the possibility of basing decisions 
on valid knowledge since this knowledge can never be verified. Faludi [1973] argues 
that a complete replacement of valid knowledge by agreement is wrong, and that policy 
makers who disregard such knowledge are liable to be unsuccessful in achieving their 
objectives, no matter whether they have achieved agreement on policies or not This is 
because agreement between different interest groups to the same policy can be reached 
for different ends, but not for conflicting ends. He further argues that planning policies 
cannot be based on analytical knowledge alone; both political agreement and 
knowledge are important, and neither can be neglected without detriment to success in 
planning.
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2.3.3 Mixed Scanning
The mixed scanning planning methodology was developed by Etzioni [1967] as an 
attempt to circumvent the limitations of rational comprehensive planning and 
incrementalism while preserving the advantages of both methods. This methodology 
regards planning as being conducted at two levels, hence the term "mixed”. General 
directions are laid down at the strategic level, whereas specific policies and actions are 
examined in more detail at the incremental level. In this way, at the strategic level the 
pitfalls of rational comprehensive analysis can be avoided, but without the restriction to 
consider only policies similar to that currently adopted, as the incrementalist approach 
suggests. Separate issues concerning the implementation of the selected policy that 
need further investigation can be explored at a higher level of specificity, without 
encumbering the whole of the analysis by considering all aspects in detail. Mixed 
scanning claims universal applicability, both as a description of the existing situation 
and as a normative approach. This alleged universality is achieved by being flexible 
"through changes in the relative investments in scanning in general... and among the 
various levels of scanning"[Etzioni 1968].
Camhis [1979] argues that this claim of universality and the apparent flexibility becloud 
the methodology's inability actually to define the criteria needed to evaluate alternative 
courses of action and to select the one to be adopted. Etzioni fails to mention how the 
consequences of various alternatives are derived. Moreover, he contradicts himself by 
claiming that an alternative must be selected on the basis of an agreed set of values, 
when the reason he gives for rejecting rational comprehensive planning is that social 
decision-making centres frequently do not have such an agreed set of values [Etzioni 
1968:218]. Camhis further argues that the universality also comes into contradiction 
with the narrow outlook of the approach: although Etzioni shifts the emphasis towards 
action, he restricts the meaning of planning to the rather limited context of decision 
making. It is however, with the decision making part of planning that this thesis is 
mostly concerned. The methodology which will be proposed in this thesis deals with
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decision making while bearing in mind the wider issues of the form that planning takes. 
In this context, Etzkmi's approach is quite appropriate.
2.3.4 Required elements o f  a methodology fo r  p lanning  under 
uncertainty
The main positions in planning theory and their limitations have been examined in the 
previous sections. It was argued that mixed scanning is the most promising alternative. 
In this section we will examine the required elements of a methodology for planning 
under uncertainty, by drawing on experience from past Operational Research (OR) 
practice.
Definitions of planning have common elements with definitions given for operational 
research. Operational Research has been defined as “the application of the methods of 
science to complex problems arising in the direction and management of large 
systems...The puipose is to help management determine its policy and actions 
scientifically” [Eilon 1975]. The purpose of conducting OR analysis is the same as that 
of planning: to suggest to management a way to achieve its objectives. The use of 
scientific method is common in both practices. Faludi [1973] writes that “planning is 
the application of scientific method, however crude, to policy-making”, and comments 
that the same definition has been given for operational research [Beer 1966]. Faludi 
claims that this underlines the generality of the phenomenon of planning and its wide 
applicability.
When dealing with ill-formulated social problems, where the information is confusing, 
there are conflicting values and the ramifications of the whole system are confusing, in 
short what have been called “wicked” problems [Rittel and Webber 1973], the 
boundaries of planning and Operational Research become blurred. It can be argued that 
in these cases, conducting Operational Research is the same as engaging in planning 
and vice versa. This may be considered by some as an over-ambitious statement; this 
is because Operational Research tends to be confused with the application of some of its
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better known techniques. It must be remembered, however, that Operational Research 
is the use of scientific thought to a problem irrespective of the methods developed to 
tackle its particular aspects.
The above argument suggests that theory of planning should be of relevance to 
Operational Research. The dominant paradigm in planning theory, rational 
comprehensive planning, has many common aspects with the traditional OR paradigm. 
It can even be argued, as mentioned above, that conducting OR is the same as engaging 
in planning. Criticisms, therefore, aimed at either paradigm may be relevant to the 
other as well.
The appropriateness of traditional planning methodologies in situations of high 
complexity and uncertainty has been extensively questioned [Rosenhead 1978a; 
Rosenhead 1980a; Rosenhead 1980b; Jackson 1987]. The traditional methodologies 
usually involve the application of ’’hard” or "mainstream” Operational Research 
techniques, which are usually targeted on the optimisation of a single objective or of 
several objectives transformed into a single one.
However, when planning in the environment of a large organisation, especially in the 
public sector, the existence of multiple, vague, and often conflicting interests, of 
political debate, and of different perceptions of the problem situation, must be 
recognised as an indisputable reality. Even in the case of a single decision-maker, 
objectives may not be consistent or may change with time; in addition, when dealing 
with non-trivial problems, multiple decision makers are the rule rather than the 
exception. The existence of a variety of objectives, some of them in conflict with each 
other, is also an inherent condition in complex situations. Clearly, an optimising 
approach requires explicit trading-off between objectives, a procedure often infeasible 
because of the vagueness of objectives, or simply undesirable. On the other hand, a 
’’satisficing" approach may help to by-pass the need for explicit trade-offs.
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Moreover, the traditional methodologies tend to produce models highly dependent on 
the quantification of qualitative aspects, which therefore both lack in credibility and 
pose overwhelming data demands. Considerable effort must be devoted to collecting 
detailed data where rough measures of key factors may well turn out to be more 
relevant. These methodologies also assume that the decision maker(s) has complete 
control of all the variables of the problem, they produce ’’solutions’’ which ignore the 
underlying uncertainty, and consequently propose inflexible plans [Best et al. 1986; 
Rosenhead 1978a].
’’Classic" techniques require top-down implementation, in which the lower tiers are 
expected to comply with higher level decisions. This is a direct consequence of the 
opacity of the techniques used and the - often mistaken - assumption of the single 
decision maker with well defined objectives. Top-down implementation results in 
bureaucracies where the planning process is slow-moving and cumbersome. Sectoral 
attempts to revise particular decisions are discouraged, and the organisation's response 
to unexpected changes is slow. On the contrary, a less technically oriented, transparent 
methodology will facilitate participation of actors internal to the organisation, and the 
much desired but often wrongly assumed consensus can emerge more easily. Such 
attempts have taken place recently in many organisational environments. As reported 
by Ferlie and McKee [1988], there has been a shift in the National Health Service 
(NHS) towards "local learning" instead of "top-down" implementation of a national 
change agenda.
A final point for the implementation of techniques-which facilitate participation, is that 
the latter recognise the role of people as active subjects and not as machines. Since OR 
deals with pmposeful systems of human and social activity, such techniques would be 
beneficial.
Figure 2.4 summarises the above and offers a comparison of the characteristics of the 
traditional and the alternative paradigms of OR.
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FORMULATION: (HARD)
-Single objective or multiple 
objectives subjected to trade-off 
onto a common scale 
-Optimisation
*S!
—
FORMULATION: (LOOSE) 
-Solutions acceptable on separate 
dimensions without trade-offs 
-Non-optimising
<Nl
DATA:
-Overwhelming data demands 
-Distortion problems 
-Availability and credibility 
problems
DATA:
-Reduced demands 
-Integration of hard and soft data 
with judgment
PEOPLE:
-Scientisation, depoliticisation, 
assumed consensus 
-People as passive objects 
-One decision maker with clear 
objectives
—
PEOPLE:
-Simplicity and transparency 
-People as active subjects 
-Bottom-up planning
UNCERTAINTY:
-Attempts to abolish uncertainty 
-Attempts to pretake future 
decisions
—
UNCERTAINTY:
-Accepts uncertainty 
-Aims to keep options open for 
later resolution
______________________________
Figure 2.4: Dominant vs an Alternative OR Paradigm
In the absence of uncertainty about the present situation and future developments, 
problems can still be successfully tackled by using traditional techniques to transform 
the different objective measures onto a common scale of value. The presence of 
uncertainty however, calls for the development of alternative methodologies in order to 
preserve flexibility, which, in contrast to the traditional principal criteria and 
methodologies, will not aim at the reduction of uncertainty [Rosenhead 1980a]. 
Uncertainty is an inherent condition in most complex problems and any attempt to 
abolish it, may well result in irrelevant recommendations, which when implemented can
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have disastrous consequences. Summarising the above, we can say that a 
methodology for flexible planning under uncertainty, should be bottom-up, non­
optimising, facilitate participation, accept uncertainty, attempt to keep future options 
open and aim at a loose fit on the planned for activities [Rosenhead 1980b].
2.4 Alternative planning methods
Alternative criteria and methodologies which allow for uncertainty and accept its 
presence have been proposed. These attempts "to live with uncertainty" include soft 
systems methodology [Checkland 1981; 1989], cognitive mapping and strategic 
options development and analysis (SODA) [Eden 1989], the strategic choice approach 
which incorporates the AIDA technique [Friend and Jessop 1969; Friend and Hickling 
1987; Friend 1989], scenario analysis, and robustness analysis [Gupta and Rosenhead 
1968; Rosenhead et al 1972; Rosenhead 1980b; Best et al 1986; Rosenhead 1989b]. 
All of the above are problem structuring methods for situations of complexity and 
uncertainty. Strategic Choice, Scenario Analysis and Robustness Analysis are methods 
proposing alternative ways to manage uncertainty in complex situations. Soft Systems 
Methodology and Cognitive Mapping are focused more on complexity rather than 
uncertainty. Since, however, complexity can be regarded as a source of uncertainty 
i.e. uncertainty about the structure and dynamics of the problem, their inclusion in the 
set of methods which deal with uncertainty is justified. Furthermore, there are other 
methodologies that apply a game theoretic approach to structuring problems that deal 
with conflict situations. These are Hypergame [Bennet et al. 1989] and Metagame 
Analysis [Howard 1971; 1989]. Although situations of conflict are not necessarily 
characterized by high uncertainty, in many high uncertainty cases conflict causes the 
prevailing uncertainty. Therefore, both methods can be of interest in uncertainty 
situations.
The methodology for flexible planning which will be developed and presented on 
Chapter 4 is based on robustness and scenario analysis using also some elements of
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metagame theory. Therefore, in the following two sections of this chapter a description 
of metagame theory and robustness analysis will be presented, while scenario analysis 
will be presented in more detail in Chapter 4.
2,4.1 Metagames
In conflict situations, both strategy and human relations affect the occurrence of a 
specific future. Metagame analysis is a method which aims to handle both strategic 
aspects and human relations, within one structured approach. Metagame analysis asks 
the client questions, by answering which the client educates himself. When answers 
are analysed, this is not so much to achieve surprising results as to summarise and state 
clearly what has already been sensed intuitively. The analysis proceeds in the 
following way: we devise a list of actors and a list of policy options for each actor. By 
selecting specific policy options for each player, we can generate alternative scenarios. 
These scenarios are in turn classified and interpreted.
The starting point is to eliminate all the infeasible scenarios. Infeasibility relates ta  
actors' plans and intentions, and therefore one player’s intentions may.be changed by 
those of others. We then move to the classification of scenarios. The following 
categories are of particular interest:
Type 1: The Status Quo as it was before the situation arose
Type 2: The present scenario, incorporating present intentions
Type 3: The positions of different actors, meaning the scenarios they would like others
to agree to.
Type 4: Possible compromises between different actors’ positions
Type 5: Possible conflict points actors might move to in trying to force others to accept
their positions.
Having done so much, we then try to interpret scenarios; that is to answer the question 
of what would it mean if the players' intentions in each scenario were held to
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indefinitely. Such insight into possible futures facilitates planning strategies for the 
interaction.
The next step, analysis of threats and promises, reveals the basic pressures that actors 
can exert on each other in the given situation. In this part, the first step is to choose a 
particular scenario to analyse for stability, i.e. acceptance by all actors as the scenario 
they expect (though this acceptance may be unwilling). Analysis of stability is carried' 
out by finding all unilateral improvements for actors and,subsets of actors from the 
particular scenario, and then by finding all sanctions that exist to deter unilateral 
improvements. Once the unilateral improvements and sanctions relative to one or more 
particular scenarios are found, they can be summed up in a strategic map, a 
diagrammatic way in which to communicate and discuss results. If no scenario is 
found to be stable, or if there is a stable scenario unwillingly accepted by some players, 
analysis of the strategic map can be used by the interested player to establish credible 
threats and promises to the other players s/he has to make to move towards a more 
preferred scenario.
In the case of type 3 conflict, direct conflict between organizations, metagame analysis 
can assist not only by clarifying the present situation, but also by assisting the decision 
maker to make the right moves to bring about the future s/he prefers.
2.4.2 Robustness analysis
The first mention of robustness in the literature has been made by Gupta-and 
Rosenhead [1968], who described the use of robustness in determining the location of 
new factories producing consumer goods. Subsequent applications include chemical 
plants [Caplin and Kombluth 1975], education [Rosenhead 1978b], and health services 
[Best et al. 1986]. The rest of this section describes briefly the methodology for 
conducting robustness analysis.
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When planning under uncertainty, two things must be borne in mind: first, the 
acknowledgement of multiple futures, and second, the recognition of a clear distinction 
between decisions and plans. A decision is a commitment of resources which can only 
be reversed by a further decision. On the other hand, a plan consists of a 
foreshadowing of a set of decisions to be taken at some times in the future. The plan, 
therefore, is a working hypothesis rather than a commitment Analytic efforts should 
be focused on getting the decision right, with the plan as a guide to the longer term 
future. The right decision under uncertainty must be a flexible one. Robustness 
analysis is a methodology for sequential decision making with the object of preserving 
future flexibility. It focuses on the alternative immediate commitments which could be 
made, which will be compared in terms of the range of possible future commitments 
with which they appear to be compatible.
The robustness of any initial decision is defined as the number of acceptable options at 
the planning horizon with which it is compatible, expressed as a ratio of the total 
number of acceptable options at the planning horizon. More formally, the robustness 
of an initial decision or decision package dj in future Fj is defined as:
rij = iSjjl /  iSjl (2 .1)
where Sj is the set of all options acceptable under the conditions of future Fj and Sy is 
the subset of those options which are attainable if decision di is taken. It is therefore 
possible to construct a multi-future robustness matrix R s  (ry) (See Figure 2.5) .
Futures
Fj F2 . • Fm
di r ll r12 * r lm
Initial d2 T21 122 • r lm
Decisions . . . . . . • . .
dn rnl rnl rnm
Figure 2.5: Multi-future robustness matrix
Complementary to robustness is the notion of debility [Caplin and Kombluth 1975]. 
Debility is defined as the number of unsatisfactory end-states still attainable after an 
initial decision, expressed as a ratio of all such end-states.
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In the case of a single future the choice of the appropriate initial decision presents no 
problems: as far as the characteristic of flexibility is concerned the appropriate decision 
to be taken (other things being equal) is the one with the highest robustness (or lowest 
debility) score. Things are not so simple in the case of multi-future robustness. There 
is no obvious choice, unless one decision has the best scores under all futures. This, 
of course is an extreme case, and if a decision proves to be so much better than the 
other candidates, it is-very likely that this fact would have been obvious even before 
starting the analysis. In most problems however, it is to be expected that a decision 
which fares well under some futures will perform less well under others. It can be the 
case that simple observations about the overall performance of a decision are impeded 
by the sheer size of the matrices; even the extreme case of one decision performing 
better under all futures may not be immediately obvious in a very big matrix. It can be 
argued that a useful way of summarizing the information contained on the two matrices 
is to fashion a single measure of relative decision flexibility. In the next section some 
possible ways to combine the information contained in the robustness and debility 
matrices into a single measure will be proposed.
2.4.3 Possible measures o f decision flexibility
The contents of the robustness and debility matrices can be combined in several 
different ways. One such possibility is the use of the robustness-debility criterion 
(RDC). This criterion is similar to the Hurwicz criterion of decision theory [Hurwicz 
1951]. It indicates the choice of the initial decision that maximizes:
where n is the number of futures, rij,and 5y are the robustness and debility scores for 
each decision respectively and a  is a subjective weight defined by the decision maker to 
express the trade-off between robustness and debility for each decision, 0 < a  <1 . A
(2.2)
high value of a would describe a risk-seeker decision maker, whereas a low a  would
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be characteristic of a risk-averse decision maker. The values of the expression lie 
between a-1 and a. Thus, for any particular a  the criterion has a total range of 1. If 
a= l, in the extreme case where the average robustness is 1 and the average debility is 
0, then RDC=1. At the other extreme where average robustness is 0 and average 
debility is 1, RDC=0. For a=0 the two extreme values become 0 and -1 respectively.
The criterion can be modified to take into account not only the mean robustness of each 
decision but also the relative concentration of values around the mean:
" \
( l -o)
l h \a j=i
n Sr / n \ s&
where s,., S5 are the standard deviations of the robustness and debility scores 
respectively for di.
An alternative combined criterion is the minimax criterion:
choose the decision dj that maximises the minimum ry (2.4)
Another is the maximax criterion:
choose the decision di that maximises the maximum ry (2.5)
All four criteria have disadvantages. Thus, one weakness of criterion (2.2) is that by 
using average values for the robustness and debility scores across futures, it implicitly 
assumes that all futures are equi-probable. The use of simple averages in the criterion 
can be justified using Laplace's "principle of insufficient reason" where knowing 
nothing about the true state of nature is equivalent to all states having equal probability 
[Laplace 1825]. However, assigning subjective probabilities to the alternative futures, 
would invalidate the whole purpose of conducting robustness analysis: the underlying 
rationale for opting for this sort of analysis is that under conditions of high uncertainty 
probabilities become irrelevant or even meaningless.
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This weakness is shared by the modified robustness-debility criterion (2.3). In 
addition, it has the further disadvantage that meaningful upper and lower limits for the 
expression are hard to calculate, thus rendering comparisons of its value for different 
decisions difficult.
Both the maximax and the minimax criteria present two major disadvantages:
1) They consider either robustness or debility only
2) Non-extreme values of the scores are not taken into consideration, resulting in the 
loss of valuable information: opportunities lost or risks suffered are ignored.
In Chapter 7, the robustness-debility criterion (2.2) will be adopted to provide a basis 
for comparison of the relative flexibility of initial decisions, since it is relatively simple 
to compute, and does not have the disadvantages of either the modified version (2.3) or 
the minimax and maximax criteria.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has explored the nature of uncertainty surrounding real life 
problem situations. It has pointed out that traditional planning methods cannot cope 
with the presence of uncertainty, and that an appropriate method should attempt, among 
other things, to preserve flexibility. It has been argued that in many problem 
situations, where uncertainty concerning the future is dominant, it may be possible for 
decisions to be made sequentially to benefit from information which is unavailable at 
the time the first decision is made, but which might become available at a later time. 
Such an approach provides an opportunity for successive revision of decisions on 
tactics, strategies, and policies. Tactics, strategies, and policies can be applied 
successfully in such situations only when they have certain desirable characteristics. In 
this chapter, some of those characteristics will be presented and discussed. As there 
are many such characteristics and properties, the discussion will be restricted to those 
that are most relevant to the decision making process under conditions of uncertainty, 
and will be focused on flexibility as the central desirable property. Many terms that 
will be used in this analysis have been employed in different senses by various authors. 
In order to avoid terminological conflicts, a set of definitions of terms which will be 
used in a technical sense throughout the analysis will be introduced next, followed by a 
discussion.
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3.2 Definitions
Outcome: The effects that result from the implementation of a decision or a set of 
decisions. Although in most people’s minds outcomes are taken to signify numerical 
results, an outcome can veiy well be a change as subjectively perceived by an observer.
Objective: According to Ackoff [1962] an objective is an outcome which has a. 
positive value for the decision maker. The positive value reflects the fact that the 
outcome is desired by the decision maker. By employing the element of desirability, 
we can define an objective as the intended result of the implementation of a decision or a 
set of decisions.
Goal: In situations where a decision or a set of decisions is implemented with a view 
to achieve multiple objectives, or where there are multiple decision makers with 
conflicting objectives, or where a decision results in more than one outcome, decision 
makers may express their objectives in the form of goals, one for each outcome; goals 
are target levels to be achieved as closely as possible.
Outcomes, objectives and goals describe the “ends” for a decision. To illustrate the 
relationship between these concepts, consider the following example: When switching 
on the central heating system of a room, its temperature rises; both the actual 
temperature measurement and the rise in temperature as perceived by the tenants of the 
room are considered outcomes of the decision. The objective of the decision makers is 
to increase the room temperature. This action, however, may result in other outcomes, 
- - such as a dry atmosphere unwelcome in various degrees by the decision makers.
Moreover, some of the tenants may wish for a further increase, others a slight decrease 
and some may find the temperature ideal. The tenants of the room can agree upon a 
specific temperature measurement acceptable to everyone; that measurement constitutes 
a goal. Thus, even this simple example demonstrates some of the complications 
associated with a decision problem. One of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the existence of a problem is the existence of an objective [Ackoff 1962]. In real life
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problem situations, complications arise from the existence of more than one objective, 
which may not be consistent with each other. Since objectives can also be non- 
quantifiable abstract concepts which reflect individual values and perceptions, further 
complications can arise from the existence of multiple decision makers each with their 
personal values. Goals, in contrast to objectives, are quantitative measures only. This 
fact facilitates the process of negotiation between decision makers in order to achieve 
consensus on the level of the goals, since expressing preferences in. numerical values 
makes the results more explicit. Another word which has been used in a similar sense 
to “objective” is the word “target”. In this analysis, however, target will be used as a 
synonym for goal.
Having considered the "ends", we will now proceed to discuss the "means" to achieve 
them. These "means" are considered at three different levels: tactics, policies and 
strategies. (When making a statement applicable to any of the three levels, the term 
alternatives will be used.) The relationships between these levels can be defined 
either top-down (in which strategies determine tactics) or bottom-up (in which tactics 
sum to strategies). Since this thesis is mostly concerned with the properties of the 
alternatives rather than the generating process, it is of little importance, for our 
purposes, which view is adopted. In this section, we will follow Walker's [1988] 
terminology, which implicitly adopts the bottom-up view.
Tactic: A tactic is a single possible action to be taken which is intended to contribute 
towards the achievement of one or more objectives. Tactics are the building blocks of 
policies and strategies.
Policy: A policy is a combination of tactics describing courses of action relevant to 
the achievement of one or more objectives which are to be taken at particular points in 
time.
Plan: A plan describes the way which a policy is to be implemented.
Strategy: A strategy is a policy plus a plan on how to bring about the desired future.
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Environment: Both the “means” and the “ends” are considered in a specific context, 
the environment: A problem’s environment consists of all factors which can affect the 
outcome of implementing an alternative and which are not under the decision maker’s 
control [Ackoff 1962]. The problem environment is alsacalled the problem context
3.3 Discussion of definitions
A distinction should be made between actions and tactics/policies/strategies. An action 
produces an outcome. A tactic is an action not yet taken which can, once taken, 
contribute towards the achievement of an objective. The same applies to policies and 
strategies: they both specify possible commitments. Unless some of the commitments 
that they describe have been taken they are in principle fully reversible and can be re­
evaluated at any point should the need arise.
Objectives are given certain weights of importance by the decision makers according to 
their priorities; the more desired an outcome is, the greater the weight it is assigned.
Whereas policy gives broad directions for actions to be taken, a strategy describes also 
how these actions are going to be implemented. For example, an AIDS prevention 
policy may be comprised of a variety of tactics, such as screening of all blood donors, 
staff protection measures, educational campaigns etc. An AIDS prevention strategy 
should specify not only the set of tactics to be adopted, but also the way in which they 
will be implemented. That is, how is the blood screening going to be conducted, which 
bodies are to undertake the educational campaigns aimed at different groups of the 
population, etc.
3.4 Desirable characteristics of alternatives under consideration by the 
decision m akers
When selecting alternatives for each problem situation, various desirable characteristics 
of alternatives should be considered. In section 3.5 it will be argued that under
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conditions of uncertainty a very important such characteristic is flexibility, and 
consequently the methodology which will be introduced in Chapter 4 is designed to 
preserve flexibility. Before introducing the concept of flexibility, two types of 
characteristics will be discussed:
(a) characteristics which facilitate the decision making process
(b) characteristics which relate to environmental uncertainties
Characteristics of the first type are desirable in all decision making situations, whereas 
characteristics of the second type are particularly relevant in decision making under 
uncertainty. The properties considered here are by no means mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive.
3.4.1 Characteristics which facilitate the decision making process
Numerous characteristics that facilitate the decision making process have been 
discussed by Walker [1988] and Archibald [1979]. These include: merit, relative 
advantage, origin, scientific status, etc. From a very long list the authors select 
compatibility with existing norms and procedures, communicability, and simplicity as 
the crucial ones to be sought
Compatibility with existing norms and procedures. In cases of wholesale 
restructuring, uncertainty as to the reception of the innovations that the alternative 
introduces is generated. Whether the alternative will be adopted or not depends on the 
balance of power between interested parties. Compatibility with existing procedures 
can reduce the opposition to the proposed changes. Maintaining compatibility does not 
mean giving up significant, visible, large scale changes. To illustrate this, Archibald 
[1979] gives the example of introducing women as firefighters.
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..This will be seen as a dramatic change, requiring adjustments in just about every phase of 
firefighting operations and lifestyle. The design of such a program will be better received if 
compatibility with existing norms, practices, equipment, attitudes, and values can be maintained. ”
Communicability is the ease with which the alternative can be understood by persons 
not involved in the analysis; that is the ease with which these persons can visualise the 
different commitments involved in each step and their respective consequences. 
Communicability can promote communication between interested parties, enhance 
understanding of the problem situation and promote participation and support for the 
project.
Simplicity is a sufficient condition for communicability but not a necessary one. It is 
difficult to define simplicity: an alternative can be characterized simple only relatively to 
others. Measures of simplicity can be the number of outcomes in which the alternative 
may result or the number of separate actions (tactics) that comprise the alternative or the 
effort needed to implement the alternative. If these measures are low, uncertainty about 
the approval of an alternative is reduced.
The type of uncertainty that is resolved if the alternatives are communicable and simple, 
is uncertainty which results from lack of understanding, by some of the individuals 
involved in the analysis, of how the alternative in question will contribute towards the 
objective and to what degree. This uncertainty is of the UV type (see Chapter 2). Since 
the adoption of an alternative may also depend on people other than those designing or 
proposing it, and decisions to adopt alternatives can be made sequentially, a policy or 
strategy may run the risk of being abandoned at some future time. This risk is reduced 
if the alternative is simple and clear at the outset. Moreover, if the alternative is 
compatible with existing norms and procedures it has a higher chance of being adopted. 
All these uncertainties fall into the "restricted" uncertainty category, since they can be 
abolished relatively easily by ensuring that the alternatives in question have the required 
characteristics.
53
Chapter 3: The Need for Flexibility
Clearly, the above characteristics arc relevant in all complex decision making situations, 
not just those where uncertainty is a key factor. For such situations, the characteristics 
of alternatives which are discussed next are most relevant
3.4.2 Characteristics which relate to environmental uncertainties
To clearly demonstrate the characteristics which are desirable under conditions of 
environmental uncertainty, the organization for which the decisions are made will be 
regarded as an operating system. Obvious characteristics of alternatives that are 
desired, in the case of an operating system, include economy, effectiveness and 
efficiency. The key requirement under conditions of environmental uncertainty is the 
preservation of the satisfactory operation of the system. The characteristics considered 
by Walker [1988] to contribute towards this requirement include insensitivity, reliability 
and invulnerability. Archibald [1979], adds that of reversibility and explores the 
implications of complexity. Other characteristics that merit examination include 
divisibility, adaptability and flexibility. The remaining part of this section will present 
and discuss all of the above characteristics, except flexibility which, due to its 
importance, will be discussed separately in section 3.5.
Insensitivity: the degree to which attainment of the objectives will be sustained despite 
disturbances encountered in normal operation of the system;
Reliability: the probability that the system is operating at any given time; and
Invulnerability: the degree to which the performance of the system remains unaffected 
by failure of one of its parts. The performance of the system is its ability to reach the 
goals.
Reversibility: the degree to which it is possible to return to the conditions that existed 
before a change if the change does not in practice seem to be contributing towards the 
achievement of the objectives. In the case of sequential investment decisions under 
uncertainty, when decisions have to be revised in the light of new information,
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reversibility is a crucial characteristic. Although alternatives are defined as 
commitments rather than actions, the psychological effect of commitment should be 
taken into account. Levin [1976] describes the phenomenon of commitment observed 
by psychologists as the state of mind associated with the expectation that a person 
fonns, implicit or explicit, that s/he will suffer a psychological or socio-psychological 
penalty of some kind if s/he goes back on her/his decision:
“...they acquire a disinclination to go back on (their decision) -to negative it- without a plausible cause 
for doing so, such as the occurrence of a change in circumstances that could not have been foreseen. ”
Therefore, a reversible alternative would seem more attractive to decision makers since 
returning to the initial conditions could be easy and less apparent.
Divisibility: A practical way to attempt to achieve reversibility is to design strategies 
and policies that can be sequentially implemented. Divisibility is a property required for 
a mixed-scanning strategy [Etzioni 1967], that is one which first covers the problem 
area holistically but in broad terms, and then focuses in on those areas shown by the 
first scan to require a more in-depth examination.
A concept negatively related to divisibility and simplicity is that of complexity. A 
complex policy or strategy is one that is comprised of a variety of undistinguishable 
parts. This may be either due to the interconnectedness of the decisions about tactics, 
or to failure of the decision makers to understand the distinction between the individual 
steps that must be taken. In the first case, however, the alternative is indivisible, and 
therefore complex, whereas in-the- second it is complex and as a result cannot be seen as 
divisible. A policy that affects groups with competing interests, and tries to deal with 
many factors simultaneously, cannot be anything but complex and thus difficult to 
comprehend. This can be avoided if the policy can be broken down into smaller 
identifiable segments to be implemented at different times and sections of subject 
matter. Avoiding complexity can facilitate the decision making process and achieve 
divisibility.
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Adaptability: the property of a strategy or policy that allows the decision maker to 
change some of the tactics that comprise it to meet changing circumstances. 
Adaptability relates to divisibility and risk. Divisibility may be a prerequisite for 
adaptability; it is easier to change small parts, of a policy than its whole. Risk is reduced 
when the alternative is designed in a way that makes it adaptable to changing 
circumstances. Adaptability is a requirement in cases where insensitivity - the ability to 
perform well under changing circumstances- is low. Adaptability is closely related, as 
will be seen, lo flexibility which is the concept to be discussed next
3.5 The concept of flexibility
There are several definitions of flexibility, and although authors agree that in uncertain 
environments the alternatives under consideration should preserve flexibility, there has 
been debate about the properties that the term implies. Flexibility is a polymorphous 
concept [Evans 1988] which adopts different forms depending on its deployment in 
unique situational contexts. Such contexts include strategic management [Ansoff 1975; 
Eppink 1978; Krijnen 1979, Harrigan 1985], military strategy [Eccles 1959; Taylor 
1959], decision theory [Heimann and Lusk 1976; Merkhofer 1977; Mandelbaum and 
Buzacott 1990], systems analysis [Collingridge 1983; Holling 1973], economics 
[Marschak and Nelson 1962; Jones and Ostroy 1984], business [Vives 1986; Carlsson 
1989] manufacturing [Buzacott 1982; Brown et al. 1984] etc. Evans [1988] states that 
despite the different forms which flexibility may require, all studies in the various 
contexts address a similar problem: that of adjusting available means to better achieve 
current and anticipated future ends. We will define flexibility as the ability to respond 
to unforeseen changes. This definition may seem similar to that of adaptability, but 
there is a fundamental difference: adaptability is a permanent adjustment to a newly 
transformed environment whereas flexibility is a temporary approximation of this 
adjustment [Stigler 1939]. The capacity for constant readaptation to meet changing 
circumstances can be termed flexibility.
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Flexibility is not a characteristic of alternatives in the strict sense; instead it can be 
considered as a property of the decision making process which should be preserved by 
the selection of alternatives that have certain characteristics. Adaptability is such a 
characteristic: because an alternative is adaptable, it contributes towards the preservation 
of flexibility. Other such characteristics are reversibility and divisibility. Alternatives 
can only be flexible because they have certain characteristics which contribute to 
flexibility preservation.
Another concept related to flexibility has been introduced by Gupta and Rosenhead 
[1968], that of robustness. Robustness is a measure of the useful flexibility maintained 
by a decision, and has characteristics which make it a suitable criterion for sequential 
decision making under conditions of uncertainty. The relationship between flexibility 
and robustness will be explained in the next section.
3.6 Flexibility and robustness
Although this section deals with flexibility as a property of decisions about tactics, 
policies and strategies, a distinction should be made between tactical and strategical 
flexibility. Tactical flexibility could be thought of as micro-flexibility in contrast with 
strategical flexibility which could be called macro-flexibility. Tactical flexibility is the 
degree to which a tactic designed to do a certain job can be used with reasonable 
success for a modified, or even an entirely different, purpose. It should not be 
confused with adaptability which is the ability to use a different tactic than the one 
selected initially for achieving the original purpose. Strategical flexibility is the ability 
to make a series of changes in the strategy to cope with unanticipated contingencies.
Since a tactic is a single thing to be done, devising flexible tactics is a relatively simple 
task: tactics are clearly specified single measures; it can be relatively straightforward to 
identify and evaluate their consequences; it may be possible to judge them on the basis 
of past experience. Past experience, however, cannot be a reliable guide to 
effectiveness at a strategic level. The consequences of adopting a certain strategy
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cannot be evaluated in advance, since they depend not only on the performance of the 
individual tactics on particular areas, but also on the relatively ill-understood 
relationships between those areas which are interconnected. Although tactical flexibility 
is relatively easier to maintain than strategic flexibility, its importance should not be 
ignored: once a decision has been made to implement a tactic, reversing or revising this 
decision will prove much more expensive in terms of commitment of resources in the 
absence of tactical flexibility.
Many authors describe flexibility as a criterion for decision making associated with 
preserving options. Options are the remaining possible alternatives once an initial 
decision has been made. Mandelbaum and Buzacott [1990] define flexibility as the 
quality of a system or process which allows it to respond effectively to a change of its 
environment or to a change in the decision maker’s perception of reality. It could be 
argued however, that this is just another version of adaptability (as we have defined it) 
and not flexibility. As an attribute of a decision problem the authors argue that one 
possible way to view flexibility might be the number of options to choose from at a 
later date once a decision has been made. In a similar way, Merkhofer [1977] states 
that the flexibility of a decision variable is determined by the size of the choice set 
associated with that variable. Pye [1978] defines flexibility as the amount of 
uncertainty which the decision maker retains concerning the future choices s/he will 
make, and argues that under simple circumstances it may be interpreted as the number 
of future alternatives from which choice will be made.
AJ1 these three “option-preserving” definitions of flexibility presented above, seem to 
confuse flexibility, a quality, with numbers of remaining options. The concept of 
robustness can help resolve the ambiguity. The distinction can be made clearly between 
flexibility as a quality, and robustness as its measure. The ability to change to 
accommodate a wide range of futures is, despite discrepancies in terminology, a 
necessary and desirable characteristic of any alternative considered in an uncertain
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environment. In this thesis, we will use the terms flexibility for this property and 
robustness will be regarded as its measure.
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SCENARIO-ROBUSTNESS METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter the necessity of maintaining flexibility when planning under 
uncertainty was discussed- In this chapter a methodology to preserve such flexibility 
based both on robustness analysis and on scenario analysis will be presented. The 
multi-future perspective of robustness analysis, as already explained, can provide 
information on the relative flexibility of alternative initial decisions under different 
futures. Robustness analysis does not however prescribe how these futures are 
obtained. Scenario analysis, a planning tool used in decision making under uncertainty 
to analyse alternative futures will be used in the new methodology to construct these 
futures.
In developing any such methodology, it is important to define all the terms involved 
since the terminology in general use fails to cover all aspects of the analysis, while 
some terms are used in varying senses in the literature. Below, we will first describe 
some aspects of the decision making environment which will be assumed, and then 
introduce formal definitions of the terms that will be used in the analysis. Before 
presenting the methodology itself, both the nature and the purpose of scenario analysis 
will be discussed.
4.2 The decision making environment
Decision making in an organisational context is a complicated and subtle process. For 
definitional clarity many of these complexities will be subjected to a robust 
simplification in what follows. Thus, the decision maker will be referred to as if s/he 
were a single person or a homogeneous group. No distinction will be made between
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decision making and the actual implementation of decisions. The reason for making 
these assumptions is that in this chapter the interest is exclusively focused on the 
behaviour of the organisation as a single entity in relation to the outside world.
The organisation for which the decision maker acts will in some instances be referred to 
as the operating system; it follows that the "operating environment" is the context in 
which the organisation operates. As a simplification, the operating environment will be 
seen_as a responsive one, in which decisions taken by the decision maker are capable of 
provoking responsive actions by other decision makers in the field. The presence of 
other factors capable of shaping the future and which are outside the decision maker's 
control must also be acknowledged. Shifts in general operating conditions do take 
place over time and factors causing these changes include non-responsive actions, one- 
off events and accidents. These factors are inherently uncertain, and therefore the 
decision maker may need to make alternative assumptions about their occurrence.
4.3 The time frame
In any planning exercise, after defining the scope of the analysis, establishing the time 
horizon is a necessary step which should be taken at an early stage. For clarity, a 
distinction should be made between the short term and the long term context: The end 
of the short term, for the purposes of this analysis, will be marked by the decision 
horizon. A number of alternative criteria can be used to identify the decision horizon:
i) The time that the decision maker must take the next decision.
ii) The time span of the immediate attention of the decision maker when making and 
implementing an initial decision.
iii) Data (both soft and hard) availability. The decision maker must judge up to which 
time current knowledge permits adequate detailed evaluation of possibilities.
iv) Operational considerations. The decision horizon can be selected to reflect a time- 
point before which repeating the analysis could be costly both in monetary and 
manpower terms.
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The selection of the criterion to be applied depends on the particular problem situation. 
Thus using the timing of the next decision as a criterion for the selection of the decision 
horizon has the advantage of assisting in structuring the problem by identifying those 
times at which action is required. Its main disadvantage is that it does not define the 
decision horizon uniquely, since different initial decisions may require subsequent 
decisions to be taken at different time points. Selecting the time span of the immediate 
attention of the decision maker as the criterion, also assists in problem structuring, 
since the decision maker must identify the time-point where specific effects of the 
implementation of the decision are expected to occur. On the other hand, if this 
criterion is adopted, the decision horizon is directly dependent on the specific initial 
decision and consequently cannot be defined uniquely.
Data availability and operational considerations are convenient criteria to use since they 
solve many practical problems. Data availability is dependent on the initial decision but 
not as strongly as the first two criteria, whereas operational considerations are totally 
independent of the initial decision. However, they both offer little help in structuring 
the problem. Whichever criterion is chosen, either on its own or in conjunction with 
the other two, the identification of the decision horizon relies ultimately on the decision 
makers' personal judgement. There is, therefore, no external objective answer to the 
question of selecting the decision horizon, but use of the above criteria provides useful 
reference points in the discussion. Whichever alternative formulation is chosen, the 
short term can be defined as the period that elapses between the decision making point 
and the decision horizon.
The planning horizon delimits the time span beyond which events including the 
possible performance of the operating system are not and cannot be taken into account 
in current decision making because of increased uncertainty and lack of relevant data. 
The location of the planning horizon can be influenced in a general sort of way by the 
economic life cycle of investment decisions, any explicit or implicit time discounting 
and by the extent of uncertainty present in the problem situation. Since the general
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nature of long term planning does not permit a great level of detail, the choice of 
criterion is not as important as in short-term planning. By "long term” we will denote , 
the latter part of the period between the decision horizon and the planning horizon. The 
duration of both the short term and the long term varies according to the puipose of the 
analysis.
4.4 Definitions
A set of mutually consistent definitions of the basic concepts needed to build up the 
scenario-robustness planning methodology will be now introduced. From this point on 
the words to be defined will be used in a limited technical sense. All concepts relating 
to the short teim are denoted by lowercase letters, whereas concepts relating to the long 
term are denoted in capitals.
A single decision element is a measure which purposefully modifies the operating 
system. The changes to the system will occur in the short term but since every decision 
has a time profile of effects in the future, the effects of the decision will continue to be 
present in the longer term.
A decision package is an integrated set of measures or commitment of resources 
which modifies the operating system in a coherent way. In many cases the null 
decision package of no deliberate change to the operating system will be among those 
to be considered. The concept of decision package includes the concept of decision 
element as a special case. The set of decision packages is denoted by the set d = {dj}, 
i=l,2,...,I. For simplicity, in what follows the term "initial decision" will be used to 
denote an initial decision package.
Within the short term, each initial decision can provoke one or more responsive 
actions by other decision makers in the field who share an interest in the situation in 
question. Let
a = {aq}, q=0,l,2,...,Q
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be the set of all responsive actions available to other decision makers. A subset of 
these, aj, are potential responses to dj. The general member of ai will be called a^, 
(k=l,2,...,Ki). These responsive actions will be assumed to take place in the short 
term and with effects which will have manifested themselves before the decision 
horizon. No explicit responsive actions after the decision horizon will be considered. 
Possible long term responsive actions will instead be incorporated within alternative 
"scenarios".
The potential responsive decision makers will be treated as a group; no responsive 
actions will be identified to particular decision makers. The value 0 for the index q 
corresponds to the case where no responsive action is taken.
The short term consequences of an initial decision are also affected by factors other 
than responsive actions. These factors may include changes in the parameters of the 
operating environment and other (non-responsive) decisions up to the decision horizon. 
The decision maker therefore may need to make alternative assumptions about these 
factors; alternative assumptions which can be made will be termed conjectures and 
will be denoted by the set c = {cm}, m = 1,2,...,M.
The realisation of particular conjectures and responsive actions will together shape the 
short term setting. Thus, at the decision horizon the decision maker may be operating 
within alternative possible contexts which will be termed environments. The set of 
possible alternative environments is denoted by e = {e^} = ( aik, cm)
Any initial decision can be combined with a compatible environment to form a 
situation. The set of possible situations is denoted by t = {t|J} = (d i, )
So far, we have only covered the situation in the short term. The long term future may 
be shaped by a multitude of external factors. The decision maker will need to make 
assumptions about particular combinations of settings/values of these factors which we 
will call scenarios. A scenario, therefore, is a complete, consistent, and plausible
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description of a possible long-term future operating environment Alternative scenarios 
are denoted by the set C = {Cj}, j= l, 2,..., J.
The implementation of one of the decision maker's initial decisions will result, ceteris 
paribus, in a specific state of the operating system at the decision horizon. These 
states will be termed interim  configurations. The set of possible interim 
configurations is denoted by g^{gv }> v = 1,2, ...,V.
Similarly, the implementation of a series of decisions taken by the decision maker will 
result ceteris paribus in a specific long-term state of the operating system which will be 
termed a configuration. One configuration may be attainable by different decision 
sequences. The set of possible configurations is denoted by G={Gn}, n = 1,2, ...,N.
Thus, an initial decision triggers off one or more responsive actions, which together 
with the realisation of particular conjectures lead to possible short-term environments. 
Subsequent decisions of the decision maker can result in a number of alternative system 
configurations. The performance of any particular configuration will generally depend 
on the scenario in which it may need to operate.
The definitions presented above.will be used as building blocks to construct the new 
methodology for planning under uncertainty. As mentioned before, this methodology 
uses robustness analysis (described in Chapter 2), a tool for sequential decision 
making, to assess the flexibility of alternative configurations under particular scenarios. 
At this point, therefore, and before introducing the methodology formally, the nature 
and purpose of scenario analysis will be discussed.
4.5 Scenario analysis
Scenario analysis is a technique applied in decision making under uncertainty for 
analysing alternative futures in order to develop strategies. Scenario planning 
techniques are adopted when increased levels of uncertainty are present in the planning 
environment and consequently traditional forecasting methods become inadequate.
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Such high uncertainty situations arise in long-term strategic planning. Scenario 
analysis is particularly useful in preparing strategic decisions, since these are by nature 
irreversible and concern the longer-term future. Companies and organisations that need 
long-term forecasts to develop their strategic plans have found it useful to replace 
traditional forecasting with scenario analysis.
Most industrial firms which adopted scenario analysis as a strategic planning tool did 
so after the 1973 oil crisis1 proved the inadequacy of forecasting by extrapolating past 
trends. Linneman and Klein [1979] in a survey they conducted in 1977 of the "Fortune 
1000" U.S. industrial corporations, found that approximately 15 % had begun using 
multiple scenario analysis. In a follow-up study [Linnemann and Klein 1983] the same 
authors found that in 1981 this percentage had risen to 35%. McHale and McHale 
[1976] found scenario building to be the most widely used internationally, of the 
structured, non-analytic futures-research techniques. More recent regular users of 
scenario analysis include the electricity industry [Mobasheri et aL 1989; Hankinson 
1986], the oil industry [Galer and Kasper 1982; Leemhuis 1985; Wack 1985a; 1985b; 
De Geus 1988; Hadfield 1990], the process (paper, fibre and wood products, 
chemicals, petroleum, glass concrete, abrasive and gypsum) and aerospace industries 
[Linnemann and Klein 1983] as well as banks, motor and electronics companies 
[Linneman and Kennell 1977].
Scenario analysis is also particularly relevant in cases where the source of uncertainty is 
conflict between actors. It is not incidental that such techniques originate in the military 
sector. The US Pentagon regularly analyses possible scenarios of conflict situations to 
determine the level of defence required to cope with those eventualities [Guardian
1 One company that had developed scenario planning in the late 60's and early 70’s is 
Royal Dutch/Shell. By listening to planners’ analysis of the global business 
environment, Shell's management was prepared for the eventuality-if not the timing- of 
the 1973 oil crisis. And again, in 1981, when other oil companies stockpiled reserves 
in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, Shell sold off its excess before the 
glut became a reality and prices collapsed [Wack 1985a].
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1992]. Metagame analysis, a technique for analysing processes of conflict or 
cooperation between actors by using scenarios, was first developed in the 1960s under 
a contract with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [Howard 1971].
By creating and analysing scenarios, planners attempt to embrace uncertainty in their 
strategies; the usefulness of the technique lies not so much in facilitating the selection of 
the appropriate course of action, as in helping managers to understand the problem 
situation, to identify the driving forces of uncertainty and to reorganise their mental 
model of reality.
4.5.1 Scenarios: Definitions
Hadfield [1992] defines scenarios as "alternative views of the future business 
environment over a long timespan". Similar definitions are given by O'Brien et al 
[1991] "... distinct snapshots of the environment at a future point in time", by 
Linneman and Kennell [1977] "...possible future operating environments for the 
organisation", and Leemhuis [1985] "... descriptions of possible future (business) 
worlds". Mobasheri et al. [1989] describe a scenario as "a complete, consistent, and 
plausible description for a possible future state of the world that could occur if one or 
more major events were to happen". To distinguish scenarios from sets of forecasts of 
individual variables independently arrived at, Linnemann and Klein [1983] stated in the 
questionnaire they sent out in the course of their second survey of US industrial firms 
that a scenario is " a written depiction of a possible external future environment facing 
the firm and/or its planning units that indicate the interdependencies among the critical 
issues of variables characterising the future". All of the above definitions agree that a 
scenario is a static picture of a possible future operating environment Linnemann and 
Klein state explicitly that a scenario is also external. This last definition disagrees with 
the definition given by Howard [1989], who describes a scenario as a combination of 
actors' plans in cases of conflict between actors. For each actor it is "a possible
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pathway into the indefinite future, representing the future each actor would anticipate if 
those plans were carried out”.
Howard's definition differs from all previous ones in that it includes the decision 
maker's actions in the scenario. Since Howard is concerned with situations of conflict, 
this is a valid assumption as the decision makers’ intended actions in such situations 
will influence the other players’ intentions. Whether the decision maker's actions 
should be included in the scenario generation process or not depends on the situation in 
question or the purpose of the analysis. For example, if the decision maker wants to 
develop different scenarios about the state of the world economy, it would be foolish to 
believe that any of his/her actions would have an influence on the outcome, unless of 
course, the decision maker happens to be the government of a world leading economic 
power or an organisation that can exert such influence, as for example OPEC. If, on 
the other hand, the purpose of the analysis is the launch of a product by a competitor in 
an oligopoly market, his/her firm's intentions as perceived by the competitor may 
influence the latteris decisions.
The question arises whether the decision maker's intended actions should be included 
in the scenarios or not. The dilemma, however, is more a question of formality rather 
than substance. The purpose of all these analyses is to assist the decision maker in 
taking the most appropriate decision. Her/his decisions, therefore, are the core of the 
analysis. Whether they are included in the scenarios, or are examined in conjunction 
with them, is secondary. Thus, since the question is one of definition, in this thesis we 
will not include the decision maker's options within the definition of a scenario, in 
order to remain consistent with the most frequent terminological usage, and so to avoid 
confusion. Table 4.1 below summarizes the differences between "scenarios” as 
commonly used in strategic planning and "scenarios" as employed in Metagame theory.
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Strategic Planning Approach
General
Metagame Approach 
Detailed
External Intemal+Extemal
Few in number Many
Table 4.1: Differences between scenarios using two approaches
All definitions mentioned above point to four basic characteristics of a scenario:
a) It is hypothetical; the decision maker only hypothesises about the future course of 
events.
b) It is static; it represents a situation at a specified future point in time.
c) It is uncontrollable (or at most, partially controllable); that is, the decision maker can 
act in a specific way to influence the course of events, but because of the existing 
uncertainty, s/he cannot ensure that a particular scenario will become reality.
d) It is self contained; the logic of the particular combination of factors in a scenario 
describe a feasible future.
Taking these characteristics into consideration we can now define a scenario more 
formally as a description complete at its level of detail, of a future state of the operating 
environment of the organisation which results from a series of actions of agents 
external to the organisation, whose actions the decision maker can only partially 
influence.
In the strategic planning approach to scenario analysis, emphasis is placed on the long­
term horizon, using mostly intuitive methods to assess possible alternative 
configurations of the environment at that point. These configurations are necessarily 
small in number (two, three or four usually) since only very broad hypotheses about a 
very limited number of key issues can reasonably be made for such a long time ahead. 
In the short run, however, more detailed predictions can be made based on the decision 
maker's current knowledge of the environment. For these more detailed short-term 
scenarios the term conjectures, as already defined, has been adopted.
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4.5.2 Generating scenarios
In the literature there are various guidelines on how to develop and use scenarios 
[Linneman and Kennell 1977; Nair and Sharin 1979; Huss and Honton 1987; Schnaars 
1987; Howard 1989; Hadfield 1991]. O' Brien et al [1991] have combined the various 
approaches described in the literature into an eight stage scenario generation process:
Stage 1 Define the scope of the analysis
Stage 2 Select key factors
Stage 3 For each key factor, determine a range over which that factor may vary
within the time horizon 
Stage 4 Combine projections of key factors to form scenarios
Stage 5 Discard internally inconsistent or implausible scenarios
Stage 6 Select a set of distinct scenarios 
Stage 7 Produce narratives for each scenario 
Stage 8 Use scenarios to create and test plans
Howard [1989] whose metagame analysis investigates situations of potential conflict, 
proposes the following process for generating scenarios:
The first step is to review the issues to be decided. Proceed by asking who controls 
the issues: the answers will provide a list of actors. By asking how the actors are 
controlling the issues, a list of policy options can be produced. A scenario results from 
a combination of specific choices for each option.
Theoretically, a very large number of scenarios can be generated by using all the 
available combinations of actors’ plans, even if the list of actors and options is 
relatively small. Even from a list of two actors with two policy options each, we can
construct 16 scenarios. Fortunately, some of the scenarios generated in this way can
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be infeasible1. The scenario generation process is followed by the classification and 
inteipretation of scenarios. Five classes of scenarios are of particular interest:
1) The status quo as it was before the "situation" arose
2) The present scenario, incorporating present intentions
3) The positions of different actors, meaning the scenarios they would like 
others to agree to
4) Possible compromises between different actors' positions
5) Possible conflict points actors might move to by changing their own plans in 
trying to force others to accept their positions.
Interpretation of scenarios involves explicit description of the effects that actors' 
intentions would have if they were all held to indefinitely. Howard continues the 
process by analysing scenarios using strategic maps and laying out all the threats and 
promises actors can make to try and stabilise the situation at scenarios they prefer. This 
process has already been described in Chapter 2. In this section, only the pre-play 
analysis (i.e. scenario generation) is of interest
We can summarize Howard's scenario generating process in 8 stages:
Stage 1 Review issues to be decided
Stage 2 Determine list of actors by asking who controls the issues
1 Howard maintains that in some combinations the infeasibility could be psychological: 
“...The infeasibility of A planning to collaborate with an unwilling B is actually 
psychological, consisting in the fact that A can’t form the intention to collaborate 
without belief in B’s corresponding intention. Hence A’s intention may be changed by 
B’s.” Recognition, however, of the fact that human interactions may change intentions, 
does not change the infeasibility of the scenario. In Howard’s example, only the 
scenarios “A collaborates with B and B collaborates with A” and “A does not 
collaborate with B and B does not collaborate with A” are feasible. Actor A may 
believe the second scenario to be more probable to occur if he considers B unwilling to 
collaborate, but in that case he does not consider the first scenario as infeasible. He 
merely considers it very improbable. Therefore, infeasible scenarios in this case are 
only those where one actor collaborates and the other does not
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Stage 3 Determine list of policy options by asking how actors can control the
issues
Stage 4 Combine actors’ options to generate scenarios
Stage 5 Discard infeasibilities
Stage 6 Classify scenarios
Stage 7 Interpret scenarios
Stage 8 Analyse threats and promises
It is clear that the two generating processes have a certain relationship in most stages. 
Stage 2 of O’Brien’s process corresponds to both stages 1 and 2 of Howard's 
procedure. In stages 2 and 3 O’Brien et al. examine the possible changes in key factors 
without specifying their source, that is the action that caused them, whereas in stages 2 
and 3 of Howard's process the actions available to the actors are examined.
Another difference in the two procedures is that O' Brien's does not include the 
decision maker's options explicitly in the formation of scenarios. These are only 
considered in the final stage where scenarios are used to test plans. This is consistent 
with Hadfield's definition of a scenario as a view of the future business environment 
[Hadfield 1990]. Metagame analysis, however, includes the decision maker's options 
in the formation of scenarios. In the previous section, we have given reasons for the 
non-inclusion of the decision maker's options in the scenarios. Although the decision 
maker's actions will not be included in our scenarios, it is however worthwhile to 
adopt Howard's way of eliciting options, since in the general case, it is possible that 
the decision maker’s intended actions as perceived by other actors will influence their 
responses, which in turn will shape the future operating environment Moreover, by 
listing the actors (including the decision maker) who are fewer than the available 
options first, and then proceed to list the corresponding options we can easily avoid to 
overlook some options.
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The following figure shows the relationships between the two procedures. The dashed 
arrows indicate a weaker correspondence than the plain ones.
O ' Brien Howard
Determine scope
Select key factors
w  Review issues
List actors
Range of variation List options
Combine into scenarios
Discard implausibilides
Combine into scenarios
Discard infeasibilities
-    . .  . . .
Select set of distinct scenarios
i  ------- __________
Classify scenarios
Produce narratives iInterpret scenarios
Use scenarios to test plans Analyze threats and promises
Figure 4.1: Relationships between the stages of the two scenario generating processes
It has been argued that the number of scenarios under consideration must be small 
enough to be manageable. Authors agree that for business purposes no more than four 
scenarios must be developed1 [Linnemann and Klein 1979; Beck 1982; Wack 1985b;
1 It is difficult to state whether two, three, or four is best. Schnaars [1987] maintains 
that the number depends on the goals of the analysis and the specific application. 
Deficiencies in using either two or three scenarios have been pointed out. Two 
scenarios tend to be classified as "pessimistic" and "optimistic". Managers then believe 
that the truth is somewhere in between. They split the difference to arrive at an answer 
not very different from a single-line forecast. A design that includes three scenarios
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Schnaars 1987]. This recommendation can be followed since the factors shaping a 
scenario can be described in very broad terms and consequently their number will be 
small.
We can use elements of both procedures to generate conjectures and scenarios in the 
planning methodology which is introduced in the next section.
4.6 The Scenario-robustness methodology
In the previous chapters we have argued that traditional planning methods are 
inadequate for conducting planning under uncertainty, largely because they aim to 
abolish it rather than recognize its presence and attempt to keep options open for future 
resolution. A methodology suitable for planning under uncertainty should aim to 
preserve flexibility. It has been argued that multiple-future robustness analysis is such 
a methodology. This methodology however, does not prescribe a specific method to 
construct these multiple futures. Rosenhead [1980b] suggests, among other methods, 
the development of alternative scenarios using the Delphi technique [Helmer 1966]. 
This technique uses a panel of experts, where each member of the panel answers 
(separately) questions on possible future developments. These answers are processed 
and re-circulated to the panel to prompt revised responses. Consensus, or stable 
polarized groups emerge usually after no more than three iterations. Rosenhead states 
that it is possible to devise a modified approach where a set of distinct positions rather 
than consensus is encouraged.
Another multi-future approach that Rosenhead considers relevant is the use of 
"conditional projections" [Sandberg 1976], where answers to "what if ' questions
describing alternative outcomes along a single dimension is dangerous because many 
managers tend to identify the middle one as a baseline [Wack 1985b]. The same view 
is shared by Wilson [1978] who prescribes that in such cases the scenarios should be 
distinctly "themed" to make them appear equally likely. Finally, four scenarios may 
seem too many.
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about the continuation of existing relations, are used to identify those relations whose 
break-up would lead to more desirable futures. Both Sandberg's conditional 
projections and scenario analysis constitute option-scanning devices to explore not only 
alternative decisions but also alternative operating environments.
It is clear that a formal, but not restrictive method to elicit possible futures would offer 
a valuable assistance to conducting robustness analysis. Scenario analysis is such a 
method. We have seen however, that there are two approaches to scenario generation: 
one requires the identification of key factors only, whereas the other requires all 
options to be explicitly stated. We can, however, use both to exploit their respective 
advantages. An approach related to Howard's can be used to conduct analysis 
pertaining to the decision horizon, since there is more information about the short term. 
Uncertainty grows as we move towards the planning horizon. Since detailed 
predictions are irrelevant in the long term, the strategic planning approach can be used 
to identify a small number of distinct scenarios about the longer-term future.
The new planning methodology therefore, consists of two exercises: one analysis at the 
decision horizon, and one at the planning horizon. Since it borrows elements from 
both robustness analysis and scenario analysis, Scenario-Robustness Methodology 
(SRM) would be an appropriate name for it. The steps involved to conduct SRM are 
listed below:
1. Select decision horizon and planning horizon
2. For decision horizon (i) list all possible responsive actions
(ii) make alternative conjectures
(iii) combine responsive actions and conjectures 
to generate feasible environments
(iv) identify possible interim configurations
(v) conduct robustness analysis to each initial 
decision under different environments on the
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basis of the desirability of interim configurations
(vi) Compute robustness-debility scores
3. For planning horizon (i) generate scenarios
(ii) identify possible configurations
(iii) for each initial decision check which 
configurations are attainable under alternative 
scenarios
(iv) apply robustness analysis to each initial decision 
under different scenarios on the basis of the 
desirability of configurations
(v) Compute robustness-debility scores
4. Check which initial decision(s) are indicated by both short-term and long-term 
analysis in terms of highest robustness-debility scores.
The procedures described in the first three steps have all been explained in detail in 
various previous sections of this thesis. Step 4, however has not yet been discussed. 
The situation may be relatively straightforward if an initial decision performs 
reasonably in terms of robustness at both horizons. Problems arise when no such 
decision can be found. The methodology will not attempt to give a particular answer in 
this case; the horizon which should have the dominant influence will be determined by 
the decision makers in the particular problem situation. It would be unrealistic to make 
a specific recommendation without knowing the details of the problem. Moreover, 
making specific recommendations is not the purpose of SRM. Its aim is to assist the 
decision making process by structuring the problem and to identify flexible decisions. 
However, in addition to flexibility, other factors such as cost, ease of implementation, 
political pressure etc. will influence the final commitment.
Since SRM is based on both scenario and robustness analysis, it follows that it is 
particularly relevant when both these methodologies are recommended. In terms of the 
classification of uncertainty described in Chapter 2, SRM is relevant in cases of "hard"
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uncertainty, when surprises are expected, and under ignorance. The type of 
uncertainty it tackles is mostly UE and UR in Friend and Jessop's terms, and 
uncertainty over consequences of actions in Hopwood’s terms. These are the types of 
uncertainty prevalent in turbulent environments where scenario analysis is indicated.
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CHAPTER 5
MEASUREMENT OF UNCERTAINTY USING MEASURES OF 
SIMILARITY BETWEEN SCENARIOS
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter an attempt will be made to measure the uncertainty about the future in a 
decision-making situation by using scenarios. Although this measurement is not 
incorporated in SRM, it is nevertheless a useful by-product of the analysis. A 
measurement of the uncertainty about the future prevalent in a planning situation may 
help to identify possible alternative analytical approaches appropriate to that situation.
The conventional way of measuring uncertainty is to apply probabilities to establish the 
relative likelihood of certain events occurring. We have argued, however, approaches 
using probabilities are not appropriate in situations of high uncertainty, where surprises 
are possible. Surprise events have by definition a very small probability of occurring 
and consequently, planning techniques based on such probabilities fail to anticipate the 
unexpected. The problem arises therefore, of how to measure uncertainty in turbulent 
environments, without applying probabilities. Scenario analysis offers one possible 
resolution of this difficulty. During the course of conducting SRM, a number of 
scenarios about the long term future are constructed. In this chapter, we will develop a 
measure of the uncertainty in a problem situation based on variation in the performance 
of the system under the different scenarios.
Suppose that the problem situation can be described by the matrix in Figure 5.11:
*For simplicity, we consider only the case of single rather than sequential 
commitments.
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Ci
c2
Cm
Each element of this matrix (symbolized by Fy) represents the future situation 
resulting from the implementation of decision i and the occurrence of scenario j. In this 
chapter these situations will be referred to as "futures”. Each of these futures may be 
evaluated using a subjective qualitative scale according to their desirability. If a 
measure of similarity between scenarios by using the corresponding futures can be 
found, it would also be a measure of the prevalent uncertainty. By similarity, we do 
not imply identical performance, but rather performance which is equally desirable. 
Thus, we can ascertain the amount of uncertainty present in the problem situation by 
examining how similarly each decision is treated by the different scenarios. The more 
similar the treatment, the less it matters which scenario finally materialises (in terms of 
the desirability of the outcomes), and thus, the less uncertainty surrounds the problem.
The following sections will examine various ways to measure similarity. Section 5.2 
attempts to measure similarity between scenarios by using similarity coefficients 
developed for use in cluster analysis. Section 5.3 examines the use of Gower’s index 
of similarity for the same purpose. In section 5.4 the suitability of the variance- 
covariance matrix of the scenarios to measure their similarity is examined, while 
section 5.5 presents the use of the coefficient of concordance (between scenarios) as a 
measure of uncertainty. Examples of such use are given in section 5.6, followed by a 
comparison in section 5.7 of the performances of the coefficient of concordance and of 
the cluster analysis similarity coefficients. The chapter concludes with a discussion in 
section 5.8 on the use of similarity measures to measure uncertainty.
di d2
F h F l2 Fm
F21 F22 F2n
. . . . . . . . .
Fml Fm2 Fmn
dn
Figure 5.1: A matrix of futures
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5.2 Measurement of similarity using cluster analysis similarity 
coefficients
The raw data to be subjected to cluster analysis consists of a matrix of measurements of 
individual entities. Similarity coefficients are used to ascertain the degree of similarity 
between those measurements in order to classify the individuals into particular groups. 
We will see that if we treat the matrix of futures as a matrix of measurements, where 
the individuals are the scenarios, and then use similarity coefficients to determine the 
similarity of those scenarios, we will produce a measure of uncertainty. A brief 
presentation of cluster analysis similarity coefficients is given below followed by the 
application of those coefficients to the futures matrix.
Everitt [1980] describes cluster analysis as a set of techniques which seek to separate 
data into constituent groups1. In general, the raw data to be subjected to cluster 
analysis consists of an n*m matrix of measurements, X, where xjj is the score on the 
jth variable, character or attribute for the i1*1 individual, entry or object under study. 
The measurements involved may be quantitative (e.g. age, weight, etc.), qualitative 
(e.g. the presence or absence of a symptom, eye colour etc.), or, as happens in many 
cases, the data will involve a mixture of both types of variable.
A range of possible measures of similarity can be applied to determine the degree of 
similarity between individuals using the information in X, and thus assign those 
individuals to particular groups. A similarity coefficient measures the relationship 
between two individuals given their values on a set of variates common to both. In 
many cases those variates are of the presence or absence type which may be arranged 
in the familiar two-way association table for binary data:
1 Although Kendall and Stuart [1979] propose that the term "cluster analysis" be used 
for techniques which group variables, and "classification" for those which group 
individuals, in this thesis we will adopt Everitt’s terminology and refer to both types of 
grouping as cluster analysis.
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Individual i
Presence Absence
Presence a b a+b
Absence c d c+d
a+c b+d a+b+c+d
Table 5.1: Two-wav association table for binary data
In Table 5.1, a represents the number of positive matches, b and c are mismatches, 
and d is the number of negative matches.
Many similarity coefficients have been suggested for data of this type [Everitt 1980]. 
These include the following:
(i) (a + d)/(a+b+c+d) (ii) a/(a+b+c) (iii) 2a/(2a+b+c)
(iv) 2 (a+d)/[2 (a+d)+b+c] (v) a/[a+2(l>fc)] (vi) a/(a+b+c+d)
The number of proposed association coefficients is large, mainly because of the 
uncertainty over how to incorporate negative matches (Le. d in Table 5.1) into the 
coefficients. In many situations the absence of a characteristic in two individuals does 
not automatically guarantee their similarity. For example, the fact that two individuals 
do not have blue eyes, does not mean that they have the same eye colour. Of the six 
coefficients presented above, only coefficients (i) and (iv) explicitly take into account 
both positive and negative matches (a and d respectively), the latter giving more 
importance to matches over mismatches (b and c). Sneath and Sokal [1973] give a full 
discussion of similarity coefficients for use with binary data and decide that no hard 
rule can be made regarding the inclusion or otherwise of negative matches. Each set of 
data must be considered on its merits by an investigator familiar with the material.
Differences amongst the coefficients also arise over the question of whether or not 
matched pairs of variables-should be weighted equally with, or carry twice the weight 
of unmatched pairs, or vise-versa. For example in coefficient (iv) matched pairs carry 
twice the weight that they carry in coefficient (i), where matched and unmatched pairs 
carry equal weight.
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Qualitative data for which the variates may have many levels (as in our problem) may 
be treated in a similar way to binary data, with each level of a variate regarded as a 
single binary variable. For example, consider the two individuals 1 and 2 , each 
measured on variates x and y, each of which can take the three values A, B, C (instead 
of 0 or 1). Suppose that individual 1 measures A on x and C on y, and that individual 
2 measures B on x, and C on Y. The new matrix of measurements is represented in 
Figure 5.2:
X y
A B C A B c
Individual 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Individual 2 0 1 0 0 0 1
Figure 5.2: Example of matrix of measurements for qualitative data
The matrix of measurements in Figure 5.2 can be treated as measurements of two 
individuals on six binary variates, and similarity coefficients for binary data can be 
applied. This representation generalises easily to larger problems. As will be seen 
later, evaluations of the performance of the futures will be treated in a similar way.
Let us now consider how similarity coefficients can be applied to our problem. If we 
have n decisions and m scenarios, each entry xjj of the matrix of futures (Figure 5.1), 
is a measurement of the performance of the future resulting from the combination of the 
the 1th decision with the j1*1 scenario. That is, each row of the matrix represents a 
scenario, whereas each column represents the future possibilities for each decision1. A 
possible matrix of measurements, using the qualitative scale of Very Good (V), Good 
(G), Fair (F), Poor (P), Catastrophic (C) is shown in Figure 5.3. This matrix shows 
how each decision fares under a particular scenario.
*In some cases it would be more convenient to work with the transposed matrix.
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d]  d2
Cl V G F
C2 G P C
F P C
Figure 5.3: Example of matrix of measurements of scenarios
Scenarios can be seen as the individuals which are being investigated for similarity, 
and decisions as the variates on which they are measured. Thus, the matrix in Figure
5.3 can be seen as equivalent to the matrix of measurements X. The scale of 
qualitative measurements of the performance of each future (V, G, F, P, C) can be 
seen as the five binary variables on which the variates (decisions) are measured. In 
this way, a matrix of measurements equivalent to that in Figure 5.2 can be produced. 
If there are only two scenarios under consideration, the cluster analysis similarity 
coefficients can be used to measure the degree of similarity between those scenarios.
We will illustrate this measurement of similarity with an example of 10 possible 
decision situations. These situations are presented in Figure 5.4. These 10 cases have 
been designed in such a way as to produce certain intuitive uncertainty rankings. The 
suitability of the similarity coefficients will be examined on the basis of verification of 
these expectations. The intuitive rankings of these cases are discussed below.
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di d2 d3 d4
Cl V G F P
C2 V G F P
Case 1
dl d2 d4
Ci V V V V
c 2 G G G G
Case 3
di d2 d3 d4
Ci
c 2
V V V V
G G F F
Case 5
di d2 d3 d4
Ci
c 2
V G F P
P F G V
di d2 d3 d4
Cl V G F P
C2 G F P C
Case 2
di d2 d? d4
Cl
C2
V V V V
F F F F
Case 4
di d2 d3 d4
Ci V V V V
c 2 G G F C
Case 6
di d2 d3 d4
Cl V G F P
C2 p G G V
Case 7
di d2 d3 64
Ci V G F P
c 2 V F G P
Case 8
di d2 d3 d4
Ci V G F P
c 2 V F F P
Case 9 Case 10
Figure 5.4: An example of 10 possible decision situations
In case 1 both scenarios treat each decision the same way, whereas in case 2, C2 treats 
each decision one level worse than Ci. In both cases we would expect a high 
similarity score.
In case 4, C2 treats each decision worse than it does in case 3. Case 4 is expected 
- therefore to give a lower similarity score than case 3.
Case 6 differs from case 5 only in one element. It would be interesting to see what 
difference, if any, this rather small difference has on the similarity scores.
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In case 7, C2 treats each decision in exactly the opposite way than Ci, while case 8 
differs from case 7 in one element only. A very low similarity score is expected in 
both cases; it would be of interest too, to measure the sensitivity of the coefficients to 
small differences.
Finally, cases 9 and 10 also differ at one element, but in contrast with cases 5 and 6 Ci 
treats all decisions differently. In this example we would expect case 10 to give higher 
similarity scores between the two scenarios.
The results on the six coefficients are given in Table 5.2. Details of the calculations 
can be found in Appendix II.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Case 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.2
Case 2 0.6 0 0 0.75 0 0
Case 3 0.6 0 0 0.75 0 0
Case 4 0.6 0 0 0.75 0 0
Case 5 0.6 0 0 0.75 0 0
Case 6 0.6 0 0 0.75 0 0
Case 7 0.6 0 0 0.75 0 0
Case 8 0.7 0.143 0.25 0.824 0.077 | 0.05
Case 9 0.8 0.333 0.5 0.889 0.2 0.1
Case 10 0.9 0 .6 0.75 0.947 0.428 0.15
Table 5.2: Results on the six coefficients for 10 hypothetical cases 
Table 5.2 indicates several disadvantages in using the similarity measures of cluster 
analysis in comparing scenarios, the basic ones being:
(1) By using two-way association tables, we can only compare two scenarios at a time.
(2) The coefficients do not reflect the degree of dissimilarity adequately. For example, 
cases 2 to 7 give the same values on all coefficients. It can be argued however, that in 
case 3 the scenarios are more similar than in case 4 since C2 in the former gives good 
futures for every initial decision whereas in the latter gives only fair ones. Similarly, it
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can be argued that there is more similarity between the two scenarios in case 2 than in 
case 7. In case 2, for every decision each scenario gives a rating one grade lower, 
whereas in case 7 this is true for two decisions only, while for the other two the ratings 
are three grades lower. This limitation of the coefficients is a result of treating the 
measurement scale as binary variables: the method distinguishes only between similar 
and dissimilar ratings but does not accommodate for the degree of dissimilarity.
(3) The selection of the appropriate similarity coefficient In case 1 where both 
scenarios are exactly the same, all coefficients except the last take the value 1. The last 
coefficient, a/(a+b+c+d), takes into account only the positive matches. In our 
problem, however, negative matches (two zeros) indicate the same similarity as 
positive matches (two ones). This is because for each decision each scenario can only 
score one 1 and four Os. If, therefore, one of the scenarios treats a decision similarly 
to the other, we will have one pair of Is and four pairs of zeros which will be equally 
important We can therefore discard this particular coefficient as not suitable for our 
purposes.
For the same reason, we can discard coefficients (ii), (iii) and (v). In all cases, 
coefficient (iv) is higher than coefficient (i). This is because the former gives matches 
twice the weight of mismatches. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that it is 
appropriate to do so in our problem. We can therefore, conclude that if, despite the 
disadvantages, we proceed to measure uncertainty with the similarity coefficients the 
most appropriate one to use is (i), the simple matching coefficient
5.3 Measurement of similarity using Gower’s index
So far we have examined cluster analysis similarity coefficients for binary data only. 
In this section, Gower’s index which accommodates mixtures of types of data will be 
examined as a measure of similarity between scenarios. As in the case of similarity 
coefficients for binary data, Gower’s index can measure similarity between two 
individuals only.
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In many applications of clustering techniques each individual is described by a set of 
variables which includes binary, qualitative and quantitative measures. In such cases, 
a similarity coefficient proposed by Gower [1971] can be very useful, since it can deal 
with such a mixture of variable types. The coefficient is defined as follows:
k = 1
Sy denotes the degree of similarity between individuals i and j. s is a binary variable
and equals 0 otherwise. The weight Wjjk is set equal to 1 or 0 depending on whether 
the comparison is considered valid for variable k, and except for the case of 
dichotomous variables, this weight can only be zero when variable k is unknown for 
one or both individuals. With dichotomous variables, Wyk is also set to zero when 
variable k is known to be absent from both individuals. Whenever Wyk = 0, then sijk 
is set to zero, and if Wyk = 0 for all variables S|j is undefined.
If all variables are binary then Gower's index is equivalent to coefficient (ii) of the 
previous section. In the case of qualitative data, Sijk =1 if the two individuals are the 
same for the kth variable, and Sijk = 0 if they differ. Gower’s index can therefore be 
used in our problem, taking the scenarios as the individuals to be compared, each 
variable to be the initial decision, and each future to be the measurement of that 
decision. The values of Gower’s index for the ten cases considered in Figure 5.4 are 
given in Table 5.3 :
m
k = 1
m (5.1)
which takes the value 1 if there is a positive match for individuals i and j on variable k,
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Case 1 1
Case 2 0
Case 3 0
Case 4 0
Case 5 0
Case 6 0
Case 7 0
Case 8 0.25
Case 9 0.5
Case 10 0.75
Table 5.3: Values of Gower's index for 10 hypothetical cases
From Table 5.3 it can be seen that in addition to the drawback that only two scenarios 
can be compared at a time, Gower's index cannot distinguish between levels of 
dissimilarity. Its merit is principally its relative computational simplicity.
5.4 Measurement of similarity using the variance-covariance matrix
Both similarity coefficients and Gower's index can measure the similarity between two 
scenarios only. In this section we will examine another possible measure of similarity 
which will allow more than two futures to be compared.
If the futures were to be measured on a numerical scale, and scenarios were to be 
treated as random variables, another possible measure of similarity could be devised by 
calculating the variance-covariance matrix of the scenarios:
Ci C2 ... Cn
Ci Var (Ci) Cov(Ci,C2) ... Cov(Ci,Cn) 
C2 Cov(C2,Ci) Var (Q2) ... Cov(C2,Cn)
Cn Cov(Cn,Ci) Cov(Cn,C2) ... Var(Cn)
Figure 5.5: Variance-covariance matrix of the scenarios
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The matrix in Figure 5.5 shows the degree of agreement between scenarios and within 
scenarios. In contrast to the measures presented above, this representation allows the 
comparison of more than one scenarios. There is not, however, a single measure of 
this matrix, that is we cannot express it with one number. We could choose to use the 
trace or the determinant of the matrix, but the meaningfulness of these measures is 
questionable. Moreover, calculating the variance-covariance matrix of the scenarios 
assumes that the scenarios can be treated as random variables, which they are not. 
Therefore, the significance of this matrix is at least dubious.
Finally, another major disadvantage of this method is the requirement of numerical 
measures for futures. We must therefore assign a numerical value to each grade of the 
qualitative scale, but these values must be equidistant; otherwise the variation between 
consecutive grades of the qualitative scale will not be the same. There is a method 
however, that avoids this problem by ranking the futures in order of preference. This 
method will be described next.
5.5 Measurement of uncertainty using the coefficient of concordance
This section proposes the use of the coefficient of concordance as a measure of 
similarity between scenarios, and therefore as a measure of the prevalent uncertainty.
A possible measure of similarity between scenarios can be found by ranking the 
futures within each scenario according to preference, and calculating Kendall’s 
coefficient of concordance W [Kendall 1975] for m rankings (as there are scenarios). 
This coefficient measures the degree of agreement between rankings, in our case the 
degree of similarity of the effects of the scenarios on each decision. Since rankings 
can be based on some quality or qualities which cannot, for either practical or 
theoretical reasons, be measured, they do not have to be objective.
The coefficient of concordance W is given by the formula:
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where m is the number of rankings (in our case scenarios), n the number of objects to 
be ranked (in our case decisions), and S is the sum of squares of the actual deviations 
of the totals of ranks from their mean, or more formally
n __ m n m  . ,  2
s = i [ i ri j - ( z  i > u ) / n]  (5-3)
i=i  j=i  v i = i j = i
where rjj is the ranking of future Fij by comparison with futures in the same row.
Formula (5.2) for W is used in the case of no ties between rankings.~W measures, in a 
sense, the commonality of the treatments of the n decisions by the m scenarios. If 
those treatments are all the same, then W=l. If the treatments differ very much, the 
sums of ranks will be more or less equal, and consequently the sum of squares S 
becomes small compared with the maximum possible value, so that W is small. As the 
measure of agreement in the rankings increases, W increases from 0 to l 1.
In the case where there are some ties in the rankings the coefficient W is defined as 
w  = ---------------      (5.4)
j~-m2(n3-n) - m ^-£nt (t3- 1)
t=2
Although Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient t, which measures the degree of 
correspondence between two rankings, ranges from -1 which denotes complete 
disagreement to +1 which denotes complete agreement, the coefficient of concordance 
W ranges from 0 to 1. This is due to the fact that when more than two scenarios are 
concerned, agreement and disagreement are not symmetrical opposites. All scenarios 
can treat all decisions in exactly the same way, but treatment in an exactly opposite 
way cannot be defined. If, for an example of three scenarios, C\ disagrees completely 
with C2 and also with C3, C2 and C3 must agree. In this case C j’s rankings would be 
the reverse of those of both C2 and C3. Therefore, C2*s and C3’s rankings must be 
the same. Complete disagreement in cases of more than two scenarios cannot be 
defined. Consequently, negative values of the coefficient would have no meaning. 
What can be measured is strong or weak agreement, and this is reflected by values 
close to 1 or 0 respectively.
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where t is the number of consecutive members which are tied and n* the number of 
times that a tie of t elements occurs. The method of allocating rank numbers to tied 
futures is to average the ranks they would possess if they were distinguishable. For 
instance, if the third and fourth futures are tied, each is allotted the number 3.5, and if 
the second to the seventh inclusive are tied, then each is allotted the number 
l/6(2+3+4+5+6+7) = 4.5.
The formulae for tied and untied ranks seem different, but they are not. They are 
different expressions of the more general formula:
W= S/mS* (5.5)
where S' is the sum of squares of deviations of all ranks from their mean, or 
mathematically
n m  n m  . . - . 2
s ' = i i [ ri j - ( i  i ri j ) / n]  (5-6)
i=lj=l i=l j=l
The significance of the coefficient W can be tested to reject or accept the hypothesis 
that the scenarios apply different treatments to the decisions. The actual distribution of 
W has been worked out by Kendall for lower values of m and n: n-3, m=2 to 10; n=4, 
m=2 to 6 ; n=5, m=3. For higher values two approximations can be used:
a) Fisher’s z-distribution. We write
i (m-l)W ~
z = ? h T w  (5'7)
2v,= n-1—  and v 2 = (m-l)vi (5.8)1 m
Then for degrees of freedom vi and V2, z can be tested using the tables of Fisher’s 
distribution.
b) Although the above test is generally valid, a simpler test may be used for n>7. If 
we write
Xr= m(n-l)W=  -----    (5.9)
— mn(n+l)
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then Xr is distributed in the form x2 with v = n-1 degrees of freedom.
When ties are present, the z-test requires no modification unless the number or extent 
of ties is large. In the latter case the degrees of freedom are modified as follows:
the summation in the numerator extending over the m(m-l)/2 values i * j; and p2i is 
the variance of the ith ranking typified by
5.6 Examples
In this section, we will use examples of futures classifications similar to those given in 
section 5.2. In this section, however, we will use five decisions to allow for all 
possible classifications (V, G, F, P, C) in a scenario, and three scenarios to 
demonstrate multi-scenario comparisons.
Consider the eight examples of futures classifications presented in Figure 5.6:
_ 2(m-l) 2
1_ 3 ri.A m
m  j l i 2( W )
(5.10)
V2=(m-l)vi (5.11)
where p 2( W)= 4 i.j (5.12)
m2(n-l) ( £ u 2i>2
(5.13)
2
Xr is given by the following formula
2 s (5.14)
94
Chapter 5: Measurement of Uncertainty Using Measures of Similarity between Scenarios
dl d2 d2 d4 d5 di d2 d3 d4 d5
Cl V G F P C Ci V G F P C
C2 V G F P C C2 G F P C* c
C3 V G F P c C3 F P C C c
Case I' Case 2’
di d2 d3 d4 ds di d2 d3 d4 ds
Cl V V V V V Cl V V V V V
C2 G G G G G C2 G G G G G
C3 F F F F F C3 C C C C C
Case 3f Case 4'
di d2 d3 d4 d5 di d2 d3 d4 ds
Cl V V V V V Cl V V V V V
C2 G G F F F C2 G G F F F
C3 F F P P P C3 F F P P C
Case 5’ Case 6’
di d2 d3 d4 d? di d2 d3 d4 d5
Cl V G F P C Cl V G F P C
C2 P C V G F C2 c G P V F
C3 P G c F V C3 F C G P V
Case T  Case 8’
Figure 5.6: Eight examples of decision situations 
If we allow rankings to be used, cases 1* and 2' can be transformed as follows:
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d i  d 2  d3 d4 d s  d i  d2 d3 d 4 d5
Cl 1 2 3 4 5 Ci 1 2 3 4 5
C2 1 2 3 4 5 c2 1 2 3 4.5 4.5
c3 1 2 3 4 5 C3 1 2 4 4 4
X: 3 6 9 12 15 3 6 10 12.5 13.5
mean: 9 mean: 9
S : (3-9)2+(6-9)2+(9-9)2+( 12-9)2+(l5-9)2= 90 S: 78.5
W: 12*90/ 9*120 =1 W: 78.5/82.5 = 0.95
Formula (5.3) was used to calculate S, and formulae (5.2) and (5.4) were used to
calculate W in cases 1' and 2* respectively. The coefficient of concordance shows that
in both cases there is low uncertainty. In fact, in case 1* there is no uncertainty at all.
If case 2* were to be restricted to the first three decisions only, there would have been
no uncertainty at all in this case as well.
Both cases 3’ and 4’ give W=0/0 which is undefined. This is because the formulae 
cannot be used when all decisions for each scenario are tied. It could be argued that 
case 3' is less uncertain than case 4’ since in the former the outcomes associated with 
scenario C3 are closer to those in the other two scenarios than the corresponding ones 
in the latter. The question arises of how can we distinguish between the two cases.
Cases 5’ and 6 ' are similar except for the element (3,5). In case 5' W=0.4 and in case 
6’ W=0.41. We can argue, in a way similar to when comparing cases 3' and 4', that 
case 5* is less uncertain than case 6’ because element (3,5) in the former is closer to the 
other elements of the matrix than in the latter. Why is then W slightly lower? We can 
observe that C2 treats each decision worse than Ci does, and C3 worse than C2. This 
is more apparent in case 6’, and if W is interpreted as measuring the degree of 
agreement between scenarios, then the result is consistent with this view. The decision 
maker is interested in the treatments that the scenarios will apply to his/her decision, 
and in case 6’ there is less uncertainty that decision 5 is worse than decision 4.
Cases 7* and 8' translate respectively to:
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d i  d 2  d 4  d s  d i  d 2  d 3  d 4  d s
Cl 1 2 3 4 5 Ci 1 2 3 4 5
C2 4 5 1 2 3 c2 5 2 4 1 3
C3 4 2 5 3 1 c3 3 5 2 4 1
which both give W=0. Thus these two cases are equally uncertain.
In case 1* it is very easy to predict that the value of W will be 1, since each decision is 
treated the same way by all scenarios. Generally, in all cases where the elements of 
each column are the same, W=1 as expected. It must be noted that W can take the 
value 1 in other cases as well. The condition, therefore is sufficient but not necessary. 
One such case is case 2 of Figure 5.4 (see also Table 5.4). This happens because 
although the elements of each column are different both scenarios rank the decisions in 
exactly the same order. It is not, however, so obvious to recognize a situation where 
W will equal zero, and no general rule exists. In cases T  and 8* no comparisons can 
be made at first sight other than recognizing that the situations differ.
5.7 Comparison of W and the cluster analysis similarity coefficients
Except the obvious (and most important) advantage of W, which is its ability to 
compare more than two scenarios simultaneously, there is another point in which it is 
stronger than the cluster analysis coefficients. This is the fact that by definition it takes 
into account the degree of dissimilarity, something that the other coefficients are not 
designed to do. We will now use W and compare the results it gives on cases 1 to 10 
(see Figure 5.4) with those given by the first similarity coefficient The results are 
presented in Table 5.4.
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(a+d)/(a+b+c+d) W
Case 1 1 1
Case 2 0.6 1
Case 3 0.6 undefined (0/0)
Case 4 0.6 undefined (0/0)
Case 5 0.6 0.5
Case 6 0.6 0.5
Case 7 0.6 0
Case 8 0.7 0.026
Case 9 0.8 0.9
Case 10 0.9 0.974
Table 5.4: Comparison of similarity coefficient and W in 10 hypothetical cases
In case 1, which is very straightforward, both methods give the value 1 implying 
complete certainty. In case 2 where the second scenario treats each decision worse 
than the first the cluster analysis coefficient gives the value 0.6 while W equals 1. It 
may appear that this is a weakness of W, but since we are trying to measure the degree 
of difference of the two scenarios in their treatments of the decisions, and C2 lags one 
level from Ci for each decision, we can argue that there is no uncertainty about those 
treatments. Yet, this is a disadvantage of W if we are trying to measure the level of 
uncertainty of a situation.
In cases 3 and 4 W cannot be defined (it equals 0/0) since each row has the same 
entries. However, this translates into the fact that in such cases we no longer have a 
decision making situation. Our decisions are irrelevant; everything depends on which 
scenario will become reality. It can be argued that there is no need to measure 
uncertainty in such cases, since nothing can be done anyway.
In case 7, W has an advantage over the cluster coefficient, since it reflects clearly the 
fact that the two scenarios are in complete disagreement by giving W=0.
In case 8, the two measures give very different results. Again, W seems to have an 
advantage, since in half the decisions the two scenarios give opposite results.
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Cases 5 ,6,9 ,10 give similar values on both coefficients, and therefore do not indicate 
which one is preferable.
In order to explore further the comparative performance of the two indices, a simple 
experiment was carried out We have shown three people the ten cases and asked them 
to identify a rule for ranking them in order of increasing uncertainty. All three came up 
with the same intuitive rule: For each decision, measure by how many levels the
corresponding futures differ, and add them. The lowest jiumber being the least 
uncertain case, the highest the most uncertain one. This rule can be applied only in the 
two-scenario case, and ranks the ten cases in order or increasing uncertainty as 
follows:
1 10 9 2,3 5 8 4,6,7
the numbers separated by a comma indicating a tie. It is interesting to see how the 
three methods rank the cases. Table 5.5 shows these rankings. For ease of 
presentation cases 3 and 4 (which give undefined values for W) have been omitted.
Intuitive rule 1 10 9 2 5 8 6,7
W 1,2 10 9 5,6 8 7
(a+d)/(a+b+c4d) 1 10 9 8 2 ,5,6 ,7
Table 5.5: Rankings of ten hypothetical situations in order of increasing uncertainty
It can be seen from Table 5.5 that the three methods generally agree in ranking the ten 
cases in terms of increasing uncertainty. In fact, the coefficient of concordance 
between the three methods is just over 0 .8.
From the analysis in this and previous sections, it can be concluded that W is the most 
appropriate measure of uncertainty, from those considered, since it has two basic 
advantages: First, it permits measurement when there aremore than two scenarios, 
and second, it takes into account the degree of dissimilarity between futures.
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5.8 Measurement of uncertainty using similarity measures: Discussion
The measures of similarity between scenarios presented in the previous section can be 
used to provide a measure of the prevailing uncertainty. The more similar two or more 
scenarios are, the less the uncertainty of the situation is. The previous section 
concluded that the coefficient of concordance W is the most appropriate measure of 
similarity between those presented. Using this measure, a further question which 
should be addressed is how to classify situations of uncertainty into different levels. 
For example, if W=0.4, is the situation in question of high or medium uncertainty? 
How can this situation be compared with another which has W=0.47? What level of 
difference in the values of W justifies different treatment of the problem situations?
There can be no general answer to those questions. This is because each situation has 
its unique features. Moreover, uncertainty about the future is often compounded with 
other types of uncertainty, for example UV (in terms of Friend and Jessop’s 
classification in Chapter 2). Therefore, it is important to determine the source of 
uncertainty in each problem situation.
As mentioned before, uncertainty can be of many types. W measures the degree of 
similarity between scenarios, and thus gives an indication of the level of uncertainty 
about the future. If a problem is sufficiently complex, (and which planning problem is 
not?) a significant part of the prevalent uncertainty may stem from the lack of 
understanding of its structure. A variety of problem structuring methods have been 
developed to deal with this type of uncertainty. SRM, which is based on robustness 
analysis provides assistance in problem structuring, in addition to defining future 
possibilities.
Each problem situation has its own unique features, and therefore, there can be no 
general rule to determine uncertainty thresholds. Nevertheless, determining the value 
of W can be a valuable decision-aiding tool, especially in cases where W is relatively 
high. A high value of W could pinpoint the fact that the prevalent uncertainty is not a
100
Chapter 5: Measurement of Uncertainty Using Measures of Similarity between Scenarios
result of uncertainty about the future, but of uncertainty about the structural 
relationships of the elements of the problem. In such a case, effort should concentrate 
on structuring the present situation.
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HIV/AIDS-RELATED PLANNING
6.1 Introduction
In the next chapter the scenario-robustness methodology will be applied to a problem 
dealing with the provision of services to people with AIDS and/or HIV infection. In 
this chapter, background information on HIV/AIDS and problems associated with 
planning for the care of people with HTV infection will be discussed.
6.2 Definition and epidemiology of AIDS and HIV infection
AIDS is the acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, a state of 
suppression of the immune system which is the most severe clinical manifestation of 
infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HTV). This virus infects a subset 
of peripheral blood lymphocytes, the T-cells, which are responsible for many of the 
functions of the cellular immune system. Infected cells lose their functional capability 
and die prematurely. This defect of the immune system leads to susceptibility to 
infection with opportunist agents, and to the development of particular groups of 
tumours. It has also been recognized that HTV infected patients may also develop a 
spectrum of other diseases without the presence either of opportunist infection or 
tumour [Weber and Pinching 1986].- The commonest of these conditions are persistent 
generalised lymphadenopathy (PGL) and AIDS related complex (ARC). Both are 
described as a combination of symptoms, signs and laboratory abnormalities, but PGL 
is less severe than ARC. Moreover, patients with ARC are likely to develop AIDS 
sooner than those with PGL only.
It is generally believed that an HTV infected person will eventually develop AIDS. 
However, since the disease is relatively new, and estimates of the incubation period
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(the time between infection and clinical manifestation of the disease) vary widely, the 
timing of such progression is uncertain. Estimating progression rates to clinical AIDS 
in seropositives (people who have been tested positive for HTV) is a matter of following 
them over a relatively long period of time. As time progresses and evidence from more 
studies comes to light such estimates are continuously reassessed. Early studies 
[Goedert et al. 1987, Polk et al. 1987] estimated progression occurring about 5-6 years 
after infection. More recent studies however, give much longer estimates for the 
average incubation period; Longini et al.[1989] estimated it as 9.8 years, Lemp et 
al.[1990] as 11.8 years, Satten et al.[1992] as 10.3 years, whereas Bailey [1994] 
reports a value of 11.7 years.
The key routes of transmission of HTV are sexual transmission, blood or tissue 
transmission, and matemofoetal transmission [Piot and Carael 1988, Institute of 
Medicine 1986]. In Europe and North America there is greater prevalence of infection 
in homosexual men, although the prevalence of HTV in the heterosexual population is 
continuously growing [Slutsker et al 1992]. In central Africa transmission appears to 
be predominantly through heterosexual intercourse, with an equal number of male and 
female cases [Quinn et al. 1986, Weber and Pinching 1986, Mann et al.1992]. The 
major route of blood to blood transmission in developed countries is by the sharing of 
needles and equipment between injecting drug users (IDUs). In earlier stages of the 
epidemic where the cause of AIDS was not determined and tests had not been 
developed, a large number of people suffering from haemophilia, a condition which 
requires receiving blood products (factor V m  or IX), were infected [Murphy and 
Dietrich 1992]. The transmission dynamics of HTV infection and the estimation of key 
epidemiological parameters are the subject of extensive research. Numerous 
mathematical and statistical models are available for studying various aspects of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic [Anderson et al. 1986, Anderson 1988a &b, Jager and 
Ruitenberg 1988, Isham 1988, Roberts and Dangerfield 1990, Caulkins and Kaplan 
1991, Homer and St. Clair 1991, Sexton and Feinstein 1991, Brailsford and Shahani 
1994, Williams and Anderson 1994].
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6.3 Treatment of HIV/AIDS
At present there is neither a cure nor a vaccine for AIDS. No vaccine is expected to be 
developed within the next 10 years. However, a large number of drugs which aim at 
debilitating the virus are currently under development At present, a number of such 
drugs are administered to patients to alleviate symptoms and prolong life expectancy. 
Of these, the most widely used are AZT, ddl and ddC, either on their own or in some 
combination [Morton 1992]. These drugs are all of the anti-viral type. This means that 
they attack the HIV lifecycle at some stage, aiming at slowing its replication rate, thus 
preventing the fast destruction of the immune system. An important problem 
concerning drug development is HIV's genetic variability: differences in genetic 
sequence can be observed between variants of a same type of HTV found in different 
patients, and even in the same patient HTV variants have appeared during long-term 
treatments by drugs such as AZT or ddl. As a result, the virus escapes the drug. 
Therefore, research for more effective drugs is directed towards the development of 
complex specific treatments using combinations of molecules which could inhibit the 
viral replication cycle at the same stage or at different stages [Barre-Sinoussi 1992].
Since HIV attacks the immune system, a patient may develop a wide variety of 
opportunistic infections, which are in turn treated using many different drugs. A 
distinction should be made therefore, between those drugs which treat the effects of the 
virus and the antiviral drugs which attack the virus itself. Because the latter are to a 
greater or lesser extent toxic, only a proportion of patients are able to take them.
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6.4 Uncertainties associated with HIV/AIDS
There is a wide variety of uncertainties surrounding the HIV/AIDS problem. These can 
be classified under three broad headings: uncertainty about the nature of the disease, 
uncertainty about future demand for services, and uncertainty about the availability of 
future treatments. Of these we will concentrate on the latter two categories which are of 
particular interest to planners.
6.4.1 Uncertainty about fu ture demand fo r  HIV I AIDS-related services
Future demand for HTV/AIDS-related services is a function of many factors:
(1) Uncertainty about current prevalence and future incidence. Prevalence generally 
refers to "the number of persons in a given population with a disease or an attribute at a 
specific point in time", whereas incidence is defined as "the number of new events (e.g. 
cases of a disease) in a defined population within a specified period of time" 
[International Epidemiological Association 1983]. Obviously any future demand on 
service provision is directly related to both current prevalence and future incidence. A 
number of alternative estimates have been calculated by epidemiologists, based on a 
wide range of assumptions. Compulsory testing has been proposed as a means of 
collecting more information about HTV prevalence but both the usefulness and ethics of 
such a practice have been strongly questioned. Reliance on voluntary testing has the 
disadvantage that volunteers cannot be expected to provide proportional representation 
of all the groups at risk. Cuirendy the AIDS Centre of the Public Health Laboratory 
Service at the Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre is coordinating the unlinked 
anonymous HTV prevalence monitoring programme with the support of the Medical 
Research Council and the Department of Health [PHLS 1993b].
(2) Uncertainty about the accuracy of currently recorded data. Current data is subject to 
double counting and poor reporting. Estimates of HTV and AIDS prevalence usually 
take this factor into account and allow for under-reporting or reporting delays [Dept of
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Health 1988, PHLS 1990, PHLS 1993a, De Angelis and Gilks 1994, Evans and 
McCormick 1994].
(3) Uncertainty about the transmission dynamics of the disease. There is still a high 
level of uncertainty about the length of the incubation period and the pattern of spread 
of the disease. Since only longitudinal studies can provide reliable estimates, and the 
disease is relatively new, a possible way to deal with the problem is the use of 
alternative assumptions about the growth of the disease. Such alternative forecasts 
have already been provided by the Cox [Dept, of Health 1988] and both Day reports 
[PHLS 1990 and 1993a].
(4) Changes in behaviour may affect the spread of the disease and consequently the 
pattern of demand for services. Therefore, behavioural studies such as the National 
Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles [Johnson et al. 1992] can provide valuable 
inputs to alternative future projections of AIDS incidence by exposure category, such 
as those of both Day repons [PHLS 1990, 1993a], which in turn are of particular 
interest to service providers.
6,4,2 Uncertainty about drugs!treatments
The development of new drugs and treatments will affect the life expectancy of the 
patients, and consequently the demand of services. This issue is discussed extensively 
in the next chapter, where different scenarios are built about the type, availability and 
implications of alternative drug treatments.
6.5 A microcomputer-based system for planning HIV/ AIDS services
6.5.1 Introduction
This section describes the development of a microcomputer-based system to assist 
planning for HTV/AIDS-related services. Detailed descriptions of the development
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process, the system’s structure and examples of use have can be found in Rizakou et 
al. [1991] and in Forte et al. [1994]. A detailed description of the system can be found 
in Appendix I of this thesis. In this section some background information on the 
planning problems associated with HIV/AIDS in the UK, and a general description of 
the system will be given.
6.5.2 Planning fo r HIV/AIDS in the UK context
To date, there have been about 10,000 AIDS cases in the UK and money has been 
targeted explicitly by the Department of Health for HIV/AIDS-specific services. The 
complexities of service planning between health authorities and local governments 
where inputs of both medical and non-medical services are required, are not made any 
easier by the fact that boundaries between the two agencies are not often co-terminous. 
The private sector also provides mainly hospital-based services but is not, as yet, a 
major provider of AIDS services. The voluntary sector is, perhaps, more important, 
particularly in providing informal support networks (especially in the homosexual 
community) which can have a bearing on the quantity and type of statutory service 
provision that is required.
Understanding the way in which earmarked funds can be used is even more significant 
following the 1991 reform of the NHS, which introduced an "internal market". Health 
authorities, as purchasers of care for their residents, are expected to assess need and 
contract with providers (hospital and community units) for appropriate levels of 
service. In 1993, further legislation introduced similar responsibilities for local 
authorities, who are now charged with organizing and commissioning long term care 
for people to be treated in a community rather than institutional setting. This will 
increasingly include the non-medical care requirements of people with HIV and AIDS.
It is this multi-agency dimension which is the nub of the service planning problem. 
Certain aspects of the treatment for people with HIV/AIDS - and particularly full­
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blown AIDS - are very clearly hospital-based, requiring specialized acute treatment, 
often in specialized units. However, there are large components of care for non-acute 
phases of the disease which can take place in community health facilities, such as GP 
surgeries, but may also require inputs from other agencies such as social services, 
housing departments, and the voluntary and private sectors. The central issue is how 
much of which service is required for whom, and who pays for i t
This planning problem is recognized, if only implicitly, through the large AIDS 
planning committees which have been established in most health authorities. These 
seek to involve the main statutory and voluntary agencies and groups likely to be 
involved in HIV/AIDS service provision or representation of client groups at the local 
level. This, in turn, means that there is usually no shortage of ideas as to the needs of 
people with HIV/AIDS. What is lacking, however, is a suitable vehicle for assessing 
the resource consequences of possible care policy innovations, particularly where a 
variety of treatment options exist for a given level of dependency and where these 
options span a range of different care-providing agencies.
This problem is not unique to the HIV/AIDS arena; similar situations face planners of 
long-term care services for other client groups, including the elderly and people with 
long-term mental illness. This means that general planning frameworks developed for 
these other client groups can also contribute to HIV/AIDS service planning, taking 
account, of course, of unique characteristics of this client group. In the case of people 
with HIV/AIDS the planning framework includes the following tasks:
-estimating local level prevalence of HIV/AIDS
-keeping in view the range of agencies, services and local interest groups with a 
contribution to make
-developing appropriate care plans when "best practice" is constantly changing 
in response to new drugs and therapies
-establishing contracts between purchasers/ commissioners and providers to 
supply these services
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6.5.3 The AIDSPLAN system
In 1988, the Operational Research Service of the Department of Health began work on 
a planning model to address the issue of local level resource planning for people with 
HIV/AIDS. In conjunction with with the Operational Research Group at the London 
School of Economics (LSE), the model was developed into the microcomputer-based 
decision support system, AIDSPLAN. This system is designed for use, by local 
managers concerned with planning HIV/AIDS-related services, as an option-scanning 
device to examine the strategic level consequences of particular policies. The approach 
was based on the Balance of Care model: a framework developed earlier for long-term 
care planning for elderly people [Bowen and Forte 1987]. The original version of 
AIDSPLAN itself is a customized spreadsheet developed in Lotus Symphony.
LSE and ORS worked together to develop the AIDSPLAN system [Bowen et al. 
1989]. The then Parkside Health Authority agreed to fund the development of a 
planning model similar in structure to that proposed by ORS. Work was conducted 
over a period of one year from autumn 1988 to autumn 1989 when the system was 
finally delivered. A modified version of the model was made available to other 
interested health authorities. In 1994 a revised version of the model was introduced to 
follow the release of new forecasts of HIV/AIDS prevalence for England and Wales 
[PHLS 1993a].
The format and operation of AIDSPLAN are described in detail in Appendix I. 
However, it would be appropriate here to summarize the way in which AIDSPLAN 
works.
Conceptually, AIDSPLAN can be thought of as two submodels, a population 
submodel and a care options submodel. In the first of these, current data on the patient 
workload are fed into the model to produce local estimates based on the official Day 
national forecasts [PHLS 1990] of future patient numbers by patient categories. Three
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forecasts can be selected: low, medium or high. These patient numbers in turn form 
the input to the second sub-model, which contains costed care options specified for 
each patient category. It then calculates estimates of the costs and resources required to 
treat these numbers of patients using the identified care options.
Figure 6.1 gives an overview of AIDSPLAN. The rounded boxes represent inputs 
and tasks performed by the user, and the rectangular boxes show the results of 
calculations carried out by the model.
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Figure 6.1. AIDSPLAN overview
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The next chapter presents the application of SRM to an HIV/AIDS planning problem. 
AIDSPLAN proved to be a valuable tool in structuring the problem and determining 
the resource implications of the alternative scenarios.
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7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 the importance of preserving future flexibility when dealing with complex 
situationsjof high uncertainty was discussed. By maintaining a high level of flexibility 
the decision maker(s) may avoid adverse consequences and even benefit from 
unexpected opportunities. SRM, as an extension of robustness analysis, is a method 
which assesses the relative flexibility of particular decisions. Moreover, by embodying 
elements of scenario analysis it attempts to give a structured picture of the uncertainties 
facing the decision maker(s). SRM, therefore, is designed to assist decision making in 
two ways: first, by structuring uncertainty and presenting the alternative futures as 
scenarios, and second, by assessing the relative flexibility of the decision makers* 
intended commitments. In this chapter SRM will be applied to an HIV/AIDS planning 
problem to examine its suitability for use in such situations. At first sight, planning for 
HIV/AIDS may seem an odd choice of area to apply a strategic planning methodology 
such as SRM; strategic planning is usually associated with business, industry or 
government. However, scenario analysis has already been used in connection with 
AIDS [van Druten et al. 1992, Beckmann 1992, Reinking et al. 1992, Leidl et al. 1992, 
Jager and van den Boom 1994]. Planning for HIV/AIDS has all the required elements 
of a problem situation which requires a strategic planning approach: it is beset by 
uncertainty, it is quite complex, and there is a variety of interested parties with 
different, though not necessarily conflicting objectives.
As discussed previously, planning the provision of services to people with AIDS and 
HIV associated illness presents problems of quite unusual intensity. The heterogeneity 
of the client group and the wide variety of associated conditions makes demands across 
the whole spectrum of hospital-based services. The cycle of acute episodes and periods
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of remission among a relatively youthful affected population produces calls on a whole 
range of community services provided by numerous statutory and voluntary agencies. 
Uncertainty about the current size of the infected group and about the transmission 
dynamics of HIV infection results in a wide variation in legitimate estimates of demand 
for services and consequently in estimates of resource requirements. Moreover, 
uncertainty about future availability of treatment affects not only the level of projected 
resource requirements but also their pattern.
Under such conditions of complexity and uncertainty, the application of a methodology 
such as SRM would appear prima facie to have a contribution to make in preserving the 
necessary flexibility to meet future uncertainties. In the illustration which follows, the 
microcomputer model AIDSPLAN, presented in the previous chapter, will be used as a 
decision support tool in conjunction with SRM. As AIDSPLAN is designed to 
provide answers to "what if..." questions, it can be used to explore the consequences 
of alternative decisions and scenarios in terms of resources. Thus, AIDSPLAN will be 
used under various hypotheses concerning future patient numbers and alternative 
modes of treatment, to produce different sets of resource requirements. These will then 
be analyzed using SRM to assess the future flexibility of alternative decision 
commitments which need to be made now. The objectives of this analysis are to 
examine the suitability of SRM in situations of high uncertainty, to find any other 
elements that might be incorporated into it, and to pinpoint any aspects where its 
procedures need strengthening.
There is no formal test for the suitability of methodologies such as SRM for particular 
problems. A possible way to assess the success of the analysis might be to judge 
retrospectively whether the choices indicated by SRM analysis were appropriate. Even 
then, it is very difficult to assess whether any particular choice was justified. For 
example, a risk averse decision maker might choose the commitment which avoids an 
outcome perceived as catastrophic over another commitment with many desirable 
outcomes but including a possible catastrophic result under a particular future. If this
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future fails to materialize, it does not necessarily follow that the decision maker was 
wrong in taking the particular decision.
It must be emphasized at this point, that all methodologies within the family of problem 
structuring methods (which includes SRM) do not attempt to prescribe solutions: 
rather, they assist decision makers to understand the problem situation and the 
implications of their decisions. It is they who ultimately decide, after careful 
consideration of the available information.
The decision making bodies which have an interest in planning the provision of 
HIV/AIDS-related services include the Department of Health, health authorities, GPs, 
hospitals, various voluntary and private organizations, and local government through 
housing and social service departments. Of these, health authorities and hospitals 
would benefit most from the use of SRM, for a number of reasons. The AIDS services 
provided by health authorities and hospitals tend to be much more expensive than those 
provided by other agencies. Moreover, health authority and hospital decisions with 
respect to HIV/AIDS are interconnected, thus increasing the complexity of the problem.
It has not proved possible to conduct a "live" use of the methodology on HIV/AIDS 
material. However, we have constructed a plausible, if simplified, version of an 
HIV/AIDS-related planning context by using information obtained during the 
development of AIDSPLAN, more recent interviews with health authority and hospital 
staff, and the published literature1. The following section describes this context.
7.2 The problem situation
Consider an NHS trust hospital which treats a number of AIDS patients in a dedicated 
ward. The hospital's objectives with respect to the HIV/AIDS problem include: to
^ome of the information used in this example was obtained during the development of 
AIDSPLAN a few years ago. However, its purpose is as an example of SRM, not as 
a model of current NHS arrangements.
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contain or reduce the average cost of treatment per patient per annum while maintaining 
their ability to secure and fulfil their contracts for treatment of HIV/AIDS patients at a 
bed occupancy rate of between 90% and 95%. The management believes that they may 
be able to bid successfully for funds to expand their AIDS services. These funds could 
be used for opening a second ward dedicated to AIDS patients and for expanding the 
day and outpatient facilities. The size of this new ward, if decided on, may lie 
between 11 and 36 beds -the precise-number would need to be recommended. A 
second possibility is that the funds could be used to expand the existing ward and 
outpatient facilities -with a maximum level of expansion of 16 extra beds. 
Alternatively, the management may decide not to bid, leaving the situation as it is. Yet 
another possible initial decision could be to reduce the number of AIDS dedicated 
beds1, by a maximum of 6 beds.
In responding to the hospital's decision to open a new AIDS ward or expand the day 
and outpatient facilities, district health authorities and GP fundholders may increase the 
number of patients for whom they make contracts for treatment with the hospital; or 
contracts could remain essentially unaffected2. A fall in the number of patients for 
whom contracts are made is not expected. If, however, no expansion or a reduction in 
facilities takes place, contracts are expected either to stay unaffected or decrease.
1 Since the number of AIDS patients treated in the hospital has been increasing steadily, 
it was felt initially that such a decision should not be considered. However, 
subsequent analysis using AIDSPLAN showed that under certain future conditions, an 
initial decision resulting in a reduction of resources could be appropriate.
2 Currently, in most cases, the HIV/AIDS budget is ringfenced. This means that 
patients are not accepted for treatment on a basis of a contract between the care provider 
and the purchasing authority.- Instead, the hospital receives from the health authority 
an amount based on expected caseload and activity levels. This practice, however, will 
be eventually phased out and replaced with the internal market system. Since the 
analysis focuses on 1999, it is reasonable to expect that by then the contracts system 
will have been well established.
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7.3 Modelling the problem situation
The previous section describes the hospital's decision situation only in very general 
terms. In order to represent the situation in a way which makes it tractable by SRM, 
further details or assumptions are needed. If the hospital decides to expand the 
outpatient facilities and either to open the new ward or to expand the existing one, a 
decision horizon of two years seems justified, since by then the implementation of the 
decisions will have been completed and the management will be able to evaluate the 
initial results.
The planning horizon will be determined both by the nature of the uncertainties for 
which the scenarios must be built, and by operational considerations. Significant 
elements of the uncertainties under consideration, such as the future availability of new 
drug treatments for example, will not appear for at least another three years. On the 
other hand, AIDSPLAN can make predictions for up to five years1. The planning 
horizon, therefore, must lie between these two figures. The selection of the planning 
horizon as five years ahead seems reasonable, since by then the possible effects of a 
new drug treatment available after the first three years would have a better chance to 
become evident
In addition to patients treated in the hospital under contracts, patients can also be 
admitted to the hospital as emergency cases, or can use the hospital's walk-in GUM 
clinic. The number of patients who do so is thought to be directly related to the number 
of HIV+ people resident in the districts which have contracts with the hospital. In the 
absence of data on local HIV+ prevalence, the only possible assumption, though rather
1 AIDSPLAN can actually be used to make predictions for as many years as required. 
However, it assumes that the pattern of growth in AIDS cases for the second and * 
subsequent five year periods, is similar to that for the first If the user has accurate 
predictions of numbers of AIDS cases from external sources, s/he can input them to the 
model directly and then calculate the corresponding resource implications. However, 
official data on future AIDS cases is available for the next five years only.
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crude, is that the growth in the number of such patients is proportional to the number of 
ADDS cases nationally.
7.4 The Scenarios
In addition to uncertainty about the likely workload, there is also uncertainty about the 
mode of treatment of the patients. Any new drug that may be introduced is expected to 
have the same characteristics as the drugs currently administered to patients (AZT, ddl 
and ddC): it would offer alleviation of symptoms rather than a complete cure, and 
would be toxic to some degree. The introduction of a new drug may affect seriously 
both the amount and the type of resources needed to provide treatment. Relevant 
factors needing consideration include1:
Side-effects: Because of AZTs toxicity, some patients need blood transfusions. The 
percentage of patients who need transfusions has dropped since 1988 from 50% (the 
figure used in the care options devised for AIDSPLAN) to around 5%-10%, due to 
reduced dosages. It will be assumed that the new drug wiU be less toxic than AZT, 
thus reducing the number of transfusions needed.
Cost: The price of the new drug is generaDy expected to be similar to that of AZT or 
cheaper. To calculate the cost of treatment the cost of other drugs used to alleviate the 
side-effects of the antiviral drug must also be considered. For example, ddl and ddC 
cause side effects that can be reduced using cheaper drugs than those used for AZTs 
side effects.
Effectiveness: The new drug could prolong either the asymptomatic phase, or the 
patient's life expectancy after fuU-blown AIDS has been diagnosed, or both. The drug 
under consideration in this illustration will be appropriate to symptomatic patients only.
1 Many of the assumptions made about the introduction of a new drug have been 
suggested by Anthony Pinching, Professor of Immunology at S t Bartholomew’s 
Hospital, London.
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In the case of patients with full-blown ADDS, a reasonable assumption is that the new 
drug will double life expectancy.
Eligibility: We need to determine to which patient category/ies the drug will be 
administered, and to what proportion of patients in each category. An indication of a 
patient's eligibility for antiviral therapy with a drug of AZTs type is a low CD4 count 
The CD4 count measures the number of CD4 (or T4) cells in the blood. The lower this 
number, the less immune the patient becomes. The CD4 count-however, is an 
expensive test: to monitor the patient’s eligibility for the drug properly the test needs to 
be carried out every three months at a cost of £25 per test It is expected that around 
70% of the total caseload may not be eligible for the new drug.
Length of hospitalization: One of the possible effects of the introduction of a new drug 
on the pattern of care is reduced hospitalization. A working hypothesis could be that 
the new drug may reduce the annual number of days spent in hospital per patient by 
50%. It is unlikely that any new drug will be given intravenously- therefore, we can 
assume that no extra resources will be required for its administration.
All of the above factors can be combined to produce three possible scenarios related to 
the introduction of a new drug. The first is a projection of the status quo, that is AZT is 
administered in combination with other drugs to symptomatic patients only. Some 10% 
of those who take it need transfusions. The costs of both AZT and other drugs 
administered to the patients to alleviate side effects remain at their present high levels. 
Patients who receive this treatment have less illness episodes requiring hospitalization 
than those who do not, and consequently consume less of the corresponding resources.
The second scenario explores the possibility of a new more effective antiviral drug 
taken on its own. Any other drugs administered to the patients would treat or alleviate 
the symptoms of secondary infections. This scenario is not very realistic, since current
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practice has moved towards treatments with combinations of antiviral drugs1. 
However, we will consider the scenario for illustrative purposes.
It will be assumed that this drug will have a price similar to AZT, will be less toxic and 
will work on its own even after prolonged treatment It will be administered to AIDS 
patients only, but at a higher proportion than that for AZT. The drugs bill per patient 
will be slightly reduced due to the lower dosages of other drugs needed to combat its 
side effects. Hospitalization rates will be similar to those of patients who are currently 
receiving AZT. Thus, the total hospitalization cost per patient (excluding the cost of 
the drug) will fall.
The third scenario describes the possibility of the discovery of a new drug that can be 
administered in combination with already existing drugs, such as ddl or ddC. This 
drug will be assumed to be suitable for all symptomatic patients. It will delay the 
progression to AIDS and the number of acute episodes after AIDS. Its cost per dose 
will be similar to AZT, but is expected to fall two years after its introduction. For these 
first two years, the drugs bill per patient treated with this drug will be similar to that in 
the second scenario. This drug is expected to lead to lower hospitalization rates 
through the reduction in the number of episodes requiring hospital admission.
7.5 The parameters
We will now translate the problem situation and scenarios described ip the previous 
section into terms compatible with SRM. It should be recalled that with SRM, the 
decision maker is seen as facing a number of alternative decision packages, which may 
be followed by a set of responsive actions. Conjectures must be made about factors
1 There are two reasons for this: First, after prolonged treatment with one drug, the 
virus becomes resistant to it, and therefore a switch is recommended. Secondly, 
patients react differently to the same drugs. For some patients, a combination of drugs 
is more beneficial than corresponding dosages of a single drug, and results in less 
serious side effects.
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other than responsive actions affecting the consequences of the initial decision packages 
in the short term. For the long term, alternative scenarios must be constructed. 
Configurations of the operating system both in the short and long terms must be 
identified, and choices are required about the length of both the short and long terms.
The decision packages1 available to the management are as follows:
di: Open new ward and expand out-patient facilities 
d2: Expand existing ward and out-patient facilities 
dy. Do nothing
64: Reduce number of beds and associated staff
There are three possible responsive actions2: The number of contracts increases, 
remains unaffected or decreases. Table 7.1 lists the initial decisions and the possible 
responsive actions. (It should be noted that responsive actions of a particular type may 
be of different magnitude.) The empty cells of the table indicate that the particular 
responsive action is incompatible with the initial decision.
Responsive action (j) 
Contracts
1. Increase 2. Unaffected 3. Decrease
1. New ward
Initial 2. Expand /
Decision (i) 3. No change ✓
4. Reduce ✓
Table 7.1: Initial decisions and responsive actions
1 Throughout this chapter, decision packages will be referred to as "decisions" for 
simplicity.
2 In the responsive action aij the first index i refers to the decision dj to which the jth 
action is taken as a response.
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According to a Department of Health report [PHLS 1993a], three AIDS growth rates 
can be considered: Low, medium and high. Therefore the three conjectures are:
ci: AIDS growth rate is low 
02: AIDS growth rate medium 
C3: AIDS growth rate high
By combining responsive actions and conjectures, nine possible future operating 
environments can be identified:
1. AIDS growth rate is low and contracts increase.
2. AIDS growth rate is low and contracts remain unaffected
3. AIDS growth rate is low and contracts decrease.
4. AIDS growth rate is medium and contracts increase.
5. AIDS growth rate is medium and contracts remain unaffected.
6 . AIDS growth rate is medium and contracts decrease.
7. AIDS growth rate is high and contracts increase.
8. AIDS growth rate is high and contracts remain unaffected
9. AIDS growth rate is high and contracts decrease.
Each situation (initial decision plus environment) must be evaluated under the following 
three scenarios:
C4 : AZT in combination with other drugs 
C2: A new stronger drug which works on its own 
C3: A new drug in combination with other drugs
7.6 Specification of AIDSPLAN runs
Since there are nine possible operating environments and three scenarios, there must be 
at least 27 configurations, each of which performs well under each combination of 
environments and scenarios. AIDSPLAN was used to identify these configurations.
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By inputting various hypotheses about patient demand, mode of treatment, and bed 
occupancy rate, the model produced the corresponding resource requirements and 
costs. These results were used to formulate desirable configurations. Some variations 
from the desirable format were also considered. The assumptions that needed to be 
made to use AIDSPLAN are listed below:
National forecasts of AIDS cases: Three levels were considered; low, medium, and 
high using data from the Day 2 report [PHLS 1993a]. This report gives annual 
projections of national AIDS cases by risk group. A most likely estimate and its upper 
and lower limits are given for each risk group. To keep the analysis manageable, it was 
decided to exclude combinations of different levels of risk group estimates. The three 
estimates were taken to represent the three different levels of forecast.
Local forecasts of AIDS cases: These were calculated pro-rata to the national cases, 
using the proportion of the national caseload that was treated in Parkside in 1992. This 
calculation assumes no change in contract levels. Separate forecasts were needed to 
reflect any changes in contract levels. According to the 1992 AIDS (Control) Act 
Report for Parkside, only one third of HIV or AIDS cases treated in Parkside were also 
resident there, and since it was assumed that only non-residents were affected by 
changes in the contracts, either an increase or a decrease in the level of contracts would 
affect two thirds of the estimated caseload. The level of the change was taken as 20%. 
Setting up the AIDSPLAN runs to reflect changes in contracts was achieved by using 
the facility provided by the model to calculate cross-boundary flows.
Local forecast of HIV-f cases (excluding AIDS): Since no future estimates of the 
national HIV+ numbers were available, to estimate the future number of HIV+ cases 
locally, an extrapolation based on an assumption of a constant proportion of HTV+ to 
AIDS cases given in the Parkside was made.
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A set of different estimates of patient numbers for 1996 (decision horizon) and 1999 
(planning horizon) based on the above assumptions is presented in Tables 7.2a and 
7.2b below.
Level of demand Contracts HTV+ ARC AIDS
Low Decrease 775 365 327
Low Unaffected 895 421 378
Low Increase 1013 477 428
Medium Decrease “ 897 422 379
Medium Unaffected 1035 488 437
Medium Increase 1175 553 496
High Decrease 983 462 415
High Unaffected 1137 535 480
High Increase 1286 605 543
Table 7.2a: Expected patient numbers for 1996
Level of demand Contracts m v + ARC AIDS
Low Decrease 819 385 346
Low Unaffected 948 446 400
Low Increase 1072 504 453
Medium Decrease 990 466 418
Medium Unaffected 1142 538 482
Medium Increase 1293 608 546
High Decrease 1205 567 509
.............High Unaffected 1390 654 587
High Increase 1576 741 665
Table 7.2b: Expected patient numbers for 1999
Care Options: Three alternative care options were developed to reflect the three 
different drug treatment scenarios. It was assumed that due to general ill health, 
injecting drug users (IDUs) would not be eligible to be treated either with AZT or with 
the two new drugs. It was also assumed that the reduction in hospitalization by 50% 
resulting from the administration of the new drug treatments would be reflected in a 
corresponding increase in out-patient or day patient visits. The reduction of
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hospitalization would be due to the drug's effect in reducing the number of illness 
episodes requiring hospitalization. For this to happen, it was assumed that patients 
would need more visits to the outpatient clinic to get their prescriptions and to be 
properly monitored. As can be seen from Table 7.3, at the time of data collection, the 
average AIDS patient visited the outpatients clinic 16 times per annum and spent 27 
days p.a. as an inpatient. The 27 inpatient days corresponded to an average of three 
episodes requiring hospital admission. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the 
patient would visit the OP clinic once a month plus once after each episode. If the 
administration of the new drug reduces the number of episodes and thus hospitalization 
by 50%, the average number of follow-up visits would drop to 1.5. Assuming that 
under the new drug regime the patient would need to visit the OP clinic twice a month, 
the OP visits increase to approximately 25. Using the same logic, the figure for OP 
visits of ARC patients becomes 19. Since HTV+ asymptomatic patients are not eligible 
for any of the drugs under consideration, it will be assumed that no change in their 
visiting pattern occurs. The following table summarizes the information used to 
calculate the increase in OP visits resulting from a 50% decrease in hospitalization.
HIV+ ARC AIDS Total
Current patient number 829 390 350 1569
IP days per patient per annum 0 7 27 n/a
OP visits per patient per annum 4 10 16 n/a
OP visits per patient taking drug p.a. 4 19 25 n/a
Table 7.3: Outpatient visits resulting from a 50% decrease in hospitalization
A summary of the assumptions concerning the effects of the new drug treatments is 
given in Table 7.4:
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Cost of drug As before As before 20% less
Cost of other drugs As before 20% less As before
Transfusions As before 50% less 50% less
Hospitalization As before 50% less 50% less
OP visits As before more more
Eligibility AIDS AIDS ARC, AIDS
Proportion of category taking drug 50% 60% 50%, 70%
Table 7.4: Summary of the effects of the three drug treatment scenarios
Bed occupancy rate: Since the hospital considers a bed occupancy rate of between 90% 
and 95% acceptable, the model was run for both these figures, to identify 
corresponding upper and lower bounds for the number of beds required. This was 
achieved by setting the conversion factors provided by the model to transform 
resources from the units in which they are expressed in the care options (e.g. annual in­
patient days) to meaningful annual resource units (e.g. number of beds).
Cost per case: to compare the cost per case figures, the cost of treatment for AIDS non- 
IDU cases was used. The average over-all cost was considered not representative, 
since the vast majority of patients are HTV+ asymptomatic who would not take any of 
the three drugs described in the scenarios. For the same reason, LDUs were excluded. 
Moreover, it was felt that a reduction in the cost of the most expensive category to treat 
(AIDS non-EDU) would be an advantage in establishing future contracts, since care 
purchasers would be attracted by the reduced cost offered.
7.7 AIDSPLAN Output
The information and assumptions listed in the previous section were used to run 
AIDSPLAN with contrasting formulations. For the decision horizon, each formulation 
represents a possible future operating environment, and for the planning horizon each
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formulation represents a possible future operating environment and mode of drug 
treatment. Thus, in each run, the following parameters could be varied:
i) The rate of growth of HIV+ and AIDS cases (Low, Medium, High) - for both 
horizons
ii) The level of contracts (Decrease, Unaffected, Increase) - for both horizons
iii) The mode of drug treatment (Scenarios 1,2 and 3) - for the planning horizon only
Moreover, for each formulation, an upper and a lower limit for the number of beds 
were produced: the upper limit representing a bed occupancy rate of 90% and the 
lower limit one of 95%.
In this specific application of AIDSPLAN, the model produces for each run the level of 
resources, and their associated costs, needed for the hospital to function under the 
particular specifications at both the decision and planning horizons (in this case 1996 
and 1999 respectively). For simplicity in what follows information on only a limited 
number of input resources has been recorded and reproduced; other resources 
consumed which are not explicitly presented here, such as transfusions, counselling 
etc. are included in the annual cost figures per patient. Table 7.5 shows the level of 
hospital resources required at the end of 1994 (assumed to be the current year). These 
were generated by running AIDSPLAN with the latest local figures for HIV+ and 
AIDS cases and current mode of treatment (Scenario 1). The output from AIDSPLAN 
shows that the hospital should have 39 AIDS beds attended by 42 Whole Time 
Equivalent (WTE) nurses and 10 WTE doctors. Two WTE nurses and four WTE 
doctors should be employed in the out-patients department.
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Beds 39
Number of nurses for in-patients 42
Number of nurses for out-patients 2
Number of doctors for in-patients 10
Number of doctors for out-patients 4
Total cost of AZT (£’000s) 938
Total cost of other drugs (£’000s) 773
Cost per AIDS patient per annum £8,111
Table 7.5: Current level of resources
The output from the series of runs of AIDSPLAN carried out for 1996 is presented in 
Table 7.6a, and the output for 1999 is presented in Table 7.6b. Table 7.6b is divided 
into three sections, one for each scenario, whereas Table 7.6a represents the scenario 1 
only (Status Quo), since at the decision horizon no new drugs (scenarios 2 and 3) are 
expected to have been developed. Each row of the tables shows the results of two runs 
of the model, one for each rate of bed occupancy. The first two columns describe the 
operating environment The third column gives two figures for the number of beds 
required; the lower corresponding to a bed occupancy rate of 95% and the higher to one 
of 90%. Columns 4 to 7 give the required number of in-patient nursing staff (IPN), 
out-patient nursing staff (OPN), in-patient medical staff (IPD) and out-patient medical 
staff (OPD), respectively. The eighth column gives the total cost of drugs other than 
AZT or those that will replace it under scenarios 2 and 3. The ninth column gives the 
cost of AZT or the new antiviral drugs in scenarios 2 and 3. Finally, the last column 
gives the total cost af treatment for all patients. The information in both tables will be 
used in the next section as a guide to construct alternative future configurations of the 
hospital, which will then be evaluated, and used to apply robustness analysis to assess 
the relative flexibility of the initial decisions.
One of the factors to be used to evaluate the performance of the system at the planning 
horizon is the cost per AIDS (non-IDU) patient per annum for each of the three 
scenarios. These figures are:
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Scenario 1: £8,111 
Scenario 2: £8,365 
Scenario 3: £8,140
For each scenario there is only one annual cost figure per AIDS patient. All cost 
figures are marginal costs, in the sense that they do not include overheads. Since the 
uncertainty in this problem relates to the size and mix of the caseload and the mode of 
treatment, any costs that are not dependent on these factors may be treated as irrelevant, 
at least as a first approximation. For the reasons explained at the end of section 7.6, it 
was decided to record the annual cost of treatment per AIDS patient. Since the 
differences in these costs for the three scenarios are trivial1, they were not taken into 
account in the evaluation of the performance of the system. Instead, it was decided to 
consider the level of non-expendable resources required to treat patients under each 
future.
INPUT OUTPUT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Level of 
demand
Contracts Beds IPN OPN IPD OPD CD
(£000 ’s)
A7T
(£000’s)
Total Cost 
(£00 0 's)
Low Decrease 35/37 39 2 9 3 726 865 2758
Low Unaffected 41/43 46 2 10 4 838 1000 3184
Low Increase 46/48 51 2 12 4 948 1129 3597
Medium Decrease 41/43 46 2 10 4 838 1005 3187
Medium Unaffected 47/49 53 2 12 5 969 1162 3686
Medium Increase 53/56 60 3 14 5 1099 1320 4182
High Decrease 44/47 50 2 11 4 920 1089 3485
High Unaffected 52/54 58 2 13 5 1065 1264 4039
High Increase 58/61 65 3 15 6 1203 1426 4557
Table 7.6a: Output of AIDSPLAN runs for 1996
1 Since Scenario 1 is a projection of the status quo as far as treatment is concerned, it 
follows that this figure for 1999 will be the same as the current one. Under scenario 2 
the cost per patient is about 3% higher, although the cost of the drug that replaces AZT 
is the same and the cost of other drugs is 20% lower. The increase in the cost per 
patient is due to the fact that under scenario 2  an extra 10% of the caseload can take the 
new drug. Under scenario 3, the difference in the cost per patient is trivial. This is 
because although the cost per dose of the drug is now 20% less, it can be administered 
to an extra 20% of the caseload. In the context of the magnitude of overall costs and 
the prevailing uncertainties, these differences are all negligible.
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Scenario 1
INPUT O u t p u t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Level of 
demand
Contracts Beds IPN OPN IPD OPD CD
(£000’s)
AZT
(£000’s)
Total Cost 
(£000 ’s)
Low Decrease 37/39 42 2 9 4 767 904 3909
Low Unaffected 43/45 48 2 11 4 888 1045 4515
Low Increase 49/51 55 2 12 5 1004 1185 5111
Medium Decrease 45/47 50 2 11 4 928 1101 4731
Medium Unaffected 52/55 58 2 13 5 1070 1269 5456
Medium Increase 59/62 66 3 15 6 1210 1438 6176
High Decrease 55/58 61 3 14 5 1130 1337 5755
High Unaffected 63/66 71 3 16 6 1301 1539 6628
High Increase 71/75 80 3 18 7 1476 1747 7518
Scenario 2
Level of 
demand
Contracts Beds IPN OPN IPD OPD QD
(£000’s)
Drug 2 
(£000 's)
Total Cost 
(£000’s)
Low Decrease 35/37 40 2 9 4 768 1084 3985
Low Unaffected 41/43 46 2 10 4 831 1252 4609
Low Increase 46/49 52 2 12 5 939 1421 5218
Medium Decrease 43/45 48 2 11 4 867 1320 4824
Medium Unaffected 49/52 55 3 13 5 1000 1522 5564
Medium Increase 56/59 63 3 14 6 1131 1724 6300
High Decrease 52/55 59 3 13 5 1056 1601 5868
High Unaffected 60/63 67 3 15 6 1217 1848 6769
High Increase 68/72 76 3 17 7 1474 2095 7670
Scenario 3
Level of 
demand
Contracts Beds IPN OPN IPD OPD CD
(£000 ’s)
Drug 3 
(£000 's)
Total Cost 
(£000 's)
Low Decrease 32/34 36 2 8 4 767 1689 4553
Low Unaffected 37/39 42 2 9 5 888 1950 5261
Low Increase 42/44 47 3 11 6 1004 2211 5956
Medium Decrease 39/41 43 3 10 5 927 2049 5505
Medium Unaffected 45/47 50 3 11 6 1069 2363 6351
Medium Increase 50/53 57 3 13 7 1210 2678 7193
High Decrease 47/50 53 3 12 6 1130 2494 6710
High Unaffected 54/57 61 4 14 7 1301 2875 7731
High Increase 62/65 69 4 16 8 1474 3257 8759
Table 7.6b: Output of AIDSPLAN runs for 1999
7.8 Configurations
Producing alternative configurations of the system is an essential task of SRM; each 
configuration represents a possible and potentially valuable future state of the operating
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system. By evaluating the performance of the configurations under each set of possible 
future conditions and linking them to the initial decisions, we can apply robustness 
analysis, and thus assess the relative flexibility of alternative initial decisions.
Configurations are evaluated on the basis of the desirability of their performance. The 
measures of desirability used in this application are the extents to which resources avoid 
either over- or underprovision. AIDSPLAN has provided us with the levels of 
resources required for desirable performance under each operating environment and 
mode of treatment1, and this output will be used to construct configurations (i.e. 
combinations of resources) that perform desirably under particular futures. Their 
performance under other futures will be evaluated according to the extent to which they 
deviate from the level of resources produced by AIDSPLAN for those futures. Then, 
the attainability of the configurations from the particular initial decisions will be 
established. Next, robustness and debility scores of each initial decision under each 
future will be calculated. Finally, by using the information contained in the robustness 
and debility matrices we will analyse the relative flexibility of each initial decision.
Tables 7.6a&b were used as a source of the data needed to construct the interim and 
final configurations. It was decided to define the configurations in terms of 
combinations of beds and staff, and to ignore drug costs. This was done to reflect the 
fact that commitments of resources such as beds and staff are less reversible and thus 
more inflexible than those involving money.
In the calculations which are reported below, increases in numbers of beds and of in­
patient nursing staff are treated as if they can occur only in multiples of five, whereas 
increases in numbers of in-patient medical staff and out-patient staff are permitted in 
single units. Using a reduced number of discrete alternatives for nurses and bed 
numbers was necessary to avoid producing a very large number of essentially similar
1 For simplicity, from now on, each combination of operating environment and drug 
treatment scenario will be called a "future”.
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configurations. A range of nursing staff (rather than a single figure as in Tables 
7.6a&b) provides an approximation of the balance of resources from which adaptations 
can be made in practice. For example, the deviation from the "ideal" figure can be 
accommodated by either overtime in case of understaffing or reallocation of the extra 
staff to other specialties, in case of overstaffing.
The initial assumption was that all configurations would feature at least the level of 
resources produced by AIDSPLAN for the end of 1994, taken to represent the current 
configuration. For beds and in-patient nurses the range between the maximum level 
needed under any future and this minimum level was divided into intervals of five. 
Each range of beds was matched with alternative ranges of in-patient nursing staff 
using Tables 7.6a&b as a guide. To each combination of beds and nurses, compatible 
numbers of in-patient medical staff were then attached. The procedure was repeated 
attaching one resource each time. This procedure resulted in 10 configurations for the 
decision horizon and 32 configurations for the planning horizon.
One very surprising outcome of the initial runs of AIDSPLAN was the observation that 
under scenarios 2 and 3, the hospital might need to consider an initial decision that had 
not been considered up to this point in the analysis: to somewhat decrease the number 
of beds and associated in-patient staff. This would be indicated under low AIDS 
growth and decreased contracts under scenarios 2  and 3, and unaffected contracts 
under scenario 3. Methodologically, this observation is a classic example of the 
common Operational Research experience that subsequent analysis leads to the 
reformulation of the initial problem. On the practical side, it can be argued that since 
the amounts of resources required under these conditions do not deviate significantly 
from the current ones, any decision about reducing these resources can be deferred 
until it becomes apparent that it must be implemented. Since the scale of hospital 
resources to reallocate would then be at most 7 beds and 6 nurses, such a change does 
not present any significant practical problems. However, for the sake of completeness
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it was decided to revise the initial decisions to include, as already mentioned, one 
representing a reduction in in-patient facilities.
This revision of the initial decisions was evidently inconsistent with the assumption that 
all configurations would feature at least the current level of resources. Therefore, it 
was necessary to construct a further set of configurations representing reduction of 
resources. Another configuration was added for the decision horizon and another three 
were added to the existing 32 for the planning horizon, each appropriate to one of the 
operating conditions which would justify a reduction in resources, as suggested by 
Tables 7.6a&b. The resulting 11 and 35 configurations respectively are recorded in 
Tables 7.8a&b. The first 6 columns describe the resource components of the 
configurations, while the remaining columns provide information on the evaluation of 
the configurations under each set of future conditions. The basis for this evaluation is 
described in the next section.
7.9 Evaluation of configurations
To apply robustness analysis we need to assess the performance of each configuration 
under each future, and also to link the configurations to the initial decisions. This 
section describes the method used to evaluate the configurations. (The "linking" 
process will be discussed in the next section.)
The measures of desirability used in the evaluation of the configurations were the 
availability of resources to meet demand, and the minimisation of resource wastage. 
The configurations were evaluated using the following method: As mentioned before, 
each configuration consists of a range of beds and nurses and exact figures for the 
remaining resources. If the figure prescribed by the "ideal" configuration suggested by 
AIDSPLAN (in Table 7.6) for the particular future falls within the range of beds and IP 
nursing staff in a configuration, and the other resources are exactly as required, then the 
configuration is considered desirable (denoted by "D" in Table 7.8). If the figures for 
beds and nurses in the "ideal" configuration deviate by no more than two from the
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extreme points of the range of beds and IP nursing staff in a configuration, and if the 
other resources deviate by no more than one unit, the configuration is considered 
acceptable ("A" in Table 7.8). Under the same conditions for beds and IP nursing staff 
but the other resources deviating by no more than two units, the configuration is 
considered of questionable merit ("Q"). All configurations that satisfy none of the 
above conditions are considered undesirable ("U"). In the calculation of the deviations 
of the "ideal" figures for beds from the extreme points in the particular configuration, 
figures for both occupancy rates (located in column 3 of Table 7.6) were considered 
"ideal".
Table 7.7 summarizes the above rules. The last 9 columns of Table 7.8a and the last 27 
columns of Table 7.8b present the evaluation of the configurations on the basis of these 
rules. It should be stressed at this point that the particular evaluation scheme employed 
to determine configuration desirability is arbitrary; other sets of rules can be applied to 
evaluate the configurations. The general rationale for this particular set of rules is that 
the closer a configuration is to the "ideal" one, the more desirable it is.
Beds IPN OPN IPD OPD Desirability
range includes 
"ideal" no.
range includes 
"ideal" no.
same as 
"ideal" no.
same as 
"ideal" no.
same as 
"ideal" no. Desirable
± 2  from 
"ideal" no.
± 2  from 
"ideal" no.
± 1 from 
"ideal" no.
± 1 from 
"ideal" no.
± 1 from 
"ideal" no. Acceptable
± 2  from 
"ideal" no.
± 2 from 
"ideal" no.
± 2 from 
"ideal" no.
± 2  from 
"ideal" no.
± 2  from 
"ideal" no. Questionable
Any other 
case Undesirable
Table 7.7: Rules for configuration evaluation
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Configuration Beds IPN OPN IPD OPD LD LU U MD MU MI HD HU HI
1 35-39 39-44 2 9 3 D A U A U U U U U
2 40-44 39-44 2 10 4 U A U A U U u U U
3 40-44 45-49 2 10 4 U D Q D U U A U u
4 40-44 45-49 2 11 4 U A A A U U A U u
5 40-44 50-54 2 11 4 U U A U U U D U u
6 45-49 50-54 2 11 4 U U A U A U D U u
7 45-49 50-54 2 12 4 U U D U A U A U u
8 45-49 50-54 2 12 5 U U A U D u A U u
9 50-54 55-59 2 13 5 U u U U A A U D u
10 50-54 60-65 3 14 5 u u U U U D U A u
11 55-61 60-65 3 15 6 u u U U U A U Q D
Table 7.8a: Evaluation of interim configurations
136
u>
SCENARIO 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Configuration Beds P N OPN IPD OPD LD LU LI MD MU MI HD HU HI LD LU LI MD MU MI HD HU HI LD LU LI MD MU MI HD HU HI
1 33-38 3641 2 8 4 A U U U u U U U U A U U U U U U U U D A u Q U u u U U
2 33-38 3641 2 9 4 A U u U u U U U U A U U U u U U U U A A U A U u u U U
3 33-38 4247 2 9 4 D U u U u U U U U A U U U u U U U U U A U A' U u u U U
4 39-44 4247 2 9 5 A Q u U u U U U U A A U Q u U U U U u D Q U u u U U
5 39-44 4247 2 9 4 D Q u U u U U U U A A U Q u U U U U u A Q A U u u U U
6 39-44 4247 2 9 5 A Q u u u U U U U A A U Q u U U U U u D Q A U u u U U
7 39-44 4247 2 10 4 A A u u u U U U U A D U A u U U U U u A Q A u u u U U
8 3944 4247 3 10 5 A A u u u U U U U A A U A u U U U U u A A D u u u U U
9 3944 4247 3 11 6 Q Q u u u U U u U Q Q U Q u U U U U u Q D A u u u U U
10 3944 48-53 2 11 4 U D u A u U U u U U A A D u U. U U U u U U Q Q u u U U
11 4549 48-53 2 11 4 U D A D u u U u U U A A D Q U U U U u U Q U Q u Q U U
12 4549 48-53 2 12 5 U A A A u u U u U U Q D A A U U U U u U A U A u A U U
13 4549 48-53 3 11 6 U Q A Q u u U u U Q Q A Q Q u U U U u U A U D u A U u
14 4549 48-53 3 12 6 U Q A Q u u U u U u Q A Q A u U U U u U A U A u D U u
15 4549 54-59 2 12 5 U U D u u u U u U u U A u A u U U U u u U U u Q A u u
16 4549 54-59 3 13 5 U U A u u U U u U u U A u D u u u U u u U u u Q A u u
17 50-54 54-59 2 12 5 U U D u A u Q u U u U A u A u A u U u u U u u Q A Q u
18 50-54 54-59 2 13 5 U u A u D u A u U u U A u A u A u U u u u u u Q A Q u
19 50-54 54-59 3 13 5 U u A u A u A u U u U A u D u D u U u u u u u Q A Q u
20 50-54 54-59 3 13 7 U u Q u Q u Q u u u u Q u Q u Q u U u u u u u D A A u
21 50-54 60-64 4 14 7 U u U u Q u Q u u u u U u U A Q u U u u u u u u U D u
22 55-59 54-59 2 13 5 U u U u D u A u u u u U u U U A u u u u u u u Q U Q u
23 55-59 54-59 3 13 5 U u U u A u A u u u u U u U u U u u u u u u u Q U Q u
24 55-59 60-64 3 14 5 U u U u A A D u u u u U u U A Q u u u u u u u u U Q u
25 55-59 60-64 3 14 6 u u u u A A A u u u u U u U D U u u u u u u u u U A u
26 55-59 60-64 4 14 7 u u u u U Q Q u u u u U u U A Q u u u u u u u u U D u
27 55-59 65-69 3 15 6 u u u u U D U u u u u U u U A D D u u u u u u u U u u
28 60-64 65-69 3 15 6 u u u u U D u A u u u U u U A U D u u u u u u u U u Q
29 60-64 70-74 3 16 6 u u u u U U u D u u u U u U U U U u u u u u u u U u Q
30 60-64 65-69 4 16 8 u u u u U Q u Q u u u U u U Q U Q u u u u u u u U u D
31 65-69 65-69 3 15 6 u u u u U u u A u u u U u U U U A u u u u u u u U u Q
32 65-69 65-69 4 16 8 u u u u U u u Q u u u U u U u U Q u u u u u u u U u D
33 65-69 70-74 3 16 6 u u u u U U u D u u u U u U u U U A u u u u u u U u Q
34 70-75 .75-80 3 17 7 u u u u u u u U A u u U u U u U U D u u u u u u U u u
35 70-75 75-80 3 18 7 u u u u u u u U D u u U u U u U U A u u u u u u U u u
SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3
Key
D: Desirable 
A: Accepatable 
Q: Questionable 
U: Undesirable
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7.10 Measurement of uncertainty in the AIDS example
In this section an attempt will be made to measure the uncertainty of the problem 
situation using the coefficient of concordance W. This measurement will refer to the 
planning horizon only, where uncertainty is higher. In the AIDS example, some 
modifications to the general formulation will be made to use all the available 
information. In Chapter 5, the uncertainty of the problem is assessed by using a matrix 
which has scenarios as rows and decisions as columns. The cell entries represent the 
performance of the outcomes of each decision under each scenario. The coefficient of 
concordance then measures the degree of similarity of the effects of the scenarios on the 
outcomes of each decision.
In the AIDS example two modifications will be made. First, the rows represent futures 
rather than scenarios, since in this example the information on performance of future 
outcomes is classified by future, a richer concept than a scenario. Secondly, the 
columns of the matrix represent configurations rather than decisions, since 
configurations can be taken to represent the outcomes of decisions. The matrix of 
futures consists of the last 27 columns of Table 7.8b, where the configurations are 
evaluated. The coefficient of concordance W now measures the similarity of treatment 
of the configurations by the futures.
The value of the coefficient of concordance can assist the analysis in many ways. A 
high value of W indicates a high similarity of treatment of the configurations by the 
futures: - the more similar this treatment is, the less important the materialization of a 
particular future becomes. As the computation of W gives a measurement of the 
prevalent uncertainty, its value could influence the choice of a  (the relative preference 
of robustness vs debility-see formula 2.2) by the decision maker. For example, if there 
are futures with particularly beneficial effects in the problem, and W shows that there is 
high uncertainty in the situation, the decision maker might feel inclined to choose a 
value for a  which gives preference to robustness. Similarly, if there are futures with
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particularly disastrous effects and high uncertainty, the choice of a could favour 
debility.
The method described in Chapter 5 is now used to compute the value of W. For each 
future, the configuration performances will be ranked using the evaluations of Table 
7.8b where the configuration performances are assessed. Desirable performances will 
be ranked first, acceptable ones second and so on. Since there are only four possible 
classifications of performance (D, A, Q, U), the presence of a great number of tied 
rankings is inevitable1. Therefore, in computing W, the formula for tied rankings (5.4) 
is used.
Of the following tables, Table 7.9 is a modified version of Table 7.8b, where the 
qualitative assessments have been replaced by their rankings, and Table 7.10 is a 
modification of Table 7.9, where tied performances have been allocated the average of 
the rank they would have if they were distinguishable (mid-rank method). Both tables 
represent the transposed matrix for ease of presentation.
For n=35 (configurations ) and m=27 (futures) a value of W of 0.051 can be 
calculated from Table 7.10. The statistical significance of W may be tested by 
computing x2 and compare it with the value given by the corresponding statistical table. 
Thus x 2= 46.79 which is significant at the 0.1 level. The value of W = 0.051 indicates 
that there is a high disagreement between futures, and therefore the problem situation is 
highly uncertain.
1 In general, in realistic problems the presence of ties is inevitable unless there are as
many performance classifications as there are futures. In the AIDS example it would 
be implausible to attempt to evaluate the configuration performances using a 
classification with a range of 27.
139
o1 SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3
Configuration LD LU LI MD MU MI HD HU HI LD LU LI MD MU MI HD HU HI LD LU LI MD MU MI HD HU HI
1 2 4 4 2 4 1 2 4 3 4
2 2 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 2 4
3 1 4 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
4 2 4 4 2 2 1 3 2 4
5 1 4 4 2 2 2 3 2 4
6 2 4 4 2 2 1 3 2 4
7 2 4 4 2 1 2 3 2 4
8 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 4
9 3 4 4 3 3 3 1 2 4
10 2 4 4 2 2 4 4
11 2 1 4 4 2 2 3 4
12 2 2 4 4 3 1 2 2 2 4
13 2 3 4 4 3 2 2 1 2 4
14 2 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 4
15 1 4 4 4 2 2 4
16 2 4 4 4 2 2 4
17 1 4 2 4 3 4 2 2 2 2 4
18 2 4 1I 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 4
19 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 1 1 * 4
20 3 4 .3 4 3 4 ;2 4
21 4 4 3 4 3 4 14 4
22 4 4 1 4 2 4 4
23 4 4 2 4 2 4 4
24 4 4 2 2 1 4 4
25 4 4 2 2 2 4 4
26 4 4 4 3 3 4 4
27 4 4 4 1 4 4 4
28 4 4 4 1 4 2 3
29 4 4 4 4 4 1 3
30 4 4 4 3 4 3
31 4 4 4 4 4 2 3
32 4 4 4 4 4 3
33 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 3
34 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 1 4
35 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 4 4
Tabic 7.9: Ranked configuration performances
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SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3
Configuration LD LU LI MD MU MI HD HU HI LD LU LI MD MU MI HD HU HI LD LU LI MD MU MI HD HU HI
1 5.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 4.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 21.5 215 20.5 19.5 1 5.5 23 9.5 20.5 22 23 23 21
2 5.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 4.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 2 5.5 23 5 20.5 22 23 23 21
3 1.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 4.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 21.5 215 20.5 19.5 19 5.5 23 5 20.5 22 23 23 21
4 5.5 8.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 4.5 4.5 23.5 8.5 23 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 1.5 8 5 20.5 22 23 23 21
5 1.5 8.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 4.5 4.5 23.5 8.5 23 21.5 215 20.5 19.5 19 5.5 8 5 20.5 22 23 23 21
6 5.5 8.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 4.5 4.5 23.5 8.5 23 21.5 215 20.5 19.5 19 1.5 8 5 20.5 22 23 23 21
7 5.5 4 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 4.5 1 23.5 4 23 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 5.5 8 5 20.5 22 23 23 21
8 5.5 4 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 4.5 4.5 23.5 4 23 21.5 215 20.5 19.5 19 5.5 3.5 1 20.5 22 23 23 21
9 9 8.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 9.5 9.5 23.5 8.5 23 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 9 1 5 20.5 22 23 23 21
10 22.5 1.5 23 2.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 23 4.5 6 1.5 23 21.5 215 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 9.5 4.5 22 23 23 21
11 22.5 1.5 6 1 22.5 21 23 21 19 23 4.5 6 1.5 9 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 8 23 4.5 22 10 23 21
12 22.5 4 6 2.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 23 9.5 1 4 5 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 3.5 23 2.5 22 5.5 23 21
13 22.5 8.5 6 4.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 9.5 9.5 6 8.5 9 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 3.5 23 1 22 5.5 23 21
14 22.5 8.5 6 4.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 23 9.5 6 8.5 5 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 3.5 23 2.5 22 1 23 21
15 22.5 23.5 1.5 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 23 23.5 6 23.5 5 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 5 5.5 23 21
16 22.5 23.5 6 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 19 23 23.5 6 23.5 1.5 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 5 5.5 23 21
17 22.5 23.5 1.5 20.5 5 21 8.5 21 19 23 23.5 6 23.5 5 21.5 4 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 5 5.5 7.5 21
18 22.5 23.5 6 20.5 1.5 21 4 21 19 23 23.5 6 23.5 5 21.5 4 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 5 5.5 7.5 21
19 22.5 23.5 6 20.5 5 21 4 21 19 23 23.5 6 23.5 1.5 21.5 1.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 5 5.5 7.5 21
20 22.5 23.5 10 20.5 8.5 21 8.5 21 19 23 23.5 11 23.5 9 21.5 7.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 1 5.5 3.5 21
21 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 8.5 21 8.5 21 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 4 7.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 22 23 1.5 21
22 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 1.5 21 4 21 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 21.5 4 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 5 23 7.5 21
23 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 5 21 4 21 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 5 23 7.5 21
24 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 5 3.5 1 21 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 4 7.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 22 23 7.5 21
25 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 5 3.5 4 21 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 1 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 22 23 3.5 21
26 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 5.5 8.5 21 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 4 7.5 20.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 22 23 1.5 21
27 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 1.5 23 21 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 4 1.5 1.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 22 23 23 21
28 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 1.5 23 3.5 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 4 215 1.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 22 23 23 4.5
29 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 1.5 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 21.5 22.5 20.5 19.5 19 22,5 23 23 20.5 22 23 23 4.5
30 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 5.5 23 5.5 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 7 22.5 4.5 19.5 19 223 23 23 20.5 22 23 23 1.5
31 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 3.5 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 21.5 22.5 4.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 22 23 23 4.5
32 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 5.5 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 21.5 22.5 4.5 19.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 22 23 23 1.5
33 22.5 23,5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 1.5 19 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 21.5 22.5 20.5 2.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 22 23 23 4.5
34 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 2 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 21.5 22.5 20.5 1 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 22 23 23 21
35 22.5 23.5 23 20.5 22.5 21 23 21 1 23 23.5 23.5 23.5 23 21.5 22.5 20.5 2.5 19 22.5 23 23 20.5 22 23 23 21
Table 7.10: Configuration performances allowing for tied rankings
Chapter 
7: The 
Use 
of 
SRM 
in 
Planning 
for 
H
IV
/A
ID
S
Chapter 7: The Use o f SRM in Planning for HTV/AIDS
7.11 Robustness Analysis
The next step in the analysis after developing the configurations, and assessing for each 
the desirability of its performance under each future (not only that for which it was 
designed), is to establish the attainability of the configurations from the initial decisions. 
This is the final step which enables us to calculate the robustness and debility scores for 
each initial decision.
First, however, some incompatibilities between certain decisions and futures must be 
eliminated from Tables 7.8a&b. It was mentioned earlier that contracts are regarded as 
responsive decisions and are not expected to fall in case of facility expansion, or to 
increase in case of a reduction or no change in resources. This means that taking a 
particular decision prevents the materialization of some futures. Therefore, all futures 
which include a decrease in contracts (labelled LD, MD, and HD) are incompatible with 
decisions di and d2 (new ward or expansion). Similarly, all futures which include an 
increase in contracts Gabelled LI, MI, and HI) are incompatible with decisions d3 and 
d4 (Do nothing or reduce).
The possibility of incompatibility of initial decisions and futures has not been discussed 
so far. There is nothing, however, in SRM itself to prevent the use of different sets of 
futures for each decision. The question will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter, where ideas for further development of SRM will be proposed.
7.11.1 Linking initial decisions and configurations
The next step is to establish which configurations are attainable from which decisions.
As described previously, the initial decisions are:
di: Open new ward and expand out-patient facilities
d2-‘ Expand existing ward and out-patient facilities
d3: Do nothing
d*: Reduce number of beds and associated staff
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In general, establishing connections between initial decisions and configurations 
depends on the decision maker's perceptions about the availability of possible 
intermediate actions. At the planning horizon, three possibilities about such subsequent 
decisions will be considered. First, we will consider a rigid formulation where there 
are no subsequent decisions, so that only configurations which effectively result from 
the implementation of the initial decision will be compatible with that decision. 
Secondly, a relaxed formulation will be considered, where subsequent decisions may 
broaden the spectrum of attainable configurations somewhat Finally, a third still more 
relaxed formulation will assume that subsequent decisions will not necessarily be of a 
minor nature, and therefore an even broader range of configurations can be reached 
from each initial decision. For the initial decisions to have any meaning, and since the 
subsequent decisions will not be explicidy stated, it will be assumed that the latter will 
be able to only partially modify the direction implicit in the former. For the decision 
horizon, a formulation similar to the second one for the planning horizon will be 
considered.
Tables 7.11a&b summarize these posited conditions of attainability (of configurations 
from initial decisions) for the decision horizon and the three formulations of the 
planning horizon.
Initial
decision
Attainable
interim
configurations
di 6-11
d2 2-8
d3 2-4
d4 1-2
Table 7.1 la: Interim configurations attainable from the initial decisions
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Initial
decision
Attainable 
configurations 
under formulation 1
Attainable 
configurations 
under formulation 2
Attainable 
configurations 
under formulation 3
di 17-35 17-35 17-35
d2 9-20 9-20, 22, 23 7-20, 22, 23
d3 3-9 3-14 1-14
d4 1-3 1-7 1-9
Table 7.1 lb: Configurations attainable from initial decisions under three formulations
It can be seen from Table 7.11b that under formulation 1, only 6 out of 35 
configurations are attainable from more than one initial decisions. Under formulation 2 
this number rises to 17 and under formulation 3 it reaches 20. Attainability of 
configurations from more than one initial decision is a desirable characteristic in 
robustness analysis; in its absence we will end up with consistently low robustness 
scores.
7.11.2 Computation o f the robustness and debility matrices
The next step in the analysis is to compute the robustness and debility matrices. Three 
alternative policies for dealing with "questionable" performances will be considered. In 
the first, to calculate the robustness scores both "desirable" and "acceptable" 
configuration performances will be considered as being above the acceptable threshold, 
and to calculate the debility scores both "questionable" and "undesirable" performances 
will be considered as being below the threshold. The second policy treats "desirable", 
"acceptable" and "questionable" configuration performances as being above the 
acceptable threshold, and "undesirable" ones as being below it. Finally, the third policy 
excludes questionable performances from the calculation of both robustness and 
debility scores.
There could of course, be other threshold levels. The choice of both scale of evaluation 
of configuration performances and of threshold level depends in practice on the 
particular problem and decision maker.
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Tables 7.12 to 7.15 show the robustness and debility matrices which result from the 
three alternative policies for treating "questionable" performances. Table 7.12 shows 
the robustness and debility matrices at the decision horizon. Tables 7.13, 7.14 and 
7.15 show the robustness and debility matrices for each formulation at the planning 
horizon, with each table representing one formulation. The X's in some cells denote 
the incompatibility of the particular future and initial decision. The last row of each 
matrix shows the total number of acceptable options in the case of a robustness matrix, 
or the total number of unacceptable options in the case of a debility matrix, for the 
particular future.
The robustness and debility scores in Table 7.12 (decision horizon) are calculated using 
the information in Tables 7.8a and 7.1 la; the robustness and debility scores in Tables 
7.13 to 7.15 (planning horizon) are calculated using the information in Tables 7.8b and
7.1 lb. The way in which the scores are calculated for the decision horizon will now be 
explained. (The scores at the planning horizon are calculated in a similar way.) For 
each initial decision, we check Table 7.11a, to determine which configurations are 
attainable from that decision. Then, for each future, we check Table 7.8a to determine 
how many of these configurations are above the acceptable threshold (or below it in the 
case of debility). The robustness score of the initial decision for that particular future is 
calculated as the ratio of the number of these configurations to the number of all 
configurations above the acceptable threshold under that future. Similarly, the debility 
score is the ratio of the number of configurations below the acceptable threshold 
attainable from that decision to the number of all configurations below the acceptable 
threshold in the particular future.
Consider, for example, initial decision 64, if the acceptability level is set with Q as 
unacceptable. For this decision interim configurations 1-2 are attainable (Table 7.1 la). 
Of these two configurations, for future LD, only one is above the acceptability 
threshold. The total number of acceptable options in this future is one. Therefore the
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robustness score for d4 in future LD is 1/1 = 1. Similarly, the total number of 
unacceptable options under future LD is 10. Of these, only one is attainable from 
decision d*. Therefore, the debility score for d4 under LD is 1/10=0.1.
| LD j LU | LI | MD 1 MU | MI | HD | HU ~Th I
Q UNACCEPTABLE 
ROBUSTNESS MATRIX
DEBILITY MATRIX
Q ACCEPTABLE 
ROBUSTNESS MATRIX
Q EXCLUDED 
ROBUSTNESS MATRIX
d4 1 0.5 X 0.5 0 X 0 0 X
d3 0 0.75 X 0.75 0 X 0.33 0 X
<*2 X 0.75 1 X 0.75 0 X 0 0
dl X 0 0.6 X 1 1 X I 1
n 1 4 5 4 4 3 6 2 1
d4 0.1 0 X 0 0.29 X 0.4 0.22 X
<*3 0.3 0 X 0 0.43 X 0.2 0.33 X
d?. X 0.57 0.33 X 0.57 0.88 X 0.78 0.7
di X 0 .86 0.5 X 0.29 0.38 X 0.44 0.5
n 10 7 6 7 7 8 5 9 10
d4 1 0.5 X 0.5 0 X 0 0 X
d3 0 0.75 X 0.75 0 X 0.33 0 X
d2 X 0.75 0.75 X 0.75 0 X 0 0
di X 0 0.5 X 1 1 X 1 1
n 1 4 6 4 4 3 6 3 1
DEBDJTYM[ATRIX
d4 0.1 0 X 0 0.29 X 0.4 0.25 X
d3 0.3 0 X 0 0.43 X 0.2 0.38 X
d2 X 0.57 0 .2 X 0.57 0.88 X 0.88 0.7
di X 0 .86 0.6 X 0.29 0.38 X 0.38 0.5
n 10 7 5 7 7 8 5 8 10
d4 1 0.5 X 0.5 0 X 0 0 X
d3 0 0.75 X 0.75 0 X 0.33 0 X
d2 X 0.75 1 X 0.75 0 X 0 0
di X 0 0.6 X 1 1 X 1 1
n 1 4 5 4 4 3 6 2 1
DEBILITY MATRIX
d4 0.1 0 X 0 0.29 X 0.4 0.25 X
d3 0.3 0 X 0 0.43 X 0.2 0.38 X
d2 X 0.57 0.2 X 0.57 0.88 X 0.88 0.7
di X 0 .86 0.6 X 0.29 0.38 X 0.38 0.5
n 10 7 5 7 7 8 5 8 10
Table 7.12: Robustness and debility matrices at the decision horizon
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
LD ILU ILI IMD IMU IMI IhD IHU IHI LD ILU ILI |MD IMU IMI |HD IHU IHI LD ILU ILI IMD IMU IMI IHD |HU IHI'
d4 0.38 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0.38 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 1 0.38 X 0.25 0 X 0 0 x!
d3 0.75 0.4 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0.75 0.71 X 0.4 0 X 0 0 X 0 0.75 X 0.88 0 X 0 0 X
d2 X 0.6 1 X 0.43 0 X 0 0 X 0.29 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0 0.8 X 1 1 X 0.25 0
dl X 0 0.33 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 0 0.3 X 0.43 1 X 1 1 X 0 0 X 0 1 X 1 1
n 8 5 9 3 7 4 6 4 2 8 7 10 5 7 6 5 3 3 2 8 5 8 3 I 9 4 2
DEBILITY MATRIX
d4 0 0.1 X 0.09 0.11 X 0.1 0.1 X 0 0.11 X 0.1 0.11 X 0.1 0.09 X 0.03 0 X 0.04 0.09 X 0.12 0.1 X
d3 0.04 0.17 X 0.22 0.25 X 0.24 0.23 X 0.04 0.07 X 0.17 0.25 X 0.23 0.22 X 0.21 0.04 X 0 0.22 X 0.27 0.23 X
d2 X 0.30 0.12 X 032 0.39 X 0.39 036 X 0.36 0.08 X 0.18 0.41 X 0.38 0.38 X 0.44 0.27 X 0.28 0.32 X 0.35 0.36
dl X 0.63 0.62 X 0.43 0.48 X 0.48 032 X 0.68 0.64 X 0.57 0.45 X 0.5 0.5 X 0.7 0.63 X 0.59 0.53 X 0.48 0.52
n 27 30 26 32 28 31 29 31 33 27 28 25 30 28 29 30 32 32 33 27 30 27 32 34 26 31 33
Decision
ILD ILU ILI IMP I MU |MI I HD | HU 1HI ILD ILU |LI |MD |MU |MI I HD I HU |HI ILD ILU ILI IMP |MU |MI I HD [HU |HI
d4 0.33 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0.3 0 k 0 0 X 0 0 X 1 0.33 X 0.3 0 X 0 0 X
d3 0.78 0.55 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0.7 0.55 X 0.55 0 X 0 0 X 0 0.78 X 0.7 0 X 0 0 X
d2 X 0.55 1 X 0.44 0 X 0 0 X 0.55 i X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0.11 0.5 X 1 0.75 X 0.4 0
dl X 0 0.4 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 0 0.36 X 0.4 1 X 1 1 X 0 0 X 0 0.75 X 1 1
n 9 11 10 5 9 6 10 6 2 10 11 11 11 10 7 9 5 3 2 9 10 10 5 8 10 10 6
DEBILITY MATRIX
d4 0 0.13 X 0.10 0.12 X 0.12 0.1 X 0 0.13 X 0.13 0.12 X 0.12 0.1 X 0.03 0 X 0 0.1 X 0.12 0.12 X
d3 0 0.04 X 0.23 0.27 X 0.28 0.24 X 0 0.04 X 0.04 0.28 X 0.27 0.23 X 0.21 0 X 0 0.23 X 0.28 0.28 X
d2 X 0.25 0.08 X 031 0.41 X 0.41 036 X 0.25 0.04 X 0.08 0.43 X 0.4 0.38 X 0.42 0.28 X 0.23 0.22 X 032 0.41
dl X 0.79 0.6 X 038 0.45 X 0.45 032 X 0.79 0.63 X 0.6 0.43 X 0.47 0.5 X 0.73 0.76 X 0.63 0.48 X 0.36 0.45
n 26 24 25 30 26 29 25 29 33 25 24 24 24 25 28 26 30 32 33 26 25 25 30 27 25 25 29
Decision
d4 0.38 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0.38 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 1 0.38 X 0.25 0 X 0 0 X
d3 0.75 0.4 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0.75 0.71 X 0.4 0 X 0 0 X 0 0.75 X 0.88 0 X 0 0 X
d2 X 0.6 1 X 0.43 0 X 0 0 X 0.29 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0 0.8 X 1 1 X 0.25 0
dl X 0 0.33 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 0 0.3 X 0.43 1 X 1 1 X 0 0 X 0 1 X 1 1
0 8 5 9 3 7 4 6 4 2 8 7 10 5 7 6 5 3 3 2 8 5 8 3 1 9 4 2
DEBILITY MATRIX
Questionable performances 
taken as unacceptable
Questionable performances 
taken as acceptable
ILD ILU I LI IMP I MU |MI IhD I HU |HI ILD ILU ILI IMP |MU IMI I HD I HU 1HI ILD ILU ILI IMP IMU Im I I HD |HU IhF I
ROBUSTNESS MATRIX
Questionable performances 
not considered in calculations
d4 0 0.13 X 0.10 0.12 X 0.12 0.1 X 0 0.13 X 0,13 0.12 X 0.12 0.1 X 0.03 0 X 0 0.1 X 0.12 0.12 X
d3 0 0.04 X 0.23 037 X 0.28 0.24 X 0 0.04 X 0.04 0.28 X 0.27 0.23 X 0.21 0 X 0 0.23 X 038 0.28 X
d2 X 0.25 0.08 X 031 0.41 X 0.41 036 X 0.25 0.04 X 0.08 0.43 X 0.4 0.38 X 0.42 038 X 0.23 0.22 X 0.32 0.41
dl X 0.79 0.6 X 038 0.45 X 0.45 032 X 0.79 0.63 X 0.6 0.43 X 047 0.5 X 0.73 0.76 X 0.63 0.48 X 0.36 0.45
n 26 24 25 30 26 29 25 29 33 25 24 24 24 25 28 26 30 32 33 26 25 25 30 27 25 25 29
Table 7.13: Robustness and debility matrices under formulation 1
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IScenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
LD |LU ILI IMD IMU IMI IHD I HU IHI LD ILU ILI IMD IMU IMI IHD |HU IHI LD ILU ILI IMD IMU IMI |HD IhU IhI
00
Decision ROBUSTNESS MATRIX
a 0.88 0.2 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0.88 0.57 X 0.2 0 X 0 0 X 1 0.88 X 0.75 0 X 0 0 X
d3 0.75 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0.75 1 X 1 0.29 X 0 0 X 0 0.75 X 0.88 1 X 0.33 0 X
d2 X 0.6 1 X 0.71 0 X 0 0 X 0.29 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0 0.8 X 1 1 X 0.25 0
dl X 0 0.33 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 0 0.3 X 0.43 1 X 1 1 X 0 0 X 0 1 X 1 1
n 8 5 9 3 7 4 6 4 2 8 7 10 5 7 6 5 3 3 2 8 5 8 3 1 9 4 2
DEBILITY MATRIX
ILD ILU ILI Im p  IMU Im I IHD IHU IHI ILD ILU ILI IMP I MU IMI IHD IHU IHI ILD ILU ILI IMP I MU |MI I HD I HU IHI
DEBILITY MATRIX
Decision
ILD | m  IU  IM P I MU IMI IHD I HU |H I ILD ILU ILI IM P I MU IMI lUD |HU IHI ILD ILU ILI IM P I MU |M I I HD I HU IHI 
  _________  ROBUSTNESS MATRIX
d4 0.88 0.2 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0.88 0.57 X 0.2 0 X 0 0 X 1 0.88 X 0.75 0 X 0 0 X
d3 0.75 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0.75 1 X 1 0.29 X 0 0 X 0 0.75 X 0.88 1 X 0.33 0 X
d2 X 0.6 1 X 0.71 0 X 0 0 X 0.29 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0 0.8 X 1 1 X 0.25 0
dl X 0 0.33 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 0 0.3 X 0.43 1 X 1 1 X 0 0 X 0 1 X 1 1
n 8 5 9 3 7 4 6 4 2 8 7 10 5 7 6 5 3 3 2 8 5 8 3 1 9 4 2
DEBILITY MATRIX
Questionable performances 
taken as unacceptable
d4 0 0.2 X 0.22 0.25 X 0.24 0.23 X 0 0.11 X 0.2 0.25 X 0.23 0.22 X 0.15 0 X 0.04 0.22 X 0.27 0.23 X
d3 0.22 0.23 X 0.28 0.43 X 0.41 0.39 X 0.22 0.18 X 0.23 0.36 X 0.4 0.38 X 0.36 0.22 X 0.19 0.28 X 0.35 0.39 X
d2 X 0.37 0.19 X 0.32 0.45 X 0.45 0.42 X 0.43 0.16 X 0.25 0.48 X 0.44 0.44 X 0.52 0.33 X 0.34 0.38 X 0.42 0.42
dl X 0.63 0.62 X 0.43 0.48 X 0.48 0.52 X 0.68 0.64 X 0.57 0.45 X 0.5 0.5 X 0.7 0.63 X 0.59 0.53 X 0.48 0.52
n 27 30 26 32 28 31 29 31 33 27 28 25 30 28 29 30 32 32 33 27 30 27 32 34 26 31 33
d4 0.^8 0.36 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0.1 0.36 X 0^6 0 X 0 0 k 1 m k 0.7 0 -x 0 0 ......
d3 0.78 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0.8 1 X 1 0.4 X 0 0 X 0 0.78 X 0.8 1 X 0.4 0 X
d2 X 0.55 1 X 0.67 0 X 0 0 X 0.55 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0.11 0.5 X 1 1 X 0.6 0
dl X 0 0.4 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 0 0.36 X 0.4 1 X 1 i X 0 0 X 0 0.75 X 1 1
n 9 11 10 5 9 6 10 6 2 10 11 11 11 10 7 9 5 3 2 9 10 10 5 8 10 10 6
d4 0 0.13 X 0.23 0.27 X 0.28 0.24 X 0 0.13 X 0.13 0.28 X 0.27 0.23 X 0.15 0 X 0 0.23 X 0.28 0.28 X
d3 0.19 0.13 X 0.23 0.46 X 0.48 0.41 X 0.16 0.04 X 0.04 0.32 X 0.46 0.4 X 0.36 0.19 X 0.16 0.23 X 0.32 0.48 X
d2 X 0.33 0.16 X 0.31 0.48 X 0.48 0.42 X 0.33 0.13 X 0.16 05 X 0.47 0.44 X 0.5 0.36 X 0.3 0.22 X 0.32 0.48
dl X ,0.79 0.6 X 0.38 0.45 X 0.45 0.52 X 0.79 0.63 X 0.6 0.43 X 0.47 0.5 X 0.73 0.76 X 0.63 0.48 X 0.36 0.45
n 26 24 25 30 26 29 25 29 33 25 24 24 24 25 28 26 30 32 33 26 25 25 30 27 25 25 29
Questionable performances 
taken as acceptable
Questionable performances 
not considered in calculations
d4 0 0.13 X 0.23 0.27 X 0.28 0.24 X 0 0.13 X 0.13 0.28 X 021 0.23 X 0.15 0 X 0 0.23 X 0.28 0.28 X
d3 0.19 0.13 X 0.23 0.46 X 0.48 0.41 X 0.16 0.04 X 0.04 0.32 X 0.46 0.4 X 0.36 0.19 X 0.16 0.23 X 0.32 0.48 X
d2 X 0.33 0.16 X 0.31 0.48 X 0.48 0.42 X 0.33 0.13 X 0.16 03 X 0.47 0.44 X 0.5 0.36 X 0.3 0.22 X 0.32 0.48
dl X 0.79 0.6 X 038 0.45 X 0.45 0.52 X 0.79 0.63 X 0.6 0.43 X 0.47 0.5 X 0.73 0.76 X 0.63 0.48 X 0.36 0.45
n 26 24 25 30 26 29 25 29 33 25 24 24 24 25 28 26 30 32 33 26 25 25 30 27 25 25 29
Table 7.14: Robustness and debility matrices under formulation 2
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Dedslon
Scenario! Scenario 2 Scenario 3
ld  Ilu  I li Im p  I m u  Imi Ih d  Ih u  Ihi Ild  Ilu  Ili Im p  Im u  Imi Ihd  Ih u  Ihi Ild  Ilu  Ili Im p  Im u  Imi Ihd  Ihu  Ihi
ROBUSTNESS MATRIX
d4 1 0.4 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 1 0.71 X 0.4 0 X 0 0 X 1 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X
d3 1 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 1 1 X 1 0.29 X 0 0 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 033 0 X
d2 X 1 1 X 0.71 0 X 0 0 X 0.57 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0.25 1 X 1 1 X 0.25 0
dl X 0 0.33 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 0 0.3 X 0.43 1 X 1 1 X 0 0 X 0 1 X 1 I
n 8 5 9 3 7 4 6 4 2 8 7 10 5 7 6 5 3 3 2 8 5 8 3 1 9 4 2
DEBILITY MATRIX
Ild  ilu ili im p  imu imi ihd  ihu  ihi ild ilu  ili Im p  im u  Imi Ihd ihu Ihi ild ilu  ili Im p  Im u  imi ihd  Ih u  ihT
ROBUSTNESS MATRIX
DEBILITY MATRIX
Dedslon
I ld  I lu  In  Imp Imu Imi Hid luu  lui I ld  I lu  Ili Imp Imu Imi Imp Ihu Imi I ld  I lu  Ili Imp Imu Imi Hid Iiiu luT 
________ ROBUSTNESS MATRIX
d4 1 0.4 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 1 0.71 X 0.4 0 X 0 0 X 1 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X
d3 1 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 1 1 X 1 0.29 X 0 0 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 0.33 0 X
d2 X 1 1 X 0.71 0 X 0 0 X 0.57 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0.25 1 X 1 1 X 0.25 0
dl X 0 0.33 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 0 0.3 X 0.43 1 X 1 1 X 0 0 X 0 1 X 1 1
n 8 5 9 3 7 4 6 4 2 8 7 10 5 7 6 5 3 3 2 8 5 8 3 1 9 4 2
DEBILITY MATRIX
Questionable performances 
taken as unacceptable
d4 0.04 0.23 X 0.28 032 X 0.31 0.29 X 0.04 0.14 X 0.23 0.32 X 0.3 0.28 X 0.21 0.04 X 0.04 0.28 X 035 0.29 X
d3 0.22 0.3 X 0.34 0.5 X 0.48 0.45 X 0.22 0.25 X 0.3 0.43 X 0.47 0.44 X 0.36 0.22 X 0.22 0.34 X 0.42 0.45 X
d2 X 0.37 0.27 X 039 0.52 X 0.52 0.48 X 0.43 0.24 X 0.32 0.55 X 0.5 0.5 X 0.52 037 X 0.41 0.44 X 0.48 0.48
dl X 0.63 0.62 X 0.43 0.48 X 0.48 032 X 0.68 0.64 X 0.57 0.45 X 0.5 0.5 X 0.7 0.63 X 0.59 0.53 X 0.48 0.52
n 27 30 26 32 28 31 29 31 33 27 28 25 30 28 29 30 32 32 33 27 30 27 32 34 26 31 33
d4 1 0.55 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0.9 0.55 X 035 0 X 0 0 X 1 1 X 0.9 0 X 0 0 X
d3 1 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 1 1 X 1 0.4 X 0 0 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 0.4 0 X
d2 X 0.73 1 X 0.67 0 X 0 0 X 0.73 1 X 1 0 X 0 0 X 0.33 0.7 X 1 1 X 0.6 0
dl X 0 0.4 X 1 1 X 1 1 X 0 0.36 X 0.4 1 X 1 1 X 0 0 X 0 0.75 X 1 1
n 9 11 10 5 9 6 10 6 2 10 11 11 11 10 7 9 5 3 2 9 10 10 5 8 10 10 6
Questionable performances 
taken as acceptable
d4 0 0.13 X 0.30 035 X 0.36 0.31 X 0 0.13 X 0.13 0.36 X 0.35 0.3 X 0.21 0 X 0 0.3 X 036 0.36 X
d3 0.19 0.13 X 03 034 X 0.56 0.48 X 0.16 0.13 X 0.13 0.4 X 0.54 0.47 X 0.36 0.19 X 0.16 0.3 X 0.4 0.56 X
d2 X 0.33 0.24 X 0.38 0.55 X 0.55 0.48 X 0.33 0.21 X 0.24 0.57 X 0.53 0.5 X 0.5 036 X 0.37 0.3 X 0.4 0.55
dl X 0.79 0.6 X 0.38 0.45 X 0.45 0.52 X 0.79 0.63 X 0.6 0.43 X 0.47 0.5 X 0.73 0.76 X 0.63 0.48 X 0.36 0.45
n 26 ■24 25 30 26 29 25 29 33 25 24 24 24 25 28 26 30 32 33 26 25 25 30 27 25 25 29
Questionable performances 
not considered in calculations
d4 0 0.13 X 0.30 035 X 0.36 0.31 X 0 0.13 X 0.13 0.36 X 0.35 0.3 X 0.21 0 X 0 03 X 036 0.36 X
d3 0.19 0.13 X 03 034 X 0.56 0.48 X 0.16 0.13 X 0.13 0.4 X 0.54 0.47 X 0.36 0.19 X 0.16 03 X 0.4 0.56 X
d2 X 0.33 0.24 X 038 0.55 X 0.55 0.48 X 0.33 0.21 X 0.24 0.57 X 033 0.5 X 03 036 X 0.37 03 X 0.4 0.55
dl X 0.79 0.6 X 038 0.45 X 0.45 032 X 0.79 0.63 X 0.6 0.43 X 0.47 0.5 X 0.73 0.76 X 0.63 0.48 X 0.36 0.45
n 26 24 25 30 26 29 25 29 33 25 24 24 24 25 28 26 30 32 33 26 25 25 30 27 25 25 29
Table 7.15: Robustness and debility matrices under formulation 3
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7.12 Analysis of the robustness and debility matrices
In the following analysis the robustness-debility criterion (Formula 2.2 in Chapter 2) 
will be used to provide a basis for comparison of the relative flexibility of initial 
decisions.
Table 7.16 gives the value of the robustness-debility criterion (RDC) at the decision 
horizon, and Tables 7.17 to 7.19 give the values of RDC at the planning horizon for 
the three formulations about subsequent decisions. All tables consider different values 
of a, and three alternative policies for the inclusion or exclusion in the computations of 
questionable performances of the configurations. Where a=0, the values of the 
criterion represent the negative of the debility scores. Where a= l, the values of the 
criterion are the robustness scores.
Decision: d i______ Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a =0 a=0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 p ii p On a =0.8 a= 1
Q unacceptable 
Q acceptable 
Q excluded
-0.494
-0.499
-0.499
-0.242
-0.249
-0.246
0.01
0.001
0.001
0.136
0.125
0.134
0.262
0.25
0.26
0.515
0.5
0.513
0.767
0.75
0.767
Decision: d2 Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a =0 a=0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a= 0.6 a= 0.8 a= l
Q unacceptable 
Q acceptable 
Q excluded
-0.638
-0.632
-0.632
-0.427
-0.431
-0.422
-0.216
-0.229
-0.213
-0.11
-0.13
-0.11
-0.01
-0.03
-0.01
0.205
0.173
0.207
0.417
0.375
0.417
Decision: d3 Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a =0 a=0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a= 0.6 a= 0.8 a= l
Q unacceptable 
Q acceptable 
Q excluded
-0.21
-0.217
-0.217
-0.107
-0.113
-0.113
-0.004
-0.008
-0.008
0.048
0.044
0.044
0.099
0.096
0.096
0.202
0.201
0.201
0.306
0.306
0.306
Decision: d4 Robustness- debility criterion
Q performance policy a =0 a-0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a= 0.6 a= 0.8 a=l
Q unacceptable 
Q acceptable 
Q excluded
-0.168
-0.173
-0.173
-0.068
-0.071
-0.071
0.032
0.03
0.03
0.082
0.08
0.08
0.133
0.131
0.131
0.233
0.232
0.232
0.333
0.333
0.333
Table 7.16: Values of the robustness-debility criterion at the decision horizon
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Formulation 1
Decision: d i______ Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a = 0 a= 0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a  =0 .6 a= 0.8 a = l
Q unacceptable -0.553 -0.32 -0.086 0.031 0.147 0.381 0.614
Q acceptable -0.556 -0.324 -0.091 0.025 0.141 0.374 0.606
Q excluded -0.556 -0.322 -0.088 0.029 0.146 0.38 0.614
Decision: d2 Robustness- debility criterion
Q performance policy a =0 a= 0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a= 0.6 a= 0.8 a = l
Q unacceptable -0.316 -0.171 -0.026 0.047 0.119 0.264 0.409
Q acceptable -0.294 -0.154 -0.014 0.055 0.125 0.265 0.405
Q excluded -0.294 -0.154 -0.013 0.057 0.128 0.268 0.409
Decision: d3 Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a = 0 a= 0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a= 0 .6 a= 0.8 a = l
Q unacceptable -0.171 -0.085 0.00 0.043 0.086 0.172 0.258
Q acceptable -0.163 -0.079 0.004 0.046 0.088 0.171 0.255
Q excluded -0.163 -0.079 0.005 0.047 0.089 0.173 0.258
Decision: dU Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a = 0 a= 0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a= 0.6 a= 0.8 a = l
Q unacceptable -0.077 -0.035 0.007 0.027 0.048 0.09 0.132
Q acceptable -0.084 -0.042 0.00 0.021 0.042 0.084 0.126
Q excluded -0.084 -0.041 0.002 0.024 0.045 0.089 0.132
Table 7.17: Values of RDC at the planning horizon under formulation 1
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Formulation 2
Decision: di______ Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy cx=0 a= 0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a= 0.6 a= 0.8 a = l
Q unacceptable -0.553 -0.32 -0.086 0.031 0.147 0.381 0.614
Q acceptable -0.556 -0.324 -0.091 0.025 0.141 0.374 0.606
Q excluded -0.556 -0.322 -0.088 0.029 0.146 0.38 0.614
Decision: d2 Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a =0 a= 0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a= 0.6 a= 0.8 a = l
Q unacceptable -0.379 -0.218 -0.058 0.023 0.103 0.264 0.425
Q acceptable -0.355 -0.196 -0.036 0.044 0.123 0.283 0.443
Q excluded -0.355 -0.199 -0.043 0.035 0.113 0.27 0.425
Decision: d3 Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a =0 a= 0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a= 0.6 a= 0.8 GC— 1
Q unacceptable -0.307 -0.148 0.01 0.09 0.169 0.327 0.486
Q acceptable -0.282 -0.126 0.03 0.108 0.186 0.341 0.497
Q excluded -0.282 -0.129 0.025 0.102 0.178 0.332 0.486
Decision: d4 Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a =0 a= 0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a= 0.6 a= 0.8 a = l
Q unacceptable -0.169 -0.076 0.017 0.064 0.11 0.204 0.297
Q acceptable -0.174 -0.083 0.008 0.053 0.099 0.189 0.28
Q excluded -0.174 -0.08 0.014 0.062 0.109 0.203 0.297
Table 7.18: Values of RDC at the planning horizon under formulation 2
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Formulation 3
Decision: di______ Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a=0 a=0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a=0.6 a=0.8 a = l
Q unacceptable -0.553 -0.32 -0.086 0.031 0.147 0.381 0.614
Q acceptable -0.556 -0.324 -0.091 0.025 0.141 0.374 0.606
Q excluded -0.556 -0.322 -0.088 0.029 0.146 0.38 0.614
Decision: d2 Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a=0 a=0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a=0.6 a=0.8 a = l
Q unacceptable -0.433 -0.248 -0.064 0.028 0.12 0.304 0.488
Q acceptable -0.412 -0.232 -0.052 0.037 0.127 0.307 0.486
Q excluded -0.412 -0.231 -0.052 0.038 0.128 0.308 0.488
Decision: d3 Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a=0 a=0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a=0.6 a=0.8 a = l
Q unacceptable -0.357 -0.168 0.022 0.116 0.211 0.4 0.59
Q acceptable -0.333 -0.146 0.04 0.134 0.227 0.413 0.6
Q excluded -0.333 -0.148 0.036 0.129 0.221 0.405 0.59
Decision: d4 Robustness-debility criterion
Q performance policy a=0 a=0.2 a=0.4 a=0.5 a=0.6 a=0.8 a = l
Q unacceptable -0.222 -0.105 0.012 0.07 0.128 0.245 0.362
Q acceptable -0.218 -0.103 0.012 0.07 0.127 0.242 0.357
Q excluded -0.218 -0.102 0.014 0.072 0.13 0.246 0.362
Table 7.19: Values of RDC at the planning horizon under formulation 3
All four tables show that the choice of threshold does not alter the scores significantly,
i.e. the policy for the questionable performances has a negligible effect on the results. 
Table 7.16 suggests that at the decision horizon the most flexible decision is di, since it 
has by far the highest pure robustness score. From the same table it can also be 
observed that decision di "dominates" d2 since it gives consistently higher scores for 
all values of a . The same is true for 64 compared to d3. Therefore, the problem 
reduces to the selection of either di or <14.
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We will now examine the problem at the planning horizon, starting with the first 
formulation. From Table 7.17 it can be observed that if the decision maker is more 
concerned about robustness than debility, decisions di and d2 (new ward and 
expansion, respectively) seem indicated. On the other hand^if the main concern of the 
decision maker is debility, decisions d4 and d3 have the advantage. In the case of 
relative indifference between robustness and debility, the differences in the values of 
the criterion are too small to justify a clear favourite. The results for the other two 
formulations may give further clarification.
Under the second formulation, the values in Table 7.18 suggest that where robustness 
is concerned decisions di and d3 have an advantage. If low debility is the main 
concern, the decisions having an advantage are (I4 and d3. In both cases, however, d3 
has not much advantage over d2. If the decision maker wants to ensure satisfactory 
scores for both robustness and debility, decision d3 although second best at both 
extremes, offers reasonable performances at both.
Similar advantages can be observed in Table 7.19 which deals with formulation 3. In 
this case however, the robustness scores of the second best decision (d3> arc veiy close 
to those of the first one (dj), while its debility scores are about 40% lower. Moreover, 
in the case of indifference between robustness and debility, the values of the criterion 
for d3, although low, are appreciably higher than those for the other decisions. Under 
this formulation therefore, d3 seems to have a clear advantage.
Table 7.20 shows the "best" two decisions (in descending order) under each 
formulation from three viewpoints: Robustness, debility and indifference between the 
two. It must be stressed though, that in some cases the differences are too small for a 
clear favourite to emerge.
154
C h ap ter 7: T he Use o l'S R M  in P lanning for H IV /A ID S
Preference Formulation 1 Formulation 2 Formulation 3
Robustness dl, d2 di, d3 dl, d3
Debility d4, d3 d4, d3 d4, d3
Indifference d2, d3 d3, d4 d3, <U
Table 7.20: Decision ranking under the three formulations
Decision d3 is present in 8 out of 9 cells of Table 7.20; this means that this decision 
produces adequate performances under all formulations from most viewpoints. It 
could be justified, therefore, to say that as far as flexibility is concerned d3 is the 
"safest" decision.
The short term analysis (at the decision horizon) has shown that the choice is limited 
between reduction of resources or opening a new ward. These two decisions 
recommend two opposing courses of action. The explanation for this apparently 
paradoxical result lies in the different set of futures which occur in response to these 
alternative initial decisions. Each of these sets of futures excludes a proportion of 
those situations in which poor performances would occur. Consequently, both 
decisions give relatively high robustness scores.
The long-term analysis has pointed out that the safest decision is to do nothing, 
therefore opening a new ward at the moment seems rather risky. On the other hand, 
reduction of resources does not require capital investment, and can be effected 
relatively quickly when the need arises. Thus, one reasonable course of action would 
be to do nothing for the moment and repeat the analysis when more information about 
demand and possible treatments becomes available. This particular choice privileges 
the long term over the short term. Which time-scale should determine the final 
decision, however, is dependent on the particular problem situation and decision 
maker. SRM does not attempt to make a recommendation in this matter; its function is 
to identify alternative courses of action which are satisfactory in terms of preservation 
of flexibility, as a contribution to a decision making process which must also 
encompass other factors.
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7.13 Discussion
In concrete situations, flexibility will be only one of a number of considerations which 
influence the choice of initial decision. Such factors may include cost of 
implementation, short-run performance, political considerations etc. SRM, like other 
methodologies used in strategic planning is not meant to replace the decision maker's 
judgement; its aim is to complement it.
In general, SRM is a methodology to assist planning by helping to identify initial 
decisions which selectively preserve the flexibility necessary in uncertain situations. 
As such, in this case study it has pinpointed a possible initial decision which satisfies 
the flexibility considerations under a certain formulation of the problem. More 
importantly, it has helped to clarify the problem situation in a number of ways. First, 
during the course of the analysis, it became apparent that a course of action initially 
considered to be inappropriate to the problem (i.e. reduction of in-patient beds), could 
be indicated under certain future conditions. Secondly, it has provided a method to 
specify what type of information should be sought and used. Finally, it has assisted in 
structuring the information and eliciting some conclusions about the appropriate 
decision to be taken.
Perhaps the most useful aspect of SRM is the production of the robustness and debility 
matrices: rather than prescribing the ''right" solution, they form the basis of a 
discussion between the participants, and thus enhance their understanding of the 
problem situation. In this case, before the analysis, it was felt that the hospital should 
consider expanding its facilities since demand in the past has been constantly rising and 
was expected to continue to do so. What was not clear, was the effect that possible 
future treatment policies would have on the level of required resources. The 
methodology pinpointed the making of no major commitment as the most flexible 
alternative. At first sight, this came as a surprise; however, with hindsight, such a 
choice seems reasonable. Possible new treatment policies will lead to a reduction in the
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resources consumed per patient, and should a mild expansion of facilities be required 
in the future, such a commitment can be implemented as an intermediate decision. A 
recommendation for not making any major commitment could be seen by some as an 
argument for inaction. In this case, it is not so. It is an argument for delaying action 
until the right moment
It also became apparent that the threshold of acceptability/unacceptability did not have a 
significant effect on the results. This of course, may be due to the level of detail 
chosen for classifying the performances of the configurations. A less refined scale 
might have identified an effect, since the number of "intermediate’’ (questionable) 
performances would be rather high.
The results of the analysis are dependent on the assumptions made at the outset. 
Changes in these assumptions could result in different recommendations. For 
example, we have taken the level of change in the contracts to be around 2 0 %. 
Sensitivity analysis on this dimension might identify different solutions. Since, 
however, this is not a "live" application, and the 20% figure is arbitrary, the value of 
the analysis of other arbitrary figures would be questionable. In a real-life problem, 
though, where realistic alternative assumptions can be made, such sensitivity analyses 
are essential to establish credibility of the results of SRM.
This example is a simplification of a real problem. In a realistic problem, however, it 
is broad directions of action rather than detailed specifications which are sought. In 
this light, SRM seems to have an advantage over the laying out and exploration of 
complex and detailed plans. It provides valuable clarification and sets the direction to 
which actions should be focused.
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CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUDING REMARKS
8.1 Summary
This thesis has introduced a new methodology, Scenario-Robustness Methodology 
(SRM), for planning under uncertainty. SRM is particularly relevant under conditions 
of uncertainty when a set of initial decisions is being considered by the planners. It 
gives a measure of the useful flexibility retained after an initial commitment is made, 
and thus provides a guide to the selection of the appropriate initial decision. 
Furthermore, by requiring the explicit statement of the available options and the 
evaluation of their consequences, it provides useful clarification of the problem 
situation and points out areas where more information should be obtained or further 
research is required. SRM uses the principles of robustness analysis but differs from it 
in two aspects: one, in contrast to robustness analysis, SRM offers a formal procedure 
to generate alternative futures, and two, SRM considers implications for both the short 
and long term. The field of application of the methodology is theoretically very wide, 
but it could be of particular interest in cases of strategic planning, as it incorporates 
elements of scenario analysis, an approach extensively used in such situations. To 
illustrate the wide applicability of the methodology, an AIDS-related resource allocation 
case study has been presented.
In Chapter 2 the issue of planning under uncertainty was discussed. First, the notion 
of uncertainty was examined, and several classifications of uncertainty were given. 
Then both the form and content of planning were discussed. An examination of the 
three main positions revealed the weaknesses of both rational comprehensive planning 
and disjointed incrementalism in handling uncertainty, and we argued that mixed 
scanning is the most promising alternative. (Indeed, the method for planning under 
uncertainty proposed in Chapter 4 can best be seen as an example of the mixed
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scanning approach). Then the elements of an alternative methodology suitable for 
planning under conditions of uncertainty were presented. A short introduction to 
existing methodologies which feature these required elements was presented, with 
particular emphasis on metagames and robustness analysis. At the end of the chapter a 
number of different criteria to interpret and summarize the elements of the robustness 
matrix were introduced. It was concluded that the Robustness-Debility Criterion is the 
most appropriate.-
Chapter 3 explored the issue of flexibility. Definitions of flexibility were discussed as 
well as the relationship of robustness and flexibility. We argued that flexibility is a 
quality which should be preserved when planning under uncertainty, and that 
robustness is a measure of flexibility.
Scenario-Robustness Methodology (SRM) was presented in Chapter 4, following a 
discussion of scenario analysis. The methodology involves the construction of 
plausible futures for both the medium and long term. In the case of the long term such 
construction constitutes scenario analysis. Then, robustness analysis for both the 
medium and long term is conducted.
In Chapter 5 several alternative measures were developed which can be used to 
quantify the uncertainty of a situation when a number of initial decisions are under 
consideration and a number of scenarios about the future are available. It was argued 
that Kendall's coefficient of concordance W is the most appropriate of these measures, 
since it is the only one which can handle cases where more than two scenarios exist
In order to proceed to demonstrate the application of SRM to an HIV/AIDS-related 
resource allocation problem in Chapter 7, some background information on the nature 
of AIDS and the associated planning problems was given in Chapter 6. In the same 
chapter an introduction to AIDSPLAN, a decision support tool for planning HIV/AIDS 
related services, was provided. A detailed description of AIDSPLAN together with 
information on its development is given in Appendix I.
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Finally, in Chapter 7 SRM was illustrated by application to a hypothetical AIDS-related 
planning situation. The decision maker in this case is a hospital facing a number of 
alternative possible investment commitments. The way in which SRM can be used to 
identify an appropriate course of action was demonstrated. In that chapter we also 
measured the uncertainty present in the problem situation using the coefficient of 
concordance, concluding that the situation is indeed highly uncertain, and therefore the 
application of SRM was justified.
8.2 Further research
There are a number of issues discussed in this work which could offer interesting 
starting points for further research. The principal ones are listed below.
1. SRM is a new methodology, and as such it has not yet been applied in practice, 
except as described in Chapter 7. It would be interesting, therefore, to apply the 
methodology to other real problems. Feedback from clients could offer opportunities 
for further development or enhancement of SRM’s component parts.
2. During the analysis in Chapter 7, it became clear that conducting robustness analysis 
for large problems (and the majority of realistic applications could be classified as such) 
would become substantially easier if a piece of software was available, to calculate 
robustness scores and produce the robustness matrix. Computation times would be 
reduced significantly, and thus the analysts could concentrate their efforts on 
experimenting with alternative assumptions about the acceptability thresholds, the 
attainability of configurations from initial decisions, etc. The development of such 
software is currently being undertaken by researchers at the London School of 
Economics [Wong 1993].
Currently there are a number of software tools available for producing scenarios. A 
discussion of their relative merits is given by Lewis [1994]. These tools, however, use 
simulation, mathematical models, and even assign probabilities for the relative
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likelihood of the occurrence of certain events, and consequendy are inappropriate for 
use towards conducting SRM analysis. Therefore, any future software for generating 
scenarios for use by SRM will need to be relatively simple, non-mathematical and 
certainly non-probabilistic. Its output will provide inputs for the robustness part of the 
analysis.
3. The Robustness-Debility Criterion has been proposed as the most appropriate way 
to summarize the information contained both in the robustness and debility matrices. 
However, there may be scope for the development of more such criteria. For example, 
multi-temporal robustness criteria, will be able to combine the information from both 
the short and long term analysis, by combining robustness (and debility) scores on 
different time frames.
4. Finally, the development of a measure for the prevalent uncertainty about the future 
(the coefficient of concordance) is a very useful by-product of this work. However, as 
shown in Chapter 2, uncertainty can be characterized in other ways than high and low. 
Further work in this area will help to identify forms of analysis appropriate to each 
category of uncertainty.
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APPENDIX I 
AIDSPLAN: TIIE AIDS PLANNING MODEL
AI.l Introduction
This Appendix describes the structure of AIDSPLAN, as well as the development of 
the model for the specific context of Parkside Health Authority. The following section 
gives some background information on the development of the model. Section AI.3 
gives a model overview, whereas section AI.4 describes the formulation of the model 
for Parkside. Finally, section AI.5 gives a list of the possible uses of the model. The 
account given in this appendix draws significantly from previously published work on 
AIDSPLAN [Rosenhead et al. 1989, Rizakou et al. 1991].
AI.2 Background
The development of AIDSPLAN was a joint effort of the department of Operational 
Research at the London School of Economics (LSE) and the Operational Research 
Service (ORS) of the Department of Health. When LSE first became involved in 
AIDS/HIV-related issues, the characteristics of the AIDS planning problem had also 
been identified by ORS. ORS had previously developed a model to support the 
planning of long term care provision for elderly people [Bowen and Forte 1987] and it 
recognised that elements of the approach could be adapted for planning services for 
people with HIV/AIDS. Extensive discussions with health service managers and 
community physicians revealed that the major areas of concern were 
-to develop estimates of future local prevalence 
-to assess the service and cost implications.
The model subsequently developed was implemented as a customised spreadsheet 
system (using Lotus Symphony software) running on industry-standard 
microcomputers, to allow widest possible dissemination.
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In the meantime, LSE had already made contact with Parkside Health Authority, which 
agreed to fund the development of a planning model similar in structure to that 
proposed by ORS. It was decided to link the two projects. The work was conducted 
over a period of one year from autumn 1988 to autumn 1989.
Parkside is no longer a District Health Authority on its own. It is now part of the 
^Kensington Chelsea and Westminster Health Authority. At the time of the 
development of AIDSPLAN, Parkside was a health district formed out of the merger in 
the summer of 1988 of the two former districts of Paddington and North Kensington, 
and Brent. It occupied some 28 square miles of London, and about 377,000 people 
lived then within its boundaries.
The principal hospital within Parkside was St. Mary's, an internationally renowned 
teaching hospital. Significantly for our purposes, clinicians within it had been among 
the first to face up to the challenge of caring for patients with AIDS. At the time, it was 
one of the three main London centres for treating AIDS patients (and the disease was in 
Britain initially largely confined to the London area). People with AIDS came to be 
treated at St. Mary's from all over the country, and even abroad. Although its 
percentage of the national total has now declined somewhat from its peak, in 1988 
Parkside was treating about 160 AIDS patients, some 17.5% of the national total. A 
further 855 HIV+ patients who had not yet developed AIDS were also on the books. 
In 1992, these figures had increased to 350 and 1219 respectively.
The purpose for which the model was developed is as a decision support tool to help in 
predicting the call on hospital- and community-based services by persons with HIV or 
AIDS treated in Parkside. It is designed to provide answers to what if... type of 
questions - that is, it can be used to explore the consequences of alternative strategies or 
investments in resources, for particular assumptions about uncontrollable and 
unpredictable factors. This permits the analysis of likely overload, of possible need for 
further resources, and of flexibility to meet future uncertainties, corresponding to any
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given strategy. The model enables calculations to be made of the possible utilisation of 
resources with corresponding itemised costs.
Evidently, future demand on services is influenced by a wide variety of factors, many 
of which are inherently uncertain. The strength of these uncertainties indicated a need 
to restrict the time focus of the model to a period no more than two to five years ahead. 
It also militated against any attempt to estimate a single "most likely" demand on 
resources in any particular future year. Instead, it seemed more appropriate to produce 
a system which would enable repeated forward predictions of demand to be made 
without undue effort for any future combinations of factors which might prove to be of 
interest. This requirement could be best met by a computer-based model, and the 
existence of a range of possible users suggested that a micro-computer be used for 
portability and accessibility.
AI.3 Model overview
Conceptually, AIDSPLAN can be thought of as two sub-models. In the first, current 
. data on the patient workload are fed into the model to produce estimates of future 
patient numbers by patient categories. These numbers in turn form the input to the 
second sub-model, where costed care options are specified for each patient category.
Estimates of the costs and resources required to treat these numbers of patients by the 
identified care options are then calculated, and can be aggregated by hospital budget 
head or other (external) agency. The system incorporates graphics and printing 
facilities to produce concise reports of the results for easy reference. Figure AI.l 
provides an overview of the model and the relationship between its two sub-models.
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Figure AL 1: Model overview
Al.3.1 Population sub-model
AIDSPLAN starts with a range of national forecasts of AIDS prevalence which are 
based on the Day Report estimates [PHLS 1990]. These are entered as three separate 
forecasts - Low, Medium, High - from which the forecast to be used in the current 
planning scenario can then be selected. This forecast is disaggregated based on local 
data to give a 5 year local forecast by 4 major sub-groups. These sub-groups are then 
further analysed into a maximum of 14 detailed patient categories for which care 
options can be entered. However, the model offers a facility to override the forecasts, 
and enter manually any required estimates of population category size.
The analysis is based on a division of patients into categories which, for planning 
purposes, can be considered relatively homogeneous in their demand for services. This 
classification must enable the model to distinguish between types of patients making
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significantly different demands for service (but without being so fine-grained as to 
overstrain the limited data available for calibration). The criteria which can be used for 
such a classification include clinical state, possible drug use, age, dependency, and 
housing situation. Evidently, patients who are at different stages of the disease, or 
homeless, or who are children, will have different care requirements. There is also 
evidence to suggest that drug users are "difficult" patients: they take up more 
counselling time, and due to .their generally poor health are more prone to infections. 
Another relevant factor is that patients who have some kind of informal support may 
make different demands on services from those who do not. For example, a patient 
who has a carer at home may take up less community nursing time. The categories 
actually used in the Parkside Model are described in section AI.3.1 later.
Al.3.2 Care options sub-model
The model requires that for each of the categories, appropriate care options are 
identified. Either a single, or multiple alternative care options can be specified for a 
given patient category. A care option is a costed combination of Health or Local 
Authority or other agency’s service inputs which constitutes a clinically acceptable 
method of treating or supporting a member of the client group.
A care option is defined in terms of the basic resources needed to supply appropriate 
care and treatment The user may either use the list of resources provided in the model 
as it stands, or may change it according to his or her special interests. For example, 
certain resources could be grouped together under a single heading, giving scope for 
others to be disaggregated into their components. Up to 32 different resources can be 
accommodated in the model. Once a list of such resources has been established, any 
given care option can be expressed as a particular combination of resources from the 
list in specified amounts. Figure AI.2 gives a simplified example of care option 
construction. The details of the care options developed for Parkside are described in 
section AI.3.4.
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Category: AIDS, Supportive home environment
Resource Care Option 1 Care Option 2 Care Option 3 Care Option 4
In-patient (acute) x X
Out-patient X X
Home care team X X
District nurse X
Therapist X X
Drugs x X X X
etc.
Figure AI.2: A simplified care option
AI.3.3 Model output
For any particular assumptions made about future demand, AIDSPLAN computes the 
resource and cost consequences of the identified care strategy. The results section of 
the menu gives various displays which summarise at different levels the effect of the 
input assumptions, and so allows the user to identify where further analysis may be 
needed. The print options on the menu allow the printing of various reports from the 
model such as population forecasts, details of resources and their units, allocations to 
care options for all patient categories, as well as results summaries.
AI.4 Formulation of the model for Parkside
The process of specifying the model involved accessing available data on the resources 
devoted to persons with HIV/AIDS, and also tapping the judgment of those with a wide 
variety of specialist knowledge. Cooperation was received from a very large number of 
people, including not only those working within Parkside, but also many from outside 
with relevant additional expertise, or whose agencies provide services complementary 
to those of the Authority. A Project Steering Group was established to provide 
guidance and liaison for the project.
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Developing the model was an iterative process involving exposing the incomplete 
model at a number of different stages to potential users, with either clinical, 
management or planning responsibilities. This was to ensure both that its contents 
were consistent with their knowledge of Parkside and of the nature of HIV/AIDS and 
its treatment, and also that the level of detail incorporated was appropriate to their 
needs.
This process of interaction produced significant changes in the model. For example, 
the number of patient categories was reduced successively from 19 to 14 (and this latter 
number in fact incorporates some distinctions not present in the original version). 
These reductions - with consequent combination of categories - were made for a variety 
of reasons: low numerical significance of the category, lack of difference in treatment, 
difficulty in defining the category operationally. While the current set of patient 
categories was accepted as reasonable by the project steering group and by those others 
we have consulted, it should not be regarded as definitive.
To make the model operational it was necessary to specify:
(i) the type of patient category classification to be used;
(ii) the resources needed to construct care options, together with units of measurement;
(iii) care options for each patient category, made up of specified quantities of the input 
resources;
(iv) costs of each resource.
The relations between these tasks are shown in Figure AI.3
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I D E N T I F Y  R E S O U R C E S  A N D  
U N I T S  O F  M E A S U R E M E N T
C O S T I N G
I N F O R M A T I O N
I D E N T I F Y  
C A T E G O R I E S  
O F  P A T I E N T S
I D E N T I F Y  C A R E  O P T I O N S  
F O R  E A C H  C A T E G O R Y
S P E C I F Y  
C O S T E D  
C A R E  O P T I O N S
Figure AI.3: Research tasks
Specifying the model for use in Parkside involved accessing a wide range of databases, 
information, expertise and informed opinion.
The sources of data used to develop dependency categories were:
-ward books
-the patient administration service data base 
-questionnaires sent to senior house officers 
-out-patient records 
-records of the drug dependency unit
-press releases issued by the national Communicable Diseases Surveillance Centre
The sources of data used to identify care options were:
-the patient administration service data base 
-in-patient and out-patient medical records
-costings from the Parkside finance department and elsewhere in the UK
-other relevant literature [Bebbington and Warren 1988; Rees et al 1988; Rees 1989]
We also used the judgments of:
-medical and nursing staff
-administrative staff in the Authority's planning and finance departments
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-general practitioners
-local authority staff
-workers in voluntary agencies.
These information flows together with the research tasks are indicated in Figure AI.4
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Figure AI.4: Tasks and information flows
Each of the four tasks, with some explanation of the more significant decisions which 
have shaped the development of AIDSPLAJN, will now be described in turn.
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Al.4.1 Patient categories
After extensive discussions, a set of fourteen patient categories were agreed as 
appropriate for use in Parkside. These are displayed graphically in Figure AI.5. 
Factors affecting this choice of categories included the current or anticipated numerical 
size of the category, the relative significance of resource inputs to different types of 
patients, and the way in which data was collected in Parkside. - __
h o m e  +  s u p p o r t  
h o m e  n o  s u p p o r t  _ J
n o  h o m e
I  D U
h o m e  +  s u p p o r t
h o m e  n o  s u p p o r t
n o  h o m e
N O N
I D U
n o  p a r e n t s
p a r e n t s
C H I L D A I D S
A I D SH I V +  A s y m p t o m a t i c  
a n d  P G L  1
H I V +  
A s y m p l  
a n d
i t o m a t i c A R C
A R C
H I V +  
A s y m p t o m a t i c  
a n d  P G L  2
A I D SA R C
Figure AI.5: Patient categories
It is evident that this is not the the only classification of HIV/AIDS patients which could 
be made. For example, other health status characteristics (for example, haemophilia) 
could well be included, while others might be omitted. There is no difficulty in 
principle in modifying the categories displayed in Figure AI.5. However, further data 
collection and analysis would then be necessary to specify corresponding care options.
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AI.4.2 Resources
Twenty eight resources were identified as contributing actually or potentially to the care 
and treatment of HIV/AIDS patients in Parkside. These resources are listed in Figure 
AI.6 and have been grouped by agency, or (within Parkside) budget heading through 
which they are provided. Within Parkside, the majority of resources were hospital- 
rather than community-based. Other organisations which provided complementary 
services without which extra call on Parkside resources would have been generated 
included local authorities, family practitioner committees, and voluntary agencies. 
However, for reasons of data availability and managerial relevance, the resources 
provided by these agencies were treated less fully than those provided by Parkside.
AGENCY RESOURCE UNITS
Hospital IP STAYS DAYS
Hospital DIRECT NURSING HRS
Hospital MEDICAL STAFF-DIRECT SESSIONS
Hospital OTHER MEDICAL STAFF SESSIONS
Hospital COUNSELLING HRS
Hospital THERAPY (PHYSIO./OCCUP.) HRS
Hospital INVESTIGATIONS/ TESTS NUMBER
Hospital SURGERY NUMBER
Hospital DRUGS £s
Hospital OTHER TREATMENTS NO.
Community HOME SUPPORT TEAM HRS
Community COMMUNITY NURSES HRS
Community CHILD SERVICES HRS
Community COMMUNITY DAY CARE HRS
Community TRANSPORT TRIPS
Community HOSPICE CARE DAYS
L. authority DOMESTIC CARE HRS
L. authority SOCIAL WORKER HRS
L. authority HOUSING £s
L. authority LIVING AIDS £s
L. authority FOSTERING/ADOPTION £s
L. authority OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY HRS
L. authority DAY CARE-ADULT DAYS
L. authority DAY CARE-CHILD DAYS
FHSA GP/PRIMARY CARE TEAM HRS
FHSA DRUGS £s
Voluntary HOSPICE BED DAYS
Voluntary VOLUNTARY SUPPORT HRS
Figure A1.6: List of resources
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Resources could be identified at other levels of detail than that of the list in Figure AI.6 . 
For example, different grades of nursing or medical staff could be included, 
investigations could be separated from tests, different tasks of community nurses or 
counsellors could be distinguished, etc. However, the level of detail in any listing of 
resources must correspond to the intended use of the model. The level incorporated in 
the current version of AIDSPLAN was that appropriate to a managerial use of the 
model for strategic planning purposes - it was designed to aid discussion about 
acquisition of resources, rather than to assist in detailed operational deployment of 
resources. Other versions could in principle be developed to help with the latter task. 
However, this would entail a considerable task of data collection and analysis; further 
system programming work; an increase in computer memory requirement; and 
appreciable problems for managers in manipulating and comprehending resource lists 
an order of magnitude larger than will fit on a monitor screen. Disaggregation should 
therefore be developed selectively, for such sectors of resource as prove in use to be 
particularly sensitive - for example, as potential future bottlenecks.
Al.4.3 Costings
Data provided by the Parkside Finance Department was invaluable in attributing costs to 
units of resource falling under the Authority's control. However, cost figures were 
obtained from a range of sources, and further processing was necessary to make them 
consistent and directly relevant to the model format
In general, costing was based on the average number of contact hours members of staff 
have with their clients. This was necessary because AIDSPLAN is built on resource 
consumption per client. Thus, for example, for occupational therapists who are 
contracted to work 37 hours per week, it would have been quite misleading to cost one 
hour spent with a client at one thirty-seventh of the total weekly cost of the therapist. 
We were advised that occupational therapists are in contact with clients for 25 hours per
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week, and this figure was used to calculate the hourly cost (Clearly, exceptions to this 
rule occur in cases where staff are available to provide care for the duration of their 
contracted hours.) Similar arguments were used for other resources - for example bed- 
days numbers needed to be adjusted for bed occupancy rates in order to convert into 
required beds.
For staffing, costs were based on gross annual cost; average costs were employed 
where different staff grades or varying pay scales are involved in the delivery of care. 
Costs for investigations, tests, drugs etc. were based on information provided by the 
relevant departments within the hospital. In cases where current or historical costs 
could not easily be obtained, it was sometimes possible to produce estimates from the 
cost of an equivalent service elsewhere, or from literature sources with adjustments for 
inflation as appropriate. In the case of the voluntary sector, the costs have been based 
on the grant allowance for the provision of a service, for example hospice beds, or on 
the cost of providing the equivalent service within the statutory sector.
Since administrative costs, grants provided to the voluntary sector by Parkside, 
research expenditure, overheads, etc. are not directly related to patient numbers, they 
were not accounted for in the care options, but were aggregated elsewhere in the model.
AI.4.4 Care options
Constructing care options for the different categories of HIV/AIDS patients proved to 
be the most complex and taxing of the tasks involved in operationalising AIDSPLAN. 
This necessitated the estimation of the average number of units of each resource 
consumed annually in the delivery of service to a patient in the given category.
Hard information based on hospital activity levels was not always available; even where 
it had been collected it was frequently not in easily accessible form. Often it proved 
necessary to supplement such objective information with the judgmental estimates of 
those with the most relevant experience. Thus, outpatient records revealed that AIDS
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patients were seen by the respiratory nurse on average four times per year; to convert 
this into usable form we obtained from the nurse an estimate that the average duration 
of a visit was approximately half an hour. Similarly, we were able to adjust the 
inpatient stay component of the care option for AIDS patients without a home (relative 
to those with a home); this was achieved by obtaining a consultant's estimate of the 
delay in discharge procedures which lack of a home typically produces. In other cases, 
was made of results produced by other researchers in the field [Bebbington and Warren 
1988; Rees et al. 1988].
When specifying care options for use in Parkside it proved necessary to reduce the 
original number of categories. The omitted categories were those for children, and 
those which distinguish patients with and without informal support The omission of 
child categories was due to lack both of information and of extensive experience on 
which to form quantitative judgments. There were no documented statistics available 
on the number of children with HIV/AIDS being treated in Parkside, due to 
confidentiality restrictions imposed by the Child Protection Act. However, the number 
was certainly small, so that the exclusion of these categories from the current set of care 
options will not have had significant cost and resource repercussions. Nevertheless, 
given the growth of the epidemic among the heterosexual population it is to be expected 
that the numbers in the child categories will increase. Therefore, it is anticipated that 
the model may be extended by establishing care options for these categories in due 
course.
Similarly, lack of reliable data or other information sources made it infeasible to 
establish care options which distinguish between the resource demands of people with 
or without informal support.
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AI.5 The uses of the model
The model is designed as a decision support tool capable of being used by Parkside (or 
elsewhere) to explore the future of its services for people with HIV/AIDS. It can be 
used to estimate the consequences of alternative future trajectories of the epidemic, both 
in aggregate, and in terms of the balance between different risk groups. And it can be 
employed to examine the resource implications of possible modifications to models of 
care, innovations in drug treatment, or changes in policy or service provision.
The model was developed at a level of detail appropriate for use to support planning at a 
strategic level. It provides comprehensive coverage of the services provided by 
Parkside, and related services provided by other agencies. The model in the form in 
which it was employed in the research related to this thesis can be used to indicate 
broadly advantageous directions for policy on HIV/AIDS-related services. It can also 
be adapted, by selective enhancement of detail in the relevant resource sector, to 
provide a useful tool at resource level also. In the short run, however, the most likely 
clients for the model are those within a health authority, or comparable body, v/ho have 
particular responsibilities for, or direct interest in, the direction of strategy for 
HIV/AIDS services.
Many of the future uses and developments of the model will emerge from the ongoing 
concerns of those who use the model. However, some particular ways of using the 
model are suggested.
(a) Sensitivity analysis. AIDSPLAN necessarily incorporates a range of judgments 
and assumptions. Where these are regarded as open to question, the model can be run 
with contrasting formulations. This "sensitivity analysis" permits the identification of 
which assumptions are critical to decisions and which are relatively insensitive. This 
focuses attention selectively on what are the key uncertainties which require urgent
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investigation, possibly involving further use of AIDSPLAN, and which issues can be 
at least temporarily deferred.
(b) Policy analysis. AIDSPLAN can be used tojexplore the resource implications of a 
wide variety of impending decisions or possible policy changes. For example issues 
confronting Parkside at the time when AIDSPLAN was under development which 
suggested themselves included: strategies for the diversion of people with HIV/AIDS to 
other centres of expertise, the transfer of the responsibility for the Home Support Team 
(a team of nurses who facilitated the transition of hospital patients to the community), 
and the adoption of a community care strategy. The implications of possible changes in 
care options for particular patient categories could also be explored - such as the 
consequences of more General Practitioner involvement in the care of HIV/AIDS 
patients. Other alternative "models of care" could also be developed, for example based 
on care delivery in other specialist Districts. AIDSPLAN could be further used to 
justify bids for funds for HIV/AIDS-related services, or to support joint planning with 
other agencies.
An example of policy analysis using is given by Rizakou et al [1991] demonstrated that 
despite the expected rise in patient numbers, an increase in AIDS beds could be 
avoided, provided the need for hospitalisation could be reduced through better support 
in the community and greater expertise in the treatment of AIDS patients.
(c) Scenario analysis. The resource implications of many of the possible decisions and 
practices in (b) above necessarily depended in part on uncertain factors outside the 
control of any health service agency. Such uncertainties include - the future numbers in 
different patient groups, the availability of prophylactic or alternative drug treatments 
(and their timing), the continuation of priority funding etc. Uncertainties current at the 
time AIDSPLAN was developed include the potential extension of AZT to classes of 
asymptomatic patients, the possibility of reduced dosage, and of use in conjunction 
with other drugs still at an experimental stage, but likely to become widely available
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within the next few years. The resource implications of different scenarios involving 
prescription of AZT to asymptomatic patients are explored in Rizakou et al.[ 1991J, 
where it was shown that the total cost for drugs could increase by almost 50% if half of 
the asymptomatic patients were to receive AZT.
AIDSPLAN can be used to devise interim "commitment packages" of decisions which 
avoid overcommitment to policies based on just one reading of the future; to identify 
potential resource bottlenecks where relaxation would most enhance future flexibility; 
and to construct action trigger points to ensure that resource commitments are not made 
sooner (or later) than they should be.
The manager responsible for HIV/AIDS planning in Parkside in 1991 [quoted in 
Rizakou et al. 1991] summarised the advantages of AIDSPLAN as follows:
"AIDSPLAN is proving to be a useful tool for testing out different approaches 
to how we provide treatment and care to this growing care group. Of particular 
note is the ability of the model to provide tailored local projections for newly 
diagnosed people with AIDS and the ease with which this information can be 
processed with regard to the care groups constructed.
In an area of such uncertainty it is imperative that health care planners are able 
to respond to the urgent pressures to provide new services in a way which is 
both appropriate and effective. The quick and easy "what if" function afforded 
by AIDSPLAN allows the ideas and views of clinicians, managers and users 
of the service to be considered. This is particularly valuable at a time when 
there is greater emphasis than ever in the National Health Service to improve 
the quality of services to consumers."
1 8 0
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APPENDIX II
CALCULATION OF THE SIMILARITY COEFFICIENTS
This Appendix gives details of the calculations of the cluster analysis similarity 
coefficients for the ten hypothetical cases described in Section 5.2. The calculations 
for cases 1 and 2 will be presented in detail. The values of the coefficients for the 
other eight cases are calculated in a similar way.
The formulae for the six coefficients are:
Coefficient (i): (a + d)/(a+b+c+d)
Coefficient (ii): a/(a+b+c)
Coefficient (iii): 2a/(2a+b+c)
Coefficient (iv): 2(a+d)/[2(a+d)+b+c]
Coefficient (v): a/[a+2(b+c)]
Coefficient (vi): a/(a+b+c+d)
The scale of qualitative measurements of the performance of each future (V, G, F, P, 
C) can be seen as the five binary variables on which the variates (decisions) are 
measured as shown in Figure AII.1.
V 1 0 0 0 0
G 0 1 0 0 0
F 0 0 1 0 0
P 0 0 0 1 0
C 0 0 0 0 1
Figure AII.1: Binary coding of performance scale 
Each of the cases of Figure 5.4 can be expressed in terms of these five binary 
variables, in a way similar to that shown in Figure 5.2. For example, cases 1 and 2 of 
Figure 5.4 which are:
di d2 <b d4
Cl
C2
V G F P
V G F P
di d2 d3 d4
Ci
c2
V G F P
G F P C
Case 1 Case 2
can be transformed to:
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d i  d 2  d3 d 4
V G F p c V G F P c V G F P c V G F p c
Cl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
c 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Case 1
di d2 d3 64
V G F p c V G F P C V G F p c V G F p c
Cl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Case 2
The six alternative coefficients can now be calculated. In the formulae for the 
coefficients, "a" represents the number of positive matches (two l ’s in the columns of 
the tables above), "b" and "c" the number of the mismatches (0/ 1, and 1/0 , 
respectively), and "d" the number of negative matches (two zeros).
Thus, for case 1: a = 4, b = 0, c = 0, d = 16
and for case 2: a = 0, b = 4, c = 4, d = 12
Therefore, the values of the six coefficients for case 1 are:
Coefficient (i): (a + d)/(a+b+c+d) = (4+16)/(4+0+0+16) = 1
Coefficient (ii): a/(a+b+c) = 4/(4+0+0) = 1
Coefficient (iii): 2a/(2a+b+c) = 2*4/(2*4+0+0) = 1
Coefficient (iv): 2(a+d)/[2(a+d)+b+c] = 2(4+16)/[2(4+16)+0+0] = 1
Coefficient (v): a/[a+2(b+c)] = 4/[4+2(0+0)] = 1
Coefficient (vi): a/(a+b+c+d) = 4/(4+0+0+16) = 0.2
Similarly, the values of the six coefficients for case 2 are:
Coefficient (i): (a + d)/(a+b+c+d) = (0+12)/(0+4+4+12) = 0.6
Coefficient (ii): a/(a+b+c) = 0/(0+4+4) = 0
Coefficient (iii): 2a/(2a+b+c) = 2*0/(2*0+4+4) = 0
Coefficient (iv): 2(a+d)/[2(a+d)+b+c] = 2(0+12)/[(2(0+12)+4+4] = 0.75
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Coefficient (v): a/[a+2(b+c)] = 0/[0+2(4+4)] = 0 
Coefficient (vi): a/(a+b+c+d) = 0/(0+4+4+12) = 0
The values of the coefficients for the other eight cases are computed in a similar way. 
The results are recorded in Table 5.2 in Chapter 5.
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